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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA6772 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA6772 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-11-17 13:40:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
VZCZCXRO0246 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHAK #6772/01 3211340 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 171340Z NOV 05 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1255 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006772 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TU SUBJECT: JANDARMA INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBING ROCKS TURKEY (U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Turkey has been rocked by alleged jandarma involvement in a November 9 bombing in the town of Semdinli, in the ethnically-Kurdish southeastern province of Hakkari. After the blast, bystanders caught and severely beat three suspects. Police released two of the three, including a jandarma sergeant, and detained a jandarma informant. The event has sparked weeklong, at times violent, demonstrations in Hakkari. Multiple and very public investigations are underway and there is widespread public agreement that there is some jandarma involvement. The question is whether PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) government can force the jandarma to cooperate with the investigation; much of the public and media, inured to the coverups of the 1990s, are skeptical the investigation will be allowed to get to the bottom of the affair. All high-level figures, from the PM to the President to the head of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), have publicly stated the investigation should go as far as needed to find those responsible. End Summary. Two of Three Bombing Suspects Released -------------------------------------- 2. (U) On November 9, one person was killed in a bomb blast in a Semdinli bookstore. Bystanders caught and severely beat three suspects before police arrived and took custody of them. The suspects included a PKK informant for jandarma intelligence and a jandarma sergeant. As a crowd gathered around the suspects' car, a prosecutor arrived to investigate; so did Hakkari parliamentarian Esat Canan, who happened to be in town at the time, and with whom we spoke on November 16. 3. (U) In the car, the prosecutor and Canan found weapons and documents allegedly linked to jandarma, including a supposed "hit list" of suspected PKK sympathizers, including the bookstore owner. The crowd around the car grew, allegedly became violent, and jandarma opened fire, killing one person. Police released two of the three bombing suspects, keeping only the informant. Another jandarma sergeant who fired on the crowd was also kept in custody. 4. (U) Local anger over the bombing incident and the release of the two suspects sparked demonstrations in Hakkari province, some of them violent, for a week after November 9. Five people died in disturbances in the town of Yuksekova on November 15 disturbances spread to the provincial capital n November 16. Investigation, Parliamentary Response -- and Criticism --------------------------------------------- --------- 5. (U) PM Erdogan has repeatedly vowed a full investigation of the incident; Turkey's political establishment has publicly and unanimously backed his call in unprecedented fashion. Prosecutors opened their investigation the same day as the incident. Several parliamentary delegations have visited Hakkari province, and parliament is set to debate the affair next week. Still, much of the public and media, particularly in the southeast, remains deeply skeptical that an investigation will get to the bottom of the affair. 6. (C) Erdogan and his ruling AKP government's response has drawn criticism. Well-connected Hurriyet columnist Sukru Kucuksahin told us privately that he blamed PM Erdogan for not speaking out more forcefully against the civil unrest the incident has generated in the southeast. He worried about nationalistic reactions inside Erodgan's AKP, from the military, and from the Turkish public if unrest continues. 7. (C) Aside from statements, Erdogan has, to date, done little publicly in response to the incident. He has continued foreign travel uninterrupted, and, at least until his return to Ankara November 15, appeared more focused on disputes regarding headscarves than on events in Semdinli. Interior Minister Aksu, despite having the jandarma under his jurisdiction, has been virtually invisible. A November 16 press report claimed several AKP parliamentarians, including both nationalists and pious MPs, criticized AKP leadership for the civil unrest, a lack of focus on the incident, and ANKARA 00006772 002 OF 003 lack of information from Aksu. 8. (C) When we met with an exhausted parliamentarian Canan, a Kurdish member of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), he was privately deeply pessimistic about the investigation. He is critical of the decision to release the other two bombing suspects and fears that Semdinli's relatively junior prosecutor will be left alone to face down the district's powerful jandarma; some media have made the same criticism. Canan predicts AKP will ask its parliamentary commission to investigate other events in addition to Semdinli, potentially watering down and delaying the results. No Dispute That Jandarma Involved --------------------------------- 9. (C) Turkey's paramilitary jandarma, under the command of a land forces general, is organizationally part of the Interior Ministry. In a deeply nationalistic country where military forces enjoy the highest prestige of any institution, almost no one -- including the military -- is disputing some level of jandarma involvement in the bombing. Many see the Semdinli bombing as an act of revenge for a November 2 bombing outside local jandarma headquarters. 10. (C) Unlike past governments, PM Erdogan's pro-Islam AKP has no affection for the secular military, no ties to it, and no reason to squelch the investigation. Even the main opposition CHP, which delights in playing the nationalist card, has not tried to point the finger away from jandarma involvement. The lingering question mark is whether the AKP government can force the jandarma to cooperate with the investigation. A leading columnist told us that jandarma commander General Turkeri told him he had not yet spoken with Minister Aksu, his ostensible boss, about the incident, and had no intention of doing so. The columnist speculated that Aksu was too intimidated to raise the issue with "his" general. Military Reaction Muted, Deferential to Judiciary --------------------------------------------- ---- 11. (SBU) PM Erdogan declared on November 12 that he had consulted with TGS Chief Ozkok and President Sezer, who agreed that the incident should be fully investigated. The military's public reaction so far has been muted, cautious and deferential to the judicial process, but has generated some controversy. 12. (U) TGS Chief General Ozkok told the press on November 11, "I will neither accuse nor protect my personnel." The media criticized land forces commander General Buyukanit for his public statement that he knows the jandarma sergeant allegedly involved in the bombing and believes him to be a good soldier, although Buyukanit added that the investigation will determine whether the sergeant is guilty or not. 13. (U) Jandarma commander General Turkeri has come under the most fire, including from PM Erdogan, for his November 11 statement that appeared to minimize the affair as only a "local incident." Much of Turkey's conspiracy-minded public believes the incident is the work of a vast "deep state" network including the military, intelligence officials, bureaucrats, judges and prosecutors, and they see Turkeri's statement as an attempted coverup. However, even Turkeri called for developments to be left to the judiciary. Comment: Much to Gain, Much to Lose ------------------------------------ 14. (C) The political consequences of the Semdinli incident are only beginning to play out. The incident brings together some of Turkey's most sensitive and important issues: the heavily-Kurdish southeast, the PKK, and the GOT policies toward them; civil/military relations; and the AKP government's ability and willingness to work for rule of law. This is an opportunity for the GOT to show determination to use the rule of law expeditiously to get to the bottom of an ugly incident reminiscent of the 1990s. They have much to gain if they succeed, and much to lose if they fail -- in terms of credibility with their own party base; with the ANKARA 00006772 003 OF 003 public in the southeast, highly skeptical of anything coming from Ankara; with the military; with the EU. 15. (C) If the investigation goes high and deep into the jandarma, the military's deferential attitude may change, sparking outright confrontation between the military and the AKP government. At this point, we see no indication of this scenario. More likely, nationalist criticism of the AKP government's handling of the incident could stiffen, including inside AKP itself. Continuing civil unrest in the southeast spawned by the incident will increase pressure on Erdogan and AKP to react strongly -- but an overreaction will further alienate the southeast's already-restive Kurds, AKP's own Kurdish MPs, and the EU. MCELDOWNEY
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