US embassy cable - 05MANILA5433

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 005433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 
TAGS: PINS, PREL, RP 
SUBJECT: NSC CHIEF ON EMERGENCY RULE, NPA, AND TERRORISTS 
 
REF: A. MANILA 5166 
     B. MANILA 4801 
 
Classified By: CDA Paul W. Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S)  Summary and comment:  In a one-on-one meeting with 
Charge 11/21, National Security chief Bert Gonzales said he 
has recommended to President Arroyo that she invoke a 
Constitutional provision "as soon as possible" that would 
allow her to order the military and police to arrest leftist 
politicians and suspected Communist forces whom Gonzales 
believes are now coordinating with the Opposition to 
overthrow the government.  Gonzales said that the weakness of 
the Opposition offers the NPA an unprecedented opportunity to 
enter government if the President is forced from office.  The 
President will surely face another impeachment when the 
one-year hiatus expires next June, he asserted; a six-month 
duration of emergency measures would substantially weaken the 
NPA threat before June.  The lack of prospect of a serious 
anti-terrorism law, as well as the lack of an anti-sedition 
law or modern national security law, left the government no 
other options for dealing with the growing NPA threat, 
Gonzales said.  The fight against the NPA must be 80 percent 
political and human rights must be strictly observed, he 
emphasized.  Regarding the current wave of killings of 
leftist politicians, Gonzales said most are victims of an 
aggressive purge of moderate leftists by the NPA.  On the 
terrorist threat, Gonzales said he had just returned from 
Southern Command in Zamboanga, where he advised military 
leaders to avoid military engagements, such as current 
operations on Sulu, that unite locals against the armed 
forces, and instead rely on the "Basilan model" of 
development and cooperation with U.S. advice and support. 
Gonzales worried about the growing islamization of terrorists 
in Mindanao, which could produce suicide bombers in the 
future. 
 
2. (S) Summary/Comment continued: Charge told Gonzales that 
the U.S. would not support emergency rule, that we did not 
share his analysis of the threat posed by the NPA, and that a 
campaign against the NPA would be rightly seen as detracting 
from the Philippines' role in the war on terrorism.  Gonzales 
said he recognized that the Philippines would be "isolated" 
in its fight against the NPA, but that it was necessary for 
the survival of the nation and would not detract from the 
fight against terrorism.  Gonzales' recommendation to the 
President increases our concern over the possibility of 
emergency rule, but other senior advisors, such as Executive 
Secretary Ermita and Mindanao advisor Dureza, have recently 
 
SIPDIS 
indicated to Charge that emergency rule is not likely or 
imminent.  Gonzales' concerns reflect those presented in an 
earlier aide memoire to senior USG officials (ref a) and a 
separate GRP document passed to Embassy (ref b).  Septel will 
analyze the Communist threat in greater detail.  We do not 
believe the threats Gonzales cites are imminent or real, 
although the legal leftists are indeed working closely, 
though in our judgment ineffectively, with other elements of 
the Opposition to force the President out of office.  We do 
not have evidence to substantiate his claim of coordination 
between the NPA and legal leftist politicians.  Gonzales 
indicated that the President may ask him to travel to 
Washington in December.  If so, we recommend high level 
meetings at NSC and State to hear clear USG opposition to the 
emergency measures he has in mind. End summary and comment. 
 
NPA/Leftist/Opposition Threat 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (S)  National Security Advisor Noberto Gonzales, in a 
one-on-one meeting with CDA on November 21, said that he was 
recommending to President Arroyo that she respond to what he 
sees as an ongoing rebellion by the Communist Party of the 
Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) with the imposition 
soon of limited emergency measure for a six month period. 
(Note:  Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution 
gives the President the right as Commander-in-Chief to 
suspend habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part 
thereof under martial law for up to sixty days in response to 
invasion or rebellion.  Congress may revoke such a 
proclamation but does not need to approve it, although 
Congress would need to extend it beyond sixty days.  End 
note)  Gonzales said that the GRP would use such powers to 
arrest all CPP Central Committee members, which he believes 
includes party list Congressman Satur Ocampo, and other 
members of Congress whom he believes to be front men for the 
CPP/NPA.  He admitted that there was no specific plan to 
date, but noted many things in the Philippines happen without 
a plan.  He insisted that the GRP needed to take forceful 
measures as soon as possible in order to disrupt the 
activities of the CPP/NPA, especially in the run-up to what 
Gonzales predicted would be another impeachment effort 
against President Arroyo next summer.  He said that he had 
told President Arroyo that, for the good of the country, she 
should take this step in order finally to get rid the 
Philippines of the Communist presence, noting that all of the 
Philippines' neighbors had already done so. 
 
