US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1307

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P AND EAP; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ECON, BM, JA 
SUBJECT: JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 6026 
     B. TOKYO 5853 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. TOKYO 5850 
     D. RANGOON 1216 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Japanese Ambassador to Burma said he 
used recent meetings with senior GOB officials to pursue GOJ 
objectives on democratization, human rights, and economic 
reform.  He believes he succeeded in convincing Burma to 
reconsider its ILO withdrawal, but indicated that he did not 
raise Aung San Suu Kyi in order to help ensure that his basic 
message got delivered to senior SPDC generals.  The 
Ambassador agreed with us in principle on the need for 
international unity on basic objectives in Burma and for 
closer U.S.-Japan collaboration.  He criticized Western 
sanctions, however, and grew visibly uncomfortable at the 
notion of Japanese and U.S. diplomats in Rangoon meeting more 
regularly to share views, indicating that he feared GOB 
retribution.  Apparently, he views maintaining "friendly 
relations" with Burma as outweighing shared U.S.-Japan 
values.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Charge and the Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Nobutake 
Odano, exchanged views on November 16 during a lengthy 
conversation that covered respective Burma policies, recent 
political developments in Burma, and senior-level U.S.-Japan 
dialogue on Burma strategies.  P/E Chief and Japanese pol 
counselor Ichiro Maruyama also participated in the meeting. 
 
JAPAN DISCOURAGES BURMA'S ILO WITHDRAWAL 
 
3. (C) The Charge told Ambassador Odano that she was keen to 
discuss ways to cooperate with the Japanese Embassy on 
sharing information and perhaps coordinating strategies, 
noting that Burma had been a topic addressed recently between 
U/S Burns and MOFA Deputy Minister Nishida (refs A, C), among 
other senior officials.  The Charge asked Odana about the 
substance of his recent meetings with the Labor and Foreign 
Ministers. 
 
4. (C) Amb Odano said that he used these meetings to raise 
Japan's goals on democratization, human rights, and economic 
reform.  He had explained to the ministers that, as a 
"long-standing friend" of Burma, Japan advised the GOB to: 
accelerate its road map process and allow the participation 
of all political parties; protect human rights; and pursue 
steps toward a full market economy.  "More foreign 
investment," Odano told the Charge, "could allow creative and 
talented Burmese to become agents of change." 
 
5. (C) Odano focused most of his efforts on reversing the 
recent Burmese decision to withdraw from the ILO (ref D).  He 
discouraged Burma from withdrawing, which would lead to 
"negative effects on many fronts," by observing that Japan's 
own withdrawal from the League of Nations had led to the 
destruction of his country.  The Minister of Labor responded 
that GOB-affiliated organizations, such as the USDA, had been 
"upset" by the ILO's treatment of Burma and had "pressured" 
the GOB to quit, but he added that no final decision had been 
made.  "It appears the GOB has taken our advice," said Odano, 
offering that he had heard earlier in the day that the GOB's 
representative in Geneva had told the ILO that Burma would 
remain a member if the ILO carries out its mandate 
"properly."  (Note: We subsequently received a copy of a 
letter from the Labor Minister to the ILO stating that the 
GOB remained open to alternatives.  End Note.) 
 
BUT DID YOU RAISE ASSK? 
 
6. (C) The Charge pressed Amb Odano to provide more details 
on his message to the GOB on democratization.  "Did you 
address, for example, the National Convention process or the 
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi?" she asked.  Odano responded 
that the GOB had already committed to its own seven step road 
map.  So he urged the GOB to speed up the process, pointing 
to quick progress achieved in Afghanistan and in Iraq on new 
constitutions.  "As for political prisoners," said Odano, "my 
mission won't be successful unless the ministers deliver my 
message to senior SPDC generals, so I didn't put everything 
on the table at once." 
 
7. (C) Addressing Odano's message to speed up the road map, 
the Charge noted that the process must be inclusive to have 
any credibility.  Odano replied that the regime's plan for a 
referendum on a new constitution would provide an opportunity 
for the Burmese people to participate.  A referendum, 
responded the Charge, would be meaningless without open 
debate.  Furthermore, she added, the regime had lost the last 
election in 1990 and would surely take measures to avoid a 
similar outcome again.  "Well," said Odano, "I'm not sure we 
had very much debate in Japan when we produced a new 
constitution after the war," stating that the Burmese people 
first needed the opportunity to vote.  They could modify 
constitutional language later, he asserted, citing the 
examples of Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries. 
 
DISSECTING THE GREAT CAPITAL MOVE 
 
8. (C) The Charge observed that she saw little logic in the 
generals' decision making.  Amb Odano agreed and cited three 
leading theories, which he had gathered from press reports, 
behind the SPDC's sudden relocation of the country's capital 
to Pyinmana:  to create a defensive stronghold against a U.S. 
invasion; to isolate the GOB from domestic anti-goverment 
threats; and to respond to the advice of palm readers.  He 
added a view that the move might also reflect closer ties 
with China, observing that the two countries were in a 
"marriage of convenience." 
 
9. (C) Odano said China must play a more constructive role in 
Burma.  Claiming that "China won't listen to Japan," he 
suggested the United States could have some influence, having 
succeeded in securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea. 
The Charge responded that all three countries--China, Japan, 
and the United States--were involved in the Six-Party Talks, 
noting that the North Korea case might be a model for how "we 
can all work together on Burma."  She observed that Chinese 
influence and interest in Burma has its limits, because the 
PRC desires above all stability and the current political 
situation doesn't inspire much confidence. 
 
SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND 
 
10. (C) The Charge, responding to Odano's request for 
thoughts on strategies, replied that the international 
community should be united on basic goals with regard to 
Burma to send a clearer signal to the regime.  A good case 
can be made, she said, that all members of the broader 
international community, while having different approaches to 
the problem, fully agree on the need for democracy, respect 
for human rights, and overall reform.  The rest of the ASEAN 
countries, she said, look outward and are increasingly 
accountable to their own citizens.  In her introductory 
meetings with other Ambassadors she had found broad agreement 
that the regime must move toward a more open system. 
 
11. (C) A united international community would be good, said 
Odano, but if the approach is one of sanctions and pressure, 
it won't help the country and will only push the generals 
further into the trenches.  "We need to show them that we are 
here to help," he said, "and that is why Japan has a robust 
humanitarian assistance program."  He lamented the ouster of 
former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, describing the former head 
of military intelligence as a "progressive element" who 
"still got bashed" despite his efforts to reach out.  "Even 
when the generals are ready to take bold initiatives, the 
international community discourages them," said Odano, 
insisting that Burma would have done "something positive" had 
it not relinquished the 2006 ASEAN chair. 
 
12. (C) The Charge responded that she had not approached Amb 
Odano to pursue collaboration on sanctions, which are not in 
any case the source of Burma's woes - regime policies are. 
She reiterated that "we need to work together in a positive, 
constructive manner to achieve shared objectives."  For 
example, she said, Japan's apparently successful efforts to 
get the GOB to rethink the utility of staying in the ILO were 
positive, and could help keep the regime from rolling back 
progress that had been achieved on forced labor.  She also 
noted reports that Burma would pursue a "no action" measure 
on the annual UNGA Burma resolution and observed that Japan 
had discouraged such behavior in the past by convincing the 
regime that it was not in the country's interest to work 
against the international community. 
 
SURELY BURMA CAN'T DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN 
 
13. (C) The Charge offered to host a lunch for the Japanese 
and U.S. Embassy policy teams to compare notes and exchange 
views.  Amb Odano noted that President Bush and Prime 
Minister Koizumi, meeting that day in Tokyo, had collaborated 
on many security and regional issues.  Despite contributing 
to "many" briefing papers for his PM, however, he asserted 
Burma had not come up in the meetings with the President. 
"We have the same goals," he said, "but it is very difficult 
to agree on how to reach them."  Odano said that the GOB had 
friendly ties with Japan, but continued to be resentful over 
the suspension of Japanese aid.  "This makes our access to 
the cabinet very difficult," he said, appealing to the Charge 
to "keep our conversation among the four of us (in this 
room)." 
 
14. (C) The Charge said that U.S.-Japan cooperation was "no 
secret" and noted that the Bush-Koizumi meetings would 
 
SIPDIS 
generate substantial press.  She pointed out that at many 
posts Japanese and American diplomats meet regularly and 
collaborate on a number of sensitive issues.  "Surely," she 
said, "the Generals cannot drive a wedge between us."  Odano 
responded that the GOB has "no sophistication to drive a 
wedge between Japan and the United States," but added Burma 
thinks that Japan is "already under U.S. influence, and I 
don't want to give them any more reason to think Japan 
responds to U.S. pressure."  Japan, he said, pursues 
democracy and human rights in Burma "because these are 
Japanese values." 
 
15. (C) Lunch with the Americans, Amb Odano allowed with 
obvious discomfort, would be fine, "but first I need to 
digest these recent negative developments, such as the UNSC 
debate, the ILO issues, and the GOB relocation to Pyinmana." 
The Charge offered that perhaps January would be a more 
convenient time to get together and Odano responded, "Well, 
the National Convention will still be going on then," before 
changing the subject. 
 
COMMENT:  SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A PAPER SWORD 
 
16. (C) This was our second substantive discussion with 
Ambassador Odano in recent weeks (the Charge made an 
introductory call on September 19).  On both occasions, Odano 
expressed similar views on engagement and a perceived growth 
in Chinese influence.  Nevertheless, his visible discomfort 
at the mere notion of a lunch with U.S. Embassy policy 
officers was startling.  He made it clear that he fears 
retribution from the GOB, and yet Japanese diplomats have 
told us that following the 2004 ouster of Khin Nyunt and the 
demise of military intelligence, GOJ access to the regime has 
been severely curtailed.  So what does Amb Odano seek to 
avoid?  Apparently he views his primary mission as 
maintaining "friendly relations" with Burma, and so will not 
risk displeasing the ruling generals by meeting with the U.S. 
to discuss shared values.  End Comment. 
VILLAROSA