US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6774

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, CY, Cyprus 
SUBJECT: THE ANNAN PLAN AND UNTYING THE CYPRUS KNOT: 
ANKARA PERSPECTIVES 
 
REF: NICOSIA 1585 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) In the aftermath of October 3, there may be an 
opportunity for us to make a renewed push toward a Cyprus 
settlement.  Though we hesitate to express even guarded 
optimism, we do believe that the time has come for us to take 
a hard look at alternative ways forward.  We applaud Embassy 
Nicosia for its efforts (reftel) to stimulate debate on this 
question.  Recognizing Embassy Nicosia is best placed to 
judge how to influence the Cypriots, we offer the points 
below as a contribution to what we hope becomes a vigorous 
review of USG Cyprus policy. 
 
2.  (C) Reftel proposes that the USG cease public endorsement 
of the Annan Plan and stop calling on Greek Cypriots to set 
forth their objections to it with clarity and finality.  We 
appreciate Embassy Nicosia's points about the difficulty in 
framing the debate with the Greek Cypriot press and Greek 
Cypriot hardliners and defer to Nicosia on how to manage that 
internal debate. 
 
3.  (C) However, we believe ceasing public references to the 
Annan Plan could undercut the UN and invite confusion and 
discouragement among the wider set of actors on the Cyprus 
issue: 
 
-- The UN is still publicly anchoring its efforts in the 
Annan Plan and the need for Greek Cypriots to state their 
objections to it.  This proposed approach would open a gap 
between the U.S. and the UN -- a first.  As stymied as the 
SYG's Good Offices Mission is, it is currently the only 
realistic vehicle for overall settlement. 
 
-- The GOT, facing over 60% domestic opposition to the Plan 
in late 2003, spent political capital, torqued around public 
opinion, and went on to help bring Turkish Cypriots to yes. 
Changing our stance now would confuse and anger the GOT and 
the Turkish public, weaken the hand of pro-solution forces 
here, and leave the field to conspiracy theories about the 
reasons for our changed public stance.  It also risks 
damaging support here for Turkey's EU process, since a number 
of vocal critics see the Negotiating Framework as already 
having given away the Cyprus store.  If we want to lobby 
Turkey for support for a renewed round of concessions, which 
we believe would ultimately be desirable, this would not 
help. 
 
-- We are concerned about how the EU and member states would 
take our new public lack of support for the Plan.  At least, 
it would be confusing; coming after Turkey's October 3 
opening of EU accession talks, some in the EU would interpret 
this as tacit endorsement of a greater (perhaps exclusive) EU 
role in settlement. 
 
-- Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly supported the Annan Plan 
in 2004.  Reftel offers no judgment about what effect ceasing 
public endorsement of the Plan would have on them. 
 
-- We believe that supporting the Plan in private while 
ceasing support in public is not a sustainable public 
diplomacy approach with the audiences with which we have to 
deal.  From our point of view, it is more useful to have a 
consistent message that we can transmit to all parties 
concerned. 
 
4.  (C) We believe reftel's public diplomacy concerns can be 
addressed without ceasing public support for the Annan Plan: 
 
-- As far as we can tell, there is unanimous agreement in the 
USG that the Plan inevitably will be changed.  We are aware 
of no USG public statement to the contrary.  As reftel 
suggests, the USG should publicly state that there will need 
to be meaningful changes to Annan to accommodate Greek 
Cypriot concerns -- with the caveat that the Plan will have 
to be re-opened to changes by both sides, not just one. 
 
-- We agree that we can cease using "uniquely balanced" 
rhetoric to describe the Plan.  Most of the Plan's basic 
concepts have been considered in one form or another for 
decades and all appear open to adjustments to the details. 
 
-- We agree it is unhelpful to debate whether the Plan is "a 
basis," "point of departure" or "point of reference."  Under 
any construction, we should stress that the SYG needs to know 
what Greek Cypriots want, and his assessment is that the 
Greek Cypriots have not adequately set that forth. 
 
5.  (C) All this is preliminary to what we hope will be a 
collective effort to see whether the post-October 3 period 
offers a window to move forward constructively with all 
parties on Cyprus.  Mission Turkey looks forward to 
participating actively in this discussion. 
MCELDOWNEY