4.  (S)  CDA told Gonzales that the U.S. would not support 
emergency rule, that we did not share his analysis of the 
threat posed by the NPA, and that a campaign against the NPA 
would be seen as detracting from  genuine counter-terrorism 
activities for domestic political reasons.  Gonzales insisted 
that the GRP had sufficient resources to undertake this new 
measure as well as to continue its counterterrorism 
operations and cooperation. 
 
5.  (S)  Gonzales explained further that the CPP/NPA, unlike 
during the EDSA 1 and EDSA 2 movements, was joining forces 
with the legitimate opposition in order to "overthrow" 
President Arroyo, believing her to be in a weak political 
position and also recognizing that the Opposition itself was 
weak.  These leftists were clearly part of planning meetings 
for protest activities with Opposition figures, another new 
development, he claimed.  He added that the CPP/NPA was also 
now coordinating its military activities in the field with 
these political activities in the capital, yet another new 
development.  (Note:  we will continue to monitor each of 
these areas for evidence to support Gonzales' views.  End 
note) 
 
6.  (S)  Gonzales said that the GRP response to this threat 
would be "80 percent political and 20 percent military," and 
that he had already begun meeting with military officials 
throughout the country to prepare them for this eventuality. 
He claimed that he consistently urged them to handle military 
oppositions with clear respect for human rights, given the 
expected level of international scrutiny.  CDA expressed 
concern about numerous killings of Bayan Muna and other 
leftists in recent months, but Gonzales claimed that in most 
cases the NPA was actually purging more moderate figures, 
though he could not exclude military collusion in some cases. 
 
 
Terrorist Threat 
---------------- 
 
7.  (S)  Gonzales offered criticism, which he said he had 
shared with SOUTHCOM Commander General Adan, for the latest 
military offensive against the Abu Sayyaf Group and Nur 
Misuari Breakaway Group on Sulu, noting that the locals were 
Tausugs and would fight back fiercely.  He said that he had 
encouraged instead use of the "Basilan" model to win over the 
locals by positive humanitarian and civic programs.  He 
commented that local military commanders keen on promotion 
were probably behind the initiation of such offensives. 
 
8.  (C)  Gonzales also warned about the increased 
"Islamization" of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
calling Vice Chair Aleem Abdulaziz Mimbantas especially 
"dangerous" and linked to the Jemaah Islamayah.  He expressed 
concern about the role of madrassas in radicalizing Muslims 
in MILF areas, and worry that this phenomenon could produce 
suicide bombers in the future.  He said he would personally 
work to empower moderate Muslims to confront these radicals, 
as he claimed was successfully done in Mindanao in 1996. 
 
CT legislation 
-------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Gonzales lamented the lack of anti-terrorism and 
anti-sedition laws, making it virtually impossible to arrest 
NPA members and other leftists, even with caught with 
weapons.  He expressed doubt that the Congress would ever 
pass serious anti-terrorism legislation because of the 
current political gridlock and the Opposition's concern over 
abuses by the government. 
 
DC Visit 
-------- 
 
10.  (S)  Gonzales indicated that President Arroyo had asked 
him to go to Washington in December to discuss intelligence 
cooperation, among other issues.  CDA said that we would want 
to set up meetings for him at the NSC and State Department as 
well as CIA, in order to hear USG views on this possible 
emergency measures as well as other issues of intelligence 
sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. 
Jones