US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU2264

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, ECON, PGOV, NP 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  ARMY PLAN TO INITIATE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
FORCE 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2169 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a November 21 meeting with Ambassadors and Nepali 
business leaders, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pyar Jung 
Thapa announced plans to form a 3,000-man "industrial 
security force" within the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).  If 
approved by the Cabinet, this new force, which he expects to 
be operational with the next six months, will be dedicated to 
providing security for sensitive business and industrial 
operations.  The General also discussed the possible creation 
of "village defense forces," or local militias, in remote 
areas, a proposal not favored by other senior military 
leaders.  End summary. 
 
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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE ANNOUNCED 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU)  On November 21 Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pyar 
Jung Thapa briefed business leaders, heads of binational 
Chambers of Commerce, and foreign ambassadors on plans to 
form an "industrial security force" within the Royal Nepal 
Army (RNA).  The mission of the new unit will be to provide 
security to sensitive business and industrial establishments. 
  Thapa proposed that 3,000 of the 10,000 new RNA recruits 
will form the core of the new force.  The new force could be 
trained and ready for deployment by May.  The proposal to 
form the force is now before the Cabinet, he said. 
 
3.  (SBU)  According to the proposal, the RNA will provide 
the manpower, training and equipment for the force, Thapa 
said, but private businesses benefiting from the enhanced 
protection will be expected to provide food, uniforms, and 
housing for the troops.  Thus all new business projects 
should factor security costs into their budgets, he 
cautioned.  (Note:  He did not provide estimated annual costs 
for maintaining the force.  End note.)  Despite being tied 
down with the tasks of providing security to 75 district 
headquarters, sensitive infrastructure like airports and 
hydroelectric plants, and key personnel and facilities within 
the capital, the RNA must take on this additional role 
because the civil police and Armed Police Force (APF) are 
unable to do so at this time.  The RNA does not enjoy 
performing such "peripheral duties," but recognizes its duty 
to do so, Thapa said, noting the Army's patrolling of customs 
checkpoints had resulted in a 30-40 percent increase in 
revenue collection. The RNA will begin the task of protecting 
businesses; the civil police and APF will then pick up their 
share of the burden later as their capability improves.  The 
RNA can advise investors and entrepreneurs on site selection 
for new projects, he added.  Ambassador Malinowski suggested 
that the RNA designate a point of contact for businessmen 
with questions or concerns regarding security.  Thapa agreed 
to do so. 
 
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VILLAGE DEFENSE FORCES 
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4.  (C)   The military alone, stretched as it is with 
"peripheral duties" and maintaining security at key sites, 
cannot counter the insurgency, Thapa warned.  The APF is not 
yet adequately trained, and is "only taking up resources 
right now."  The RNA is thus considering developing "a new 
strategy" of employing "village defense forces" to supplement 
security in remote areas.  Villagers would be trained and 
armed with shotguns and muskets.  The villagers would be the 
first line of defense under this strategy, while the RNA 
would provide "a reaction force."  Members of the new 
militias could also provide information on Maoist activities 
and plans so the RNA could mount large-scale attacks.  For 
this strategy to work, formation of the militias must also be 
linked up with solid rural development plans for these areas, 
Thapa noted.  The UK Ambassador suggested that his goverment 
might be able to provide some experts on civil defense forces 
to assist with this strategy. 
 
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HOW ARE THE MAOISTS DOING? 
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5.  (C)  The Maoists' savage tactics have eroded their 
erstwhile popular support, Thapa declared.  Only about 20-30 
percent of their current forces are "hard-core," he 
estimated, while another 50 percent may have been conscripted 
forcibly into their ranks.  Rural areas have been depopulated 
as one-time residents flee forced conscription.  The Maoists' 
new strategy is to target schoolchildren for recruitment, 
Thapa said. 
 
6.  (C)  The RNA controls the headquarters of all 75 
districts.  Outside district headquarters, however, is 
another matter, Thapa acknowledged.  Some districts, such as 
Rolpa, are almost completely Maoist.  He speculated that the 
Maoists may be attempting to move south of their original 
power base in Rukum-Rolpa-Jajarkot, where most of the people 
are ethnic Magar, toward Dang, where much of the population 
are disaffected Tharus and Kamaiyas, the former bonded 
laborer class.  The Maoists appear better armed than before, 
he continued, and undoubtedly have better weapons and 
training than the civilian police.  In the battle in Jumla, 
for example (Reftel), they fired 81 mm mortars at close 
range.   The insurgents occupied civilian homes in their 
effort to take the district headquarters, making it difficult 
for the RNA to return fire.  Nonetheless, the RNA battalion 
succeeded in turning back a Maoist attack at the brigade 
level.  The RNA had improved perimeter defenses around the 
headquarters.  In the past, the Maoists have successfully 
used hooks to pull apart barbed wire defenses.  In Jumla, 
however, the RNA had used double and triple strands of barbed 
wire that the Maoists had been unable to penetrate. 
 
7.  (C)  The Maoists are not sincere about dialogue, Thapa 
asserted, adding the RNA had captured Maoist documents 
indicating that talks were to be used only as a ploy. 
Nonetheless, talks can be a good thing, he suggested, and the 
Government must remain open to them.  Altogether, 16,000 
Maoists have surrendered, he noted, but the Government still 
lacks an effective program for their rehabilitation.  Right 
now, surrendered Maoists are put on parole, whence they 
frequently disappear.  Thapa said he has raised with the 
Government the possibility of setting up rehabilitation 
camps, as had been operational in Sri Lanka.  Such camps 
could also be a magnet to draw in others debating whether to 
surrender, he said. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C)  The business community, caught between frequent 
general strikes and even more frequent extortion demands, has 
been pleading with the RNA to augment its protection of key 
business and investment enterprises.  The RNA, strapped for 
both human and financial resources, is clearly looking to the 
business community to fill at least part of the budgetary 
shortfall.  Gen. Thapa's presentation is the first indication 
of any RNA enthusiasm we have heard for the concept of local 
militias.  Clearly a village defense force is a difficult 
program to implement successfully for a variety of reasons, 
including caste and educational disparities, logistical 
factors, and security concerns.  The RNA and the Government 
will have to plan very carefully how to train, equip, and 
employ this local militia, lest it become a hapless victim of 
the Maoists and a source of additional weapons for them. 
Other senior military leaders have told us that they have 
serious doubts about this proposal. When informed of the 
concept, IGP Shrestha of the APF quipped that it would be 
better to supply the villagers with cell phones (which 
Shrestha knows would not work in most of Nepal) than arms. 
What the Government most needs from the villagers is timely 
intelligence, Shrestha said. 
 
 
MALINOWSKI