US embassy cable - 05DHAKA5650

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 005650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2010 
TAGS: PTER, KISL, ASEC, PGOV, BG, BG Terrorism 
SUBJECT: BANGLADESHI EFFORTS TO BRING JMB BOMBERS TO JUSTICE 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 04090 
     B. DHAKA 005627 
 
Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 d. 
 
1. (S) Summary.  A disorganized, inter-agency BDG effort 
continues to scramble to catch JMB bombers and prevent future 
attacks, but investigators have failed to arrest seven senior 
JMB leaders or learn how the bomb attacks were organized, 
financed, and coordinated.  The BDG remains receptive to USG 
offers of assistance but has not aggressively courted it, as 
it did, largely for domestic political reasons, on two prior 
occasions.  We have good working-level cooperation with the 
police and military intelligence services, but BDG 
policymakers persist in requesting helicopters, mobile phone 
interceptors, and forensics labs.  Poor BDG performance can 
be attributed to lack of political will for pursuing the case 
to its ultimate conclusion, investigative incompetence, 
blurred lines of authority, and inadequate resources; there 
are, however, several reasonable steps the BDG could take to 
address these problems.  End Summary. 
 
What We Have Done 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Since the August 17 bomb blasts (ref a), we have: 
 
A) Stressed on at least a weekly basis to senior BDG 
officials (primarily at MFA, PMO, Home Ministry, DGFI, NSI, 
and the military) the importance of bringing terrorists and 
their patrons to justice. 
 
B) Brought to Dhaka a USG computer hard-drive expert (twice) 
and two USG bomb experts to meet with investigators and 
assess captured items.  Access to investigators and the items 
has been good.  The bomb experts have submitted their 
reports, and the mining and assessment is still underway of 
data recovered from a computer allegedly used to produce the 
leaflets found at the August 17 bomb sites.  The use of this 
computer by police for other purposes before our expert 
arrived may have limited its potential yield.  The computer 
expert returned to Dhaka November 21 to analyze four other 
captured computers made available to us last week by police 
after numerous requests. 
 
C) Sent to the FBI in Washington via New Delhi LEGATT the 
following documents/information provided by the BDG: a list 
of the 274 suspects, an alleged JMB bank account number, 
statements by nine suspects, other telephone and bank account 
information associated with JMB suspects, 14 confessional 
statements, and details on a seized computer and accessories. 
 Embassy Dhaka FSN's translated the documents in Bangla. 
 
D) Pressed the BDG for greater clarity and detail on the 
nature of USG assistance needed to support the bomb blast 
investigations. 
 
The BDG Response 
---------------- 
 
3. (S) The BDG has: 
 
A) Assured everyone that it is determined to follow the road 
wherever it goes to bring the bombers to justice.  However, 
it denies that the blasts are a manifestation of Islamic 
extremism by suggesting, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, that India and the political opposition are 
behind the bombers.  Also, since violence is contrary to 
Islam, the perpetrators, it says, must not be real Muslims. 
The BDG has worked hard to pursue the bombers and prevent new 
attacks, but it has failed to learn how the attacks were 
organized, financed, and coordinated.  Intelligence comes 
mostly from interrogations of detainees; as we saw with a 
Bangladeshi-American who was held for more than two months on 
spurious suspicions he had funneled money to the bombers, the 
Bangladeshis -- in this case, the notorious Rapid Action 
Battalion -- can be quick to torture an innocent man. 
 
The BDG has posted large rewards for seven regional and 
national JMB leaders, but the most senior figure it has 
succeeded in arresting is JMB executive committee member, and 
operational Abdur Rahman's son-in-law, Abdul Awal.  The BDG 
says it has twice come close to catching Abdur Rahman, once 
in Dhaka in September and once several days ago in 
Panchagarh. 
 
By pursuing the bombers as criminals instead of religious 
extremists, the BDG hopes to evade questions about the role 
of its Islamist political allies in the attacks -- IOJ 
leaders have admitted personal contacts with Abdur Rahman, 
and some of the JMB detainees have past or current links to 
JI and its student wing.  Also, because the ruling BNP is 
convinced that it needs JI and apparently even IOJ to win the 
next election, it resists actions that might undermine its 
relationship with the Islamists. 
 
B) Given us good access to investigators and those overseeing 
the investigation, and it has been generally responsive, 
sometimes after long delays, to our requests for documents 
and other case materials. 
 
C) Expressed interest in USG technical assistance on 
financial investigations but then failed to present specific 
needs, perhaps because of investigators' lack of basic 
knowledge in terrorist financing for framing such a request. 
 
D) Pursued with us, at the senior level, its mantra for USG 
assistance in the form of helicopters, mobile phone 
interceptors, and forensic labs.  Home Minister of State 
Babar argued to Charge that the BDG just missed Abdur Rahman 
in Dhaka because it lacked a helicopter.  He also said 
investigators are delayed by having to get cell phone 
information from the service providers. 
 
E) Formally brought charges against at least 23 alleged JMB 
bombers and their fugitive leaders. 
 
F) On October 14, Interpol Red Notices were finally issued 
for Bangla Bhai and Abdur Rahman, though BDG suggestions that 
JMB leaders might have fled to India have tapered off in 
recent weeks. 
 
Priorities and Benchmarks 
------------------------- 
 
4. (S) Nearly 100 days after August 17, the BDG has failed to 
demonstrate it has the political will to recognize and combat 
Islamist extremism.  Its first challenge is to acknowledge, 
by word and action, the nature and scope of its problem.  To 
show credibility and commitment, it needs to hold coalition 
figures accountable for their links to extremists.  Virtually 
no one outside the BDG doubts that a BNP state minister, a 
BNP deputy minister, and a BNP MP set up and protected Bangla 
Bhai and Abdur Rahman as Islamic vigilantes to fight their 
local enemies.  The lack of any censure, investigation, or 
even acknowledgment of these allegations projects an aura of 
impunity.  Another example is the current Commerce Minister 
and an IOJ leader who, recently arrested HUJIB chieftain 
Mufti Hannan claims, protected him from arrest.  Most 
recently, there is the challenge to stand up visibly against 
alleged JMB threats to kill judges, police, and now the 
minister of law unless Ahle Hadith leader Prof. Galib and 
other JMB detainees are released. 
 
5. (C) Ultimately, there's no greater deterrent to crime than 
bringing criminals to justice.  With the apparent exception 
of MP Ahsanullah Master's killers, the BDG has failed to do 
this in a single case of major political or religious 
violence.  Credible prosecutions against the detained JMB 
bombers, the alleged killers of AL leader Shah Kibria, Ahle 
Hadith spiritual mentor Prof. Galib, and participants in the 
2004 Chittagong arms haul would represent a significant step 
forward. 
 
6. (C) Finally, there are several reasonable steps the BDG 
could take to improve its counter-terrorism capabilities and 
signal its commitment for moderate values.  It could provide 
clear lines of authority in CT investigations and respect the 
role assigned to the lead agency.  While the politics and the 
scope of the problem are different, the BDG showed it can act 
effectively bureaucratically when it turned around in 60 days 
its performance on human trafficking by appointing a dynamic 
senior civil servant with strong PMO backing to inspire and 
coordinate a inter-agency effort to identify, capture, 
prosecute, and convict human traffickers. 
 
7. (C) In this vein, the BDG could, as we have urged PM Zia 
to do at least twice, elevate DGFI's CT wing to a CT bureau 
to give it the resources and stature needed to attract good 
people and give them the tools to succeed. 
 
8. (C) Other indicators of BDG resolve could include shutting 
down local NGO's like the Kuwait-based RIHS that are found to 
be funding extremist groups, and to seek cooperation from the 
Saudi and Kuwaiti governments for tracing foreign funds sent 
to such groups. 
 
9. (C) Openly defending Ahamadiyas and other religious 
minorities from extremist violence, in the name of tolerance 
and the constitution, instead of ad hoc behind-the-scenes 
pressure, would show a new BDG commitment to moderation and 
due process, two key elements in successfully combating 
religious extremism. 
 
Next 
---- 
 
10. (C) This is the second of a three-part assessment of 
post-August 17 Bangladesh.  Septel will suggest a USG 
approach for promoting BDG action against extremism, 
CHAMMAS