US embassy cable - 05DHAKA5627

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 005627 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: PTER, KISL, PGOV, PREL, ASEC, BG, BG Terrorism 
SUBJECT: "SUICIDE" BOMBER MARKS ESCALATION OF EXTREMIST 
VIOLENCE 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 04090 
     B. DHAKA 05593 
 
Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 d. 
 
 1. (S) Summary.  The November 15 assassination of two 
provincial judges, and the perception that the attacker meant 
to martyr himself for Islamic glory, marks a worrisome growth 
in the evolution of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh.  The 
recurring attacks on the judiciary have upped the political 
stakes for the BNP and the anxiety of civil society.  JMB, 
the putative mastermind of the attacks, has mutated from 
being seen as a relatively small regional outfit, pre-August 
17, to a mastermind of national terror.  The BDG's failure to 
capture even one of the JMB's shadowy leaders adds to JMB's 
mystique.  The BDG is scrambling to provide security for 
courthouses and senior judges, to catch JMB bombers, and to 
prevent future attacks, but it continues to resist viewing 
JMB as a manifestation of home-grown religious extremism, 
largely because of its determination to preserve the 
cohesiveness of the ruling BNP-Islamist coalition.  The 
judges' service association has demanded that the BDG 
guarantee the security of judges by November 21, the day 
before a mass opposition rally in Dhaka.  It is unclear if 
the opposition has finally found an issue to galvanize 
anti-BDG pressure, but there is a growing sense of unease -- 
even among ruling party members -- that the JMB campaign of 
violence will only escalate.  End Summary. 
 
The Drumbeat Intensifies 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) On August 17, more than 400 small bombs rattled 
government facilities and public areas across Bangladesh (ref 
a).  The design and placement of the bombs indicated the 
bombers' objective was to send a message, not inflict mass 
casualties.  A banned group named Jamaat ul-Mujahidin 
Bangladesh (JMB) claimed responsibility for the blasts in 
leaflets found at the sites.  After initial skepticism that 
JMB had the ability or the reach to mount a coordinated 
nationwide attack, BDG security services shifted gear after 
suspects confessed to acting as part of a JMB campaign to 
install sharia law in Bangladesh.  The BDG maintained that 
the bombers were orchestrated by a foreign influence (read 
India), and cranked up a disorganized multi-agency effort to 
catch the bombers.  The ruling BNP's Islamist coalition 
partners, Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB) and Islami Oikyya 
Jote, condemned the bombings as contrary to Islam. 
 
3. (C) On November 15, a bomb-carrying assailant killed two 
judges in the southeastern city of Jhalakathi (ref b),  the 
seventh assault on a courthouse or a judge claimed by JMB 
since August 17.  The Jhalakathi attack marked a turning 
point, however, because the injured attacker was found to 
have a second IED attached to his thigh, he reportedly tried 
to blow himself up after he was caught, and he told reporters 
from his hospital bed that he was a suicide attacker 
committed to the JMB campaign to end "man-made" (i.e., 
non-sharia) law in Bangladesh.  Some details remain murky but 
the attacker, Mamun, was clearly fluent in martyrdom 
rhetoric.  Home Minister of State Babar confided to Charge 
that the possibility that Mamun was Bangladesh's first 
suicide bomber "could not be ruled out."  Many Bangladeshis, 
encouraged by newspaper headlines, have concluded that Mamun 
was a suicide bomber and speculate on when the next one will 
come. 
 
A Pattern Emerges 
----------------- 
 
4.  (C) Three months after the August 17 blasts, it seems 
apparent that: 
 
A) The August 17 blasts were not an isolated episode.  Rather 
than being just a shot across the bows to announce JMB's 
arrival or to pressure the BDG on some particular point, like 
releasing spiritual leader Prof. Assadullah Galib, it was the 
start of a broader campaign that at this point shows no sign 
of abetting. 
 
B) JMB has leapt from being perceived as a relatively minor 
regional group to an effective organization with national 
reach.  Like Bangla Bhai's JMJB before it, JMB has achieved 
such a fearsome profile that others are now invoking its name 
to make hoaxes or threaten primarily reporters for various 
reasons, including extortion. 
C) Achieving Islamic law is JMB's primary objective, at least 
ostensibly.  It has listed government officials and agents of 
Western/"Crusader" interests as additional enemies of Islam, 
but the judiciary was a major target of the August 17 blasts 
and it has been the exclusive focus of its attacks since 
then.  Even if JMB has an ulterior agenda, attacking judges 
is covering itself in zealously Islamist hues. 
 
D) The BDG has made the tactical decision to go after JMB 
attackers, in part to prevent future attacks and deflect 
mounting domestic and foreign political pressure for action. 
However, it is unable or unwilling to capture district or 
national leaders of JMB, and it continues to resist 
acknowledging that home-grown religious extremism is a real 
problem. 
 
E) Jamaat Islami is on the defensive over allegations that 
some of the bombers have past or current links to JIB or its 
violent student wing.  Beyond stoutly denying any ties to the 
bombers and condemning the violence as "un-Islamic," JIB 
officials note privately that it was three BNP leaders in 
Rajshahi who recruited and protected Bangla Bhai.  They 
insist that JIB is successfully committed to the political 
process and that it can only lose by association with a 
campaign of terror.  Ironically, mounting pressure on the BNP 
could further boost its dependence on JIB as an electoral 
partner. 
 
Immediate Challenges 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) Several mostly pro-Awami League (AL) lawyer groups 
have launched boycotts and protests over the attacks, and the 
judges' service association has demanded that the BDG 
"guarantee" the security of judges by November 21, the day 
before a mass opposition rally in Dhaka designed to kick off 
yet another month of national agitation to force the BDG to 
hold early elections.  Attacking the judiciary has upped the 
political pressure on the BNP because, if the courts are 
significantly disrupted, assertions will spread that the BDG 
is unable to govern.  Even at the more corrupt lower levels, 
the judiciary remains, after the military, Bangladesh's most 
venerable government institution, and attacks on it are 
deeply worrisome to civil society.  The BDG has scrambled to 
provide bodyguards for about 75 senior judges, but it cannot 
"guarantee" security for all 877 judges, much less the 700 to 
800 magistrates who, as members of the Executive branch, 
adjudicate issues at the local level. 
 
Issues To Watch 
--------------- 
 
6. (C) Will the JMB attacks, and the BDG's failure to capture 
seven senior JMB leaders, finally give the AL an issue to 
generate real pressure on the BNP?  Education Minister Farooq 
gloomily predicted to Charge that JMB attacks would spread to 
local government officials and then MP's.  Will the broader 
civil service feel threatened and join the opposition?  The 
civil service has been alienated by BNP promotion and 
assignment policies, and in 1996 its delegation to then 
President expressing concern about the prevailing political 
instability was a major factor in forcing the BNP government 
to accede to new elections. 
 
7. (S) Will JMB violence expand to include foreigners or 
minorities?  BDG officials downplay the impact of JMB attacks 
on foreign investment by noting that no foreigners have been 
attacked.  JMB detainees have reportedly told interrogators 
that they are unaware of any plans to target Westerners, 
which would not be surprising given the detainees' junior 
status.  Interestingly, there has been no comment on the fact 
that at least two of the judges attacked by JMB are Hindus, a 
reflection of the widespread acceptance of Hindus in public 
service and also because there is no evidence or JMB claim 
that they were targeted because of their faith.  However, 
there could be as many as 100 non-Muslim judges (mostly 
Hindus), and in the JMB universe they are presumably unfit to 
interpret Islamic law. 
 
8. (C) Will the BDG make the strategic decision to recognize 
that Islamic extremism is a real problem?  Will it take some 
relatively easy steps, like creating a CT bureau in DGFI or 
holding accountable wayward ruling coalition members, to 
improve its chances of defeating the JMB?  Or will it 
continue to blame the attacks on people (i.e., India and the 
opposition) who want to destabilize the government?  Late 
November 17, local media reported that the Bangladesh Rifles 
have recovered explosives near the Indian border in Sylhet 
similar to those used in a JMB attack; this could be a 
prelude to reasserting an Indian connection to the violence 
and even a response to Indian PM Singh's counter-terrorism 
warnings to Pakistan and Bangladesh at the SAARC summit. 
 
9. (C) How committed is JMB to challenging the political 
status quo?  Some Bangladeshis allege there was a truce that 
led to the JMB's postponing attacks until after the SAARC 
summit; AL president Sheikh Hasina predictably attributed 
that timing to proof that the bombers acted at BDG direction. 
 Will JMB expand its target list to include political 
leaders?  Political violence in Bangladesh traditionally 
plays out at the lower levels, which is one reason the 
attacks in the past two years on AL leaders are viewed as so 
alarming.  However, before the JMB onslaught, no judge to our 
knowledge had ever been killed in Bangladesh, and Ahsanullah 
Master and Shah Kibria are the only serving MP's who have 
been assassinated in office.  The assassination of the two 
Jhalakathi judges may have been a bungled suicide attack; 
will there be a more clear-cut next time? 
 
Comment and Next Steps 
---------------------- 
 
10. (S) Three months after the August 17 attacks, we have 
crossed one and perhaps two important tripwires: the 
continuation of terrorist attacks, and the introduction of 
suicide bombers.  Septels next week will assess BDG efforts 
to defeat the JMB, suggest benchmarks for gauging BDG 
performance, and propose a game plan for focusing the BDG on 
its terrorist challenge. 
CHAMMAS