US embassy cable - 05BRATISLAVA922

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SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS CUBAN DISSIDENTS, NOTES SPANISH "IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY" WITH THE CASTRO REGIME

Identifier: 05BRATISLAVA922
Wikileaks: View 05BRATISLAVA922 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2005-11-18 15:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL LO CU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181530Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2020 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, PREL, LO, CU 
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS CUBAN DISSIDENTS, NOTES SPANISH 
"IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY" WITH THE CASTRO REGIME 
 
 
Classified By: CDA a.i. Lawrence R. Silverman for Reasons 1.4 (B) and ( 
D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  At a November 8 Embassy sponsored 
discussion, GOS officials told us that Slovakia is working 
hard to promote democracy and "do the right thing" in Cuba. 
They outlined efforts being made by Slovak NGOs, members of 
parliament, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
island, and discussed their concerns that the Cuban dissident 
movement was "fractured," with activists on the island being 
at odds with the activist community in Miami.  The Foreign 
Policy Advisor to the Slovak Chairman of Parliament told us 
that the Chairman -- who visited Cuban dissidents in Miami 
during an official visit to the United States in April -- was 
concerned with what he sees as Spain's "ideological affinity" 
towards Cuba's regime.  Our interlocutors, however, demurred 
when asked about their opinions of the EU's suspended 2003 
sanctions, which will be up for reevaluation in 2006.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
SLOVAKIA'S THREE-PRONGED ATTACK ON CASTRO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  On November 8, Poloff hosted an informal roundtable 
with officials from the MFA's Fifth Territorial (Americas) 
Division, the regional office of the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), the Office of the Chairman of Parliament, 
and the MFA's Human Rights Division.  The GOS representatives 
highlighted Slovakia's active role in promoting democracy on 
the island, noting that there is a "three-pronged attack" on 
Castro.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the 
activities of its Embassy in Havana in meeting with 
dissidents, but noted that the situation in Cuba "is tough," 
and that visiting MFA officials are frequently denied 
permission to meet with Cuban officials and are sometimes 
denied visas at the last moment.  They support the activities 
of Bratislava-based NGOs, however, such as IRI and the Pontis 
Foundation, both of which are active in bringing dissidents 
and activists to Slovakia for meetings and training. 
Finally, Chairman of Parliament Pavol Hrusovsky has taken a 
personal interest in the issue; the Chairman met with the 
dissident community in Miami during his April official visit 
to the United States, and has "adopted a dissident" 
imprisoned in Cuba, making frequent inquiries as to his 
welfare.  Tomas Zalesak, the Foreign Policy Advisor to 
Hrusovsky, told us that the dissident communities in Havana 
and Miami were "fractured" and that divisions among the 
different groups was hindering coordination and cooperation. 
 
3.  (C)  Dusan Kristofik, the Director of the MFA's Americas 
Division, told us that Slovakia is "trying to do the right 
thing" in Cuba, and that if Europe was graphed onto a 
spectrum on the Cuba issue with "Madrid being number 1 and 
the Czech Republic being number 25, Slovakia would be 23 or 
24."  The GOS representatives were open and engaged in a 
discussion of the Cuba embargo at our roundtable, noting that 
they feel Spain is interested in the financial gains its 
hotel chains get from the strong trade relationship.  Zalesak 
told us that he is concerned with the "ideological affinity" 
the Spanish seem to have for Castro's regime. 
 
COMMENT: WAITING FOR JUNE 
------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  When asked about the status of the EU's suspended 
2003 sanctions (currently scheduled to be re-evaluated in 
June 2006), our interlocutors were noncommittal.  They seemed 
to be taking a "wait and see" approach to the attempt to 
affect change in Cuba through economic engagement, despite 
what they see as Spanish and Italian opportunism in the 
island's economy.  More specifically, however, their game of 
"wait and see" may have less to do with a strategy of 
engagement, and more to do with waiting for "biological 
change" to come to Cuba's 79 year old leader. 
 
5.  (C)  COMMENT, cont'd:  Separately, Foreign Policy Advisor 
to the Prime Minister Anna Turenicova told us this summer 
that she believes the goal of EU "engagement" was not so much 
an effort to reach out to Castro as an attempt to keep 
communication open with working-level Cuban contacts, who 
will likely still be in their positions the morning after 
Castro's funeral.  Given the problems getting visas and 
traveling to Cuba, however, she wondered when EU countries 
will realize that this strategy is "just not happening" and 
give up. 
SILVERMAN 
 
 
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