US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8750

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, PGOV, MOPS, ECON, IN, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: FS SARAN GIVES AMBASSADOR MORIARTY READOUT OF 
PM-KING TALK AT DHAKA 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  Summary (C) In a 16 November meeting, Indian Foreign 
Secretary Saran and visiting Ambassador Moriarty discussed 
 
SIPDIS 
the worrying political climate in Nepal.  The Ambassador 
described options for increasing pressure on the King to 
reach out to Nepalese political parties to counter growing 
Maoist influence and promote a multi-party democracy in the 
Kingdom.  Saran relayed the substance of a meeting between 
Prime Minister Singh and the Nepalese King at the SAARC 
Summit (strictly protect) during which Singh underlined 
India's support for a multi-party democracy and pressed for 
outreach to the parties.  During the discussion, the King 
acknowledged the failure of his February 1 seizure of power 
and lobbied for more active support of his position from 
India.  Saran was cautious about the King's intentions, 
noting that his words often do not match his actions, and 
agreed with us on the need for dramatic action to break the 
political stalemate.  End Summary. 
 
On the Ground Realities 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In a November 16 meeting with Foreign Secretary 
Saran, visiting Ambassador Moriarty relayed his 
"ground-truth" perspective that the Maoists were the only 
group in Nepal making any progress.  The political parties 
were desperate to get back into the rural areas to organize 
pressure against the King, but needed Maoist permission to do 
so.  Moreover, despite the cease-fire, Maoist extortion and 
abduction continued at high rates.  For his part, the King 
has offered no plans to counter Maoist moves, and it is 
unclear when he might do so.  Consequently, increased 
external pressure or persuasion was necessary to convince the 
King to make a dramatic political gesture to break the 
stalemate.  One possibility would be for the King to call for 
an internationally-monitored bilateral cease-fire.  The 
Maoists might well reject such a proposal, in which case 
domestic and international opinion would swing violently 
against them.  If they agreed to an effective, monitored 
cease-fire, HMGN would be viewed as the party that had 
brought peace to the countryside.  More importantly, if the 
Maoists were no longer able to use terror, their influence in 
Nepal's villages would decline dramatically; if they were no 
longer able to obtain funds through extortion, many cadre 
would leave the Maoists. 
 
PM Singh Efforts to Dialogue 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) After agreeing that the King had to take dramatic 
steps to begin the process of reconciliation with the 
parties, Foreign Secretary Saran noted with dismay the 
discrepancy between what the King says and what the King 
does.  Saran went on to relay the substance of the one-on-one 
meeting between Prime Minister Singh and the King on November 
13 in Dhaka on the margins of the SAARC summit.  Singh told 
the King that the latter's actions of February 1, 2005 to 
concentrate power in the Monarchy were obviously not working; 
the King's request for three months to chart the way forward 
had turned into 10 months, with no end in sight.  Singh said 
the security situation in Nepal had deteriorated and that 
India was concerned that the worsening economic situation 
might lead to the collapse of Nepal's economy.  In light of 
these troubling trends, Singh asked whether the King had a 
"Plan B". 
 
4.  (C) The King acknowledged the failure of his February 
palace putsch, but explained that he was forced to react in a 
time of crisis.  The King said he remained committed to 
multi-party democracy.  However, he was highly critical of 
Nepal's political parties and warned that multi-party 
democracy in Nepal could not be a carbon copy of democracy in 
India due to historical differences between the two 
countries.  He said he felt India was treating Nepal 
insensitively and that he wanted India's support.  The King 
further insisted that India had no right to tell him who 
should lead a multi-party government. 
 
The Indian Position 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C) In reply, FM Saran noted, PM Singh had told the King 
that political parties in any democracy had short-comings; 
one must live with those short-comings and recognize that the 
voters would decide who was entitled to lead their country. 
It was the voters' responsibility to decide between the good 
and the bad.  Singh had also stressed that there could be no 
multi-party democracy without political parties.  He 
reassured the King that India did not expect democracy in 
Nepal to mimic its own but that the creation of a democracy 
had to follow certain tenets, which included allowing the 
evolution of political parties.  He said that neither India 
nor the King should have a role in this process.  Singh 
pointed out that the King's actions were endangering the 
Monarchy.  Singh underscored the necessity of reaching out to 
the political parties and bringing them into the fold to 
prevent continued polarization in the country. 
 
Playing the China Card 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The King said he understood Singh's reasoning and was 
looking at options for the way forward, which would include 
municipal elections, FM Saran continued.  PM Singh reiterated 
the need for fast action by the King, noting it was not in 
India's best interest for the Maoists to gain power.  The PM 
added that there was evidence of links between Maoists and 
Indian Naxalites.  This was why India had provided massive 
assistance to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in the past and had 
beefed up intelligence sharing with Nepal.  India was 
reluctant to provide security assistance, however, if the RNA 
were to be used as an instrument of repression.  Singh also 
criticized Nepal's tendency to "wave the China or Pakistan 
card," pointing out that such moves made it much harder to 
engender any support for HMGN within India.  The King pushed 
back, however, saying that he had been forced to reach out to 
China, given the cut-off of support by India, which was 
treating Nepal as a pariah. 
 
SAARC 
----- 
 
7.  (C) Ambassador Moriarty also raised the subject we have 
heard from others in the GOI that India would welcome a U.S. 
request for observer status at SAARC (septel).  Saran said 
that was definitely Indian policy and encouraged the U.S. to 
submit an application in the SAARC meeting in Kathmandu and 
to keep India informed so New Delhi could weigh in on the 
behalf of the U.S. request. 
 
8.  (U)  Ambassador Moriarty cleared this cable. 
 
9.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE