US embassy cable - 05ALMATY4076

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 004076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN J. MUDGE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: KZ, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, 2005 Election 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. ALMATY 3924 
     B. ALMATY 4029 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  President Nazarbayev's chief political 
strategist told the Ambassador on November 4 that he was 
confident of Nazarbayev's convincing lead in the presidential 
race, and even somewhat surprised that the opposition had not 
made a stronger showing to date.  Deputy Presidential 
Administration Head Marat Tazhin said that Nazarbayev has 
enjoyed consistent ratings of 69-75% since July.  In 
contrast, For a Just Kazakhstan candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay 
and Ak Zhol candidate Alikhan Baymenov were polling at the 
most 12% and 6% respectively nationwide.  Tazhin indicated 
that certain regional leaders had been reprimanded for 
interfering in opposition campaign events, but maintained 
that overall Tuyakbay and Baymenov have been able to campaign 
freely and get their message out in the press.  He indicated 
that the implementation of democratic reforms after the 
election would depend in large part on which camp within the 
government came out on top.  Tazhin hinted that Nazarbayev's 
October 24 statement regarding his willingness to work with 
the opposition after the elections had created the basis for 
cooperation with opposition leaders.  Tazhin also reported 
that the decision had been made to free jailed opposition 
leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Deputy Head of the 
Presidential Administration Marat Tazhin in Astana on 
November 4 to discuss the political environment in the run-up 
to December 4 presidential elections. 
 
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Zhakiyanov to Be Freed 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Tazhin opened the conversation by informing the 
Ambassador that opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov would 
be freed.  Tazhin explained that the judicial process would 
take another three to four weeks, but the fundamental 
decision to free him had been made.  He commented that U.S. 
interventions had had an impact on the GOK's decision, which 
he contrasted with the handling of the Khodorkovskiy case in 
Russia and described as an example of Kazakhstan's capacity 
for modernization.  (Note:  On November 2, the administration 
of the "settlement colony" in Shiderty where Zhakiyanov is 
being held formally recommended him for release.  A court 
must now act on the recommendation.  Zhakiyanov's wife 
Karlygash told POEC chief on November 2 that she is confident 
that the court will ratify the colony administration's 
recommendation.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------ 
Presidential Campaign "Boring" 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) When asked by the Ambassador how the campaign was 
progressing, Tazhin exclaimed that it was "boring."  He had 
expected more changes in the popularity ratings of the 
candidates after the campaign began.  Instead, Nazarbayev's 
rating had remained stable; Tazhin attributed this to the 
positive economic situation, the effect of Nazarbayev's 
February 1 address to the nation, the impact of unrest in 
Kyrgyzstan and Andijon, and the increase in Nazarbayev's 
domestic and international activity.  Tazhin added that 
Nazarbayev's October 24 statement regarding his willingness 
to work with the opposition after the election if they behave 
responsibly during the campaign had also had the desired 
positive effect. 
 
5. (C) Tazhin commented that the opposition candidates have 
been able to campaign nationwide and get their message out to 
the public.  Newspapers that support FJK candidate Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbay have a weekly print run of 700,000-940,000 copies. 
The Ambassador noted that there have been many problems with 
seizures and interference with the delivery of opposition 
papers.  Tazhin minimized the issue, claiming that delivery 
problems resulted from the opposition papers' use of 
unreliable distributors.  He said that these papers were now 
negotiating an agreement with KazPost that would improve 
distribution.  (Note:  Opposition representatives have told 
us in the past that papers sent via KazPost often do not 
reach their destination.  End note.)  Tazhin questioned the 
wisdom of the opposition's strategy of holding meetings with 
300-400 people at a time in cities around the country, rather 
than doing larger events that would reach a wider audience. 
He also commented that Tuyakbay and Baymenov were not 
purchasing many television ads. 
 
----------------------- 
 
Tuyakbay Polling 10-12% 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C) Turning back to Tuyakbay, Tazhin noted that he has 
significant financial resources.  He claimed that opposition 
media frequently violates electoral law by running 
"propaganda" in support of Tuyakbay that is not paid for by 
the campaign.  Tazhin noted with irritation that the same 
people then criticize the official media for reporting on 
Nazarbayev.  Polls commissioned by the Presidential 
Administration show that Tuyakbay's nationwide rating has 
increased from 5% to 10-12%.  In Almaty, Tuyakbay is polling 
about 15%.  Tazhin predicted that Tuyakbay could reach 17-20% 
if he campaigns well.  He is hindered by his relative lack of 
charisma and "overly serious" demeanor. 
 
-------------- 
Baymenov at 6% 
-------------- 
 
7. (C) Baymenov is polling around 6% nationwide, according to 
Tazhin, and about 8% in Almaty.  He has the benefit of a 
nationwide, albeit weak, party structure and an experienced 
campaign team.  The PA had done a psychological focus group 
on Baymenov, which revealed that he is also helped by his 
youth, his mastery of the Kazakh language, his openness to 
change, and his warmth and genuine enjoyment of contact with 
the public.  Baymenov is hindered, according to Tazhin, by 
his lack of financial resources and newspapers.  Tazhin 
predicted that Baymenov could raise his rating with a good 
campaign and strong showing in the televised debate the CEC 
is organizing November 17. 
 
---------------------------- 
Nazarbayev Steady Since July 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Returning to Nazarbayev's own polling data, Tazhin 
reported that the president had been polling in the 69-75% 
range nationwide since July.  His rating in Almaty, which 
Tazhin described as "the most politicized" area of the 
country, was 56-58%.  Russians and other Slavs strongly 
support Nazarbayev, according to Tazhin, because they were 
scared by the March events in Kyrgyzstan and see Nazarbayev 
as a guarantor of stability.  Tazhin predicted that undecided 
voters would break predominantly toward Nazarbayev.  One 
expert group he convened told him that he was underestimating 
to what degree external stress could impact voters' 
decision-making, for example the likelihood that instability 
in other countries could make voters shy away from change. 
Tazhin pointed out that Nazarbayev received 79% in the last 
presidential election in 1999, which was a time of economic 
crisis.  (Comment:  It was also not a contested election. 
End comment.)  Tazhin expressed bewilderment as to why the 
opposition "insisted" on elections this year, with the 
economy strong and Nazarbayev in excellent health. 
 
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Role of the Akims 
----------------- 
 
9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the 
role of the akims in the upcoming election, Tazhin remarked 
that regional leaders are actually offended because Astana 
has sent such strong signals about the need for accurate 
voter lists, the prohibition of the use of administrative 
resources to influence results or procedures, and the 
requirement to send voting results to Astana quickly.  Tazhin 
affirmed that the procedural situation will be "different 
this time" compared to the 2004 parliamentary elections. 
 
-------------------------- 
Problems with the Campaign 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador informed Tazhin that the Embassy had 
received many reports of problems with opposition campaign 
events in the regions, primarily with agitators occupying 
space reserved for campaign events or attempting to disrupt 
them in other ways.   This had happened in a long list of 
cities around the country.  Tazhin minimized the problem, 
acknowledging that there had been "anecdotal events" in a few 
places like Semipalatinsk in northeast Kazakhstan.  He 
conceded that some akims were believed to have been involved 
in the incidents, and said that the PA had called them 
afterwards to chastise them.  Tazhin noted that it was a 
positive thing that none of the candidates had encountered 
physical violence.  (Note:  Likely a reference to the attacks 
on Tuyakbay in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Shymkent in the spring. 
End note.) 
 
11. (C)  The Ambassador asked about the two seizures of 
opposition newspaper Svoboda Slova (Ref A).  Tazhin claimed 
that the seizures had been order by the city procurator 
because the paper ran articles insulting the honor and 
dignity of President Nazarbayev.  Tazhin said that such 
articles were having a significant negative public impact, 
and he agreed fully with the seizure orders.  He asserted 
that Kazakhstani authorities would do the same if any other 
candidate were similarly insulted.  Tazhin once again 
contrasted the GOK's approach to that of the opposition, 
remarking that authorities "had not attacked the opposition 
despite the fact that several of them have been involved in 
criminal affairs."  Tazhin said that former Nazarbayev 
ally-turned-outspoken opposition activist Zamanbek Nurkadilov 
had broken the law by alleging that Nazarbayev was behind the 
murder of Turgut Ozal.  He claimed that Tuyakbay's son lives 
in Boston in a house purchased with bribes from James Giffen. 
 Tazhin added that Baymenov has  "problems" with his 
relatives as well, but did not offer any details.  He alleged 
that while akim of Pavlodar oblast, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov had 
stolen several businesses, even going