US embassy cable - 05PARIS7813

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007813 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, KPKO, FR, HA, EUN 
SUBJECT: FRENCH RELUCTANT TO DEPLOY EU GENDARMERIE TO HAITI 
AT THIS TIME 
 
REF: STATE 206172 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary and Comment: The French are reluctant to send 
the EU Gendarmerie to Haiti in support of upcoming elections 
for a number of reasons.  The primary concern they cite is 
that the EU Gendarmerie is not yet ready to deploy, and won't 
be until sometime in 2006.  Additionally, the GoF is worried 
that the situation in Haiti might prove too challenging for a 
fledgling force, and that a failure on the first mission 
would be disastrous for the future of the program.  The 
French also seek international cover for any such mission and 
are hesitant to send troops without a direct request from the 
UN.  Finally, the GoF believes that any EU Gendarmerie 
deployment would rely heavily on French manpower, and the 
unrest that has plagued France the last three weeks has tied 
up most available personnel.  While the situation has 
returned to relative normalcy, the underlying tension 
remains, and the French are averse to committing troops to 
international duty while there is still a possibility for 
trouble at home.  Ultimately, it seems unlikely the French 
will engage in Haiti without U.S. participation.  End Summary 
and Comment. 
 
2.  (C) In a discussion November 16 with PolMinCouns, MFA 
A/S-equivalent for WHA Daniel Parfait stated that the GoF had 
examined deploying the EU Gendarmerie to Haiti in June and 
July of 2005, but ultimately dismissed the possibility due to 
resistance on a number of fronts.  First, Parfait indicated 
that the EU Gendarmerie would not be ready until 2006. 
Second, Parfait expressed the fear that the situation in 
Haiti might prove a difficult challenge for the fledgling 
force, and that problems on the inaugural mission would 
damage the future of the EU Gendarmerie.  Although security 
in Haiti is improved compared to the summer, Parfait 
elaborated, the gangs and arms remain, and both could easily 
reemerge during elections to derail the process.  Parfait 
expressed concern that Aristide supporters might unite behind 
the candidacy of former president Renee Preval in the hopes 
of paving the way for Aristide's return or another virtual 
Aristide presidency.  Any electoral result could touch off 
violence, Parfait speculated, but while the GoF was 
concerned, he said there was not yet enough impetus to engage 
French troops.  In the end, in the face of possible widescale 
violence, such a deployment of French forces (vice European 
gendarmes) might be possible, Parfait entertained, if the 
U.S. were also involved. 
 
3.  (C) Post also delivered reftel points to Alexis Morel, 
MFA Counselor in the Directorate for Strategic Affairs (ASD) 
covering EU Gendarmerie issues.  Morel indicated to PolOff 
that the GoF was still evaluating our request, but that the 
general mood or reaction to our proposal was one of 
"skepticism."  Morel echoed Parfait's concern that the EU 
Gendarmerie was not yet operational.  He added that the 
situation in Haiti remained uncertain, raising the question 
among some in the GoF as to whether the Haitians would be 
able to hold elections under the current timeframe.  Morel, 
too, noted that the extent to which the U.S. would be 
involved in election security was a key factor; he suggested 
that French participation was likely to be influenced by 
whether or not U.S. security personnel also were deployed. 
 
4.  (C) On November 15, Deputy PolCouns and PolOff presented 
reftel points to MFA DAS-equivalent for Mexico, Central 
America, and the Caribbean Pierre-Alain Coffinier, Haiti Desk 
Officer Cecile Merle, and UN Desk Officer for Haiti Benoit 
Guidee.  Coffinier stated that there was political reluctance 
to send troops to Haiti, and Guidee questioned whether DPKO 
was in favor of additional support or would be able to 
coordinate that support with existing forces.  According to 
Guidee, the issue was a non-starter for France absent an 
explicit request from the Secretariat of the UN, with a 
recommendation from DPKO.  His impression was that DPKO had 
not yet been consulted, or was in any case not engaged. 
 
5.  (C) Guidee indicated that troop availability was also an 
issue, as any early deployment of the European Gendarmerie 
Force (EGF) would require French gendarmes to take the lead 
and bear a disproportionate burden (given the lack of 
Francophones in other EU member states).  Moreover, 81 French 
gendarmes and police were already engaged in Haiti through 
MINUSTAH.  Asked about a possible ad hoc coalition formed 
from the gendarmes of five EU countries, Guidee responded 
that the GoF had earlier considered, but then rejected, this 
idea. 
 
6.  (C) Guidee saw few prospects for GoF flexibility, 
concluding that French participation would be difficult to 
sell politically to the GoF in any case, given that French 
gendarmes were currently needed in France to combat the wave 
of civil unrest that has plagued the country for three weeks. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton