US embassy cable - 05NAIROBI4758

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, SU, KE, SLM, CPA 
SUBJECT: SUDAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY CONFERS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERS IN NAIROBI 
 
 
Classified By: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a November 8 meeting with 
international partners in Nairobi, Deputy Secretary Zoellick 
emphasized the urgency of conveying to the various parties in 
Sudan the need to regain momentum in implementing the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  Speaking with representatives 
from Europe, Canada and the UN ahead of his session with the 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), Zoellick outlined US 
objectives for next steps with respect to Sudan, and his 
message to the SLM rebels to unify.  The international 
partners present were supportive of the Deputy Secretary's 
initiative and agreed that the Government of National Unity 
in Khartoum needed to be demonstrably more inclusive.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Deputy Secretary Zoellick 
Dr. Cindy Courville, Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for African Affairs, NSC 
Mike Gerson, NSC 
D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla 
Viraj LeBailly, Embassy Notetaker 
 
International Partners 
Jim Wall, Canadian High Commissioner, Nairobi 
Francesca Arato, Regional Political Section, European 
Commission, Nairobi 
Jean-Christophe Belliard, Africa Task Force, Council of the 
European Union, Brussels 
Antoine Anfre, French Deputy Head of Mission, Nairobi 
Taye Zerihoun, UN Principal Deputy Special Representative of 
the Secretary General 
Eva Rogers, United Nations 
Pekka Haavisto, European Union 
Wim Wessels, Ambassador, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, The Hague 
Vegard Ellefsen, Director General, Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Oslo 
Kjell Hoednebo, Senior Advisor, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Oslo 
Alan Goulty, Special Envoy for Sudan, United Kingdom 
Gerard Prunier, Head of French Delegation, Addis Ababa 
 
CARROTS AND STICKS FOR ACTION NOW 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Speaking with representatives from Canada, Europe, 
and the UN, the Deputy Secretary highlighted the urgent need 
for the parties in Sudan to hasten implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the importance of the 
international community sending a strong message to the 
rebels that they will not succeed militarily.  The Deputy 
Secretary outlined the US objectives of pressing Abdul Wahid 
 
SIPDIS 
to issue a statement of respect for the cease-fire and the 
Abuja process, urging the Government of National Unity (GNU) 
to follow through on establishing the commissions required by 
the terms of the CPA, and encouraging the SPLM in its efforts 
to implement the CPA.  He added that in his meeting with the 
SLM later that day, he would urge unification and discuss 
ways it could be accomplished. 
 
4.  (C) On unification, the Deputy Secretary explained, there 
were a number of carrots the U.S. could offer: support for 
understanding the provisions of the CPA; continued contact 
with the U.S. if the cease-fire and negotiations are 
respected; financial support for attending negotiations; and, 
if progress is evident, possible targeted aid and/or an 
invitation to visit the U.S.  As for sticks, he would make it 
clear there is no international tolerance for violence and no 
scope for military success.  The Deputy Secretary also 
stressed the importance of addressing the potential 
transition from the current AU force to a UN peacekeeping 
mission, as well as the possibility of SPLM forces in 
Khartoum as part of the joint integrated units provided for 
in the CPA. 
 
PARTNERS WANT TO SEE REAL UNITY 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The international partners present were 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Deputy Secretary's 
initiative and agreed that the GNU needed to be demonstrably 
more inclusive.  Haavisto cited the urgent need for some 
outcome from Abuja, even if it is only a recommitment to the 
cease-fire and remarked that it was necessary to hold 
Khartoum to its word.  The UK's Goulty countered that if the 
cease-fire was strong, there would be less need to move 
quickly in Abuja, but agreed on the need for a clear message 
that an upsurge in violence during the seventh round would 
not influence the negotiations.  Goulty added that the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) should be reminded that 
the situation in Darfur could undermine the achievements of 
the CPA. 
 
6.  (C) Asked about his current assessment of the SLM, the 
Deputy Secretary responded that there were three options for 
the group.  They could unify both politically and in their 
position, they could establish a joint position without 
coming together politically, or they could remain separate 
but still engage in negotiations.  Zerihoun advised against 
focusing solely on Darfur in favor of a broader approach. 
Acknowledging the possible sticks and carrots the Deputy 
Secretary had outlined, Zerihoun further suggested that those 
 
SIPDIS 
present needed to move beyond the current problems which were 
stalling the talks, and instead think about the outcome, 
working backwards from there. 
 
7.  (C) Wessels commented that the international community 
ought to urge the parties to consider possible repercussions 
if they could not achieve internal peace.  He asked 
rhetorically whether the international community would apply 
sanctions and, if so, whether they would be effective. 
Wessels also expressed concern that the SLM leadership had no 
ideology and no connection to the people suffering in Darfur 
camps.  Ellefsen commented that the CPA and Darfur could not 
be separated with both requiring attention, and that for UN 
forces to replace the AU, there had to be forward movement. 
The Deputy Secretary responded that the transition had to be 
done in such a way that the AU could be seen as having 
fulfilled its mission.  He also cautioned against the 
perception that a UN force would be a panacea. 
ROWE