US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6846

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, TU, AJ, AM, GG, KZ, RS 
SUBJECT: NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA 
 
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 7044 
 
     B. ANKARA 6768 
 
Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett 
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) During Nov. 8 Caucasus Working Group discussions, the 
U.S. and Turkey shared assessments of the strategic situation 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  The U.S. side briefed on 
the Caspian Guard program, and urged the Turks to 
participate in the upgrade of Nasosnaya Airbase in 
Azerbaijan, to host a Marshall Center conference on enhancing 
Azeri-Kazakh security cooperation, and to participate in the 
South Caucasus Clearinghouse.  Turkey requested the U.S. 
coordinate more closely on equipment transfers.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) On November 8, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) hosted 
bilateral Caucasus Working Group talks in Ankara.  The U.S. 
delegation was led by OSD Principal Director for Eurasia 
Scott Schless.  Turkey was represented by TGS J5 Chief of 
Strategy and Force Planning MG Serdar Savas.  Unlike the last 
CWG meeting in Dec. 2004, the Turkish MFA was represented. 
Schless and Savas agreed that Turkish and U.S. interests and 
policies in the region remain quite close, and that 
senior-level dialogue on the Caucasus and Central Asia should 
continue. 
 
3. (C) In his opening statement, MG Savas expressed concern 
that weak economies in the Caucasus and Central Asia make it 
that much harder to solve regional problems.  Additionally, 
Central Asian countries are vulnerable to Islamic extremism, 
and Georgia faces a special threat from infiltrating Chechen 
terrorists.  According to Savas, security for energy projects 
(such as the BTC pipeline) is "essential."  He added the (for 
Turkey, obligatory) point that Armenian genocide claims hurt 
Turkey-Armenia relations, and "hurt our efforts to bring 
peace to the region." 
 
4. (C) Schless noted that since the first CWG in 1999, it has 
become even clearer that Turkey and the U.S. share many 
common policy objectives in the region.  Additionally, Turkey 
and the U.S. are the two countries most active and involved 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  The U.S. remains most 
concerned about the Russian role in the region, energy 
security, and frozen conflicts.  Schless noted that 
Azerbaijan is a "country of priority" for OSD; for its part, 
Georgia is eager to join the Alliance, and the U.S. wants to 
assist the GOG to be in the best position when it comes time 
for NATO to make future enlargement decisions. 
 
Assessment of the Region 
------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Schless pointed out that the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict keeps the U.S. from fully realizing full cooperation 
with Azerbaijan.  Despite the Minsk Group's best efforts, we 
have been unsuccessful in solving the dispute to date.  That 
said, the two presidents met in May and August and reached 
agreement on some issues.  Schless added that Turkey -- with 
its uniquely close relationship to Azerbaijan -- may be able 
help move the process along.  Additionally, the prospect of 
opening Turkey's border with Armenia might give Yerevan an 
incentive to be more flexible in making a deal. 
 
6. (C) Savas responded emotionally to this subject: he 
averred that 1.3 million Azeris have been displaced and still 
face a desperate situation.  "This (situation) is not frozen 
for them," he stated.  He noted that U.S. policy toward the 
region stressed democratization, human rights, free markets, 
and not changing borders by force, and asked that this 
standard be applied to Armenia as well.  The MFA 
representative, Department Head for the Caucasus Suleyman 
Gokce, took a more positive approach, urging that we take 
advantage of the window of opportunity from now until 
Armenian elections in early 2007.  He added that the onus is 
now on Armenia to act responsibly. 
 
7. (C) Turning to Russia's role in the region, Savas believed 
that Moscow had been hurt by the popular revolutions in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; in turn, this might compel 
the Russians to be more realistic in dealing with 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Turkey seeks to help the countries in the 
 
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region be fully independent.  Given both Russian and Iranian 
designs in the region, this is critically important. 
However, Savas added, the very fact that these countries' 
militaries use Russian equipment is just one example of how 
hard it is to break Russian influence.  Schless replied that 
we share Turkey's view: Establishing fully independent 
nations in this region is at the heart of U.S. policy. 
 
8. (C) Turning to Georgia, Schless reviewed President 
Saakashvili's proposal for the international community to 
help solve the South Ossetia conflict.  The United States is 
concerned that events there could spin out of control, for 
example the "independence day" celebrations and the 
subsequent mortar firings on Sept. 20.  He noted that the USG 
urged the OSCE to take an active role to reduce tensions. 
 
9. (C) MFA's Gokce noted the Oct. 8 Georgian parliamentary 
resolution asking the GOG to "take all necessary steps" to 
engage with all parties to solve South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
and expressed concern that such a move might provoke the 
Russians.  Gokce said that the GOT had advised the GOG not to 
provoke Moscow unnecessarily.  Schless added that the main 
U.S. message has been the need to settle these issues 
peacefully.  While the U.S. has counseled the Georgians not 
to be impulsive, putting some pressure on Russia "is not 
necessarily a bad thing."  The Turkish delegation noted that 
while Turkey wanted to assist Georgia's military, the GOT 
hoped the GOG would not use the military to solve its 
internal problems.  Schless agreed: The main goal in building 
up Georgia's military was for it to play a useful role in 
international coalitions. 
 
10. (C) Schless characterized Abkhazia as "the most frozen" 
of the regional conflicts, especially given the extent of 
Russian interference.  Unfortunately, Russia has not been 
able to move away from a "zero sum" mentality and understand 
how stable border areas are in its own best interest.  For 
its part, Georgia must find a way to attract local support in 
the area.  Savas agreed.  (NOTE: We reported ref b on Senior 
Adviser for Eurasia Mann's meetings with Turkish MFA 
officials the same day on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
Caspian Guard 
------------- 
 
11. (C) EUCOM Azerbaijan Desk Officer LTC Scott Sweetser 
briefed the Caspian Guard program and security assistance to 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  Over the next 6 years, the USG is 
planning to spend $130 million for counterterrorism, 
counterproliferation, and counter-trafficking efforts.  Our 
main priorities are airspace and maritime surveillance, 
national-level command and control, and enhancing the 
militaries' and coast guards' ability to respond to a crisis. 
 The U.S. side invited Turkey to consider participating with 
us in providing upgrades to Nasosnaya Air Base in Azerbaijan, 
and also to consider hosting in April 2006 a George C. 
Marshall Center conference on bilateral Azeri-Kazakh security 
cooperation.  (NOTE: Later Savas said that Turkey will 
consider the first issue, but he asked that we direct the 
conference proposal to the Turkish MFA.  MFA officials asked 
that the proposal be fleshed out further before we formally 
approach them.  END NOTE.) 
 
12. (C) Savas responded that Turkey enthusiastically supports 
Caspian Guard as a concrete measure in the GWOT.  He believed 
that the assistance we have provided to Azerbaijan under this 
program has contributed to security for the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, obviously of 
great importance to Turkey.  Savas asked if Russia had 
objected to Caspian Guard; the EUCOM briefer responded that 
we had heard no complaints above the 0-6 level. 
 
Central Asia 
------------ 
 
13. (C) Schless stated that Central Asia is in a time of 
flux, with political, religious, and economic sources of 
instability.  Russia and China are promoting competing models 
of governance, while the U.S. continues to support 
independence, democratic reforms, good governance, and free 
markets.  The flow of drugs into and through the region from 
Afghanistan threatens to "rot away" any progress we might 
make.  Schless asked Savas for his view on the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, which seems to be taking an even 
 
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more forthrightly negative stance toward the west. 
 
14. (C) Savas agreed with the U.S. assessment, but added that 
radical Islam is a growing negative influence in Central 
Asia.  It is partly for this reason that Turkey has continued 
to encourage the Central Asian governments to maintain strong 
relations with the west and with NATO institutions.  Schless 
noted that in the past, Uzbekistan had been more willing to 
stand up to Russia and China, but now that U.S.-Uzbek 
relations have soured, Karimov may be more willing to 
cooperate with Moscow and Beijing.  Thus Kazakhstan becomes 
all the more important; luckily, Kazakhstan's natural 
resources give it an edge in maintaining its independence. 
Savas added that the people in Turkmenistan share western 
values but are stifled by their government.  Turkey will 
engage with Shanghai Cooperation Organization members. 
 
Security Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
15. (C) Both Turkey and the U.S. briefed on our security 
cooperation programs in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. 
During the briefs, the Turks noted that both countries 
provided similar items -- such as radios -- to the Georgians. 
 TGS argued that the U.S. and Turkish sides should seek to 
coordinate these donations more efficiently, perhaps with an 
eye toward reducing potential maintenance issues later on for 
the equipment.  The U.S. side urged Turkey to participate 
more fully in the South Caucasus Clearinghouse meetings. 
Both sides agreed to consider each other's requests.  Schless 
closed the meeting by inviting Savas to Washington for the 
next CWG. 
 
16. (U) Mr. Schless has cleared this cable. 
MCELDOWNEY