US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN2022

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ARMENIA: LACK OF SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN RELIEF EFFORT DISAPPOINTING

Identifier: 05YEREVAN2022
Wikileaks: View 05YEREVAN2022 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2005-11-17 13:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: AEMR ASEC EAID PGOV PREF MASS AM IN PK NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN 
DEFENSE FOR OSD EURASIA AMER LATIF AND DSCA DIANE LAMB 
USMISSION OSCE FOR KIT TRAUB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: AEMR, ASEC, EAID, PGOV, PREF, MASS, AM, IN, PK, NATO 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA:  LACK OF SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN RELIEF 
EFFORT DISAPPOINTING 
 
REF: A) STATE 196411 B) YEREVAN 1911 C) YEREVAN 1885 
     D) YEREVAN 1811 
 
Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) On multiple occasions since October 21, Armenian 
Defense and Foreign Affairs officials have not responded to 
our calls for military and other assistance -- which we think 
they are capable of rendering -- to the Pakistan relief 
effort.  Early promises to answer requests for assistance 
(reftels) have faded into ambivalent denials of 
responsibility, likely tied to a GOAM perception that 
assistance to Pakistan is not in Armenia's self-interest.  As 
a result, Armenia has missed an opportunity to contribute to 
international relief efforts and departed, at least in this 
case, from the commitment GOAM leaders say they have made to 
increasing Armenian military interaction with the West and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO.  We appreciate the 
GOAM's generous assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
and we will continue to encourage our Armenian interlocutors 
to extend that generosity to other international relief 
efforts.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
STRIKE 1:  MFA STILL "DISCUSSING" ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
2. (C) On October 21 (ref A) and again on October 27 (ref B), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO Section Head Hrach Tashchyan 
told us the GOAM would be willing "to work through the NATO 
Response Force to render assistance" to Pakistan, but that he 
could not comment on specific, concrete steps Armenia might 
take, including operational assistance for MI-17 helicopters, 
until the GOAM had a better idea about NATO's operational 
requirements.  On November 2 and again on November 9, Marta 
Ayvazyan, who replaced Tashchyan as MFA NATO Section Head, 
told us the MFA was still "discussing a response."  On 
November 11 and on November 16, Ayvazyan told us she would 
contact us "if there is anything new on the subject." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
STRIKE 2:  PARTS IN INVENTORY, JUST NOT "AVAILABLE" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (C) On October 27 and November 2, Deputy Minister of 
Defense General-Lieutenant Artur Aghabekyan told us the 
Armenian military had compatible hardware and maintenance 
crews he could deliver to assist Pakistani MI-17 helicopter 
operations, but that the decision to engage in the relief 
effort could only come from "political leaders," with whom 
Aghabekyan told us he would follow-up.  (Note:  In his 
initial response to reftel demarche, Aghabekyan told us that 
Armenia does not/not have MI-17 helicopters but failed to 
acknowledge that spares from its MI-8 inventory should be 
compatible.  End Note). 
 
---------------------------------------- 
STRIKE 3:  DON'T CALL US, WE'LL CALL YOU 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) On November 2, we passed a copy of the NATO-produced 
MI-17 combined parts list, which details specific helicopter 
parts the Pakistan relief effort critically needs, to 
Aghabekyan.  Aghabekyan told us he would review the list and 
work with Armenia's political leadership "to determine what 
we might be able to do."  On November 17, however, 
General-Major Mikael Melkonyan, the Head of the Foreign 
Relations and Military Cooperation Department who, despite 
working closely with Aghabekyan, told us he had never heard 
of our requests for Pakistan relief operation assistance. 
 
------------------------------ 
COMMENT:  MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Whether a political or military decision, the GOAM's 
failure to coordinate a substantial response to our request 
for assistance in the Pakistan relief effort falls well short 
of Armenian generosity in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 
This is disappointing.  Aghabekyan, who consistently appears 
to be more forward looking than many of his defense 
establishment peers, has both the political cache and the 
military authority to produce at least a symbolic, if not 
substantial, GOAM contribution.  His failure to do so, and 
the MFA's apparent refusal to pursue alternative assistance 
measures, is a departure from the enthusiasm the government 
has recently indicated for increased Armenian interaction and 
interoperablity with the West and Euro-Atlantic institutions 
like NATO (ref D). 
GODFREY 

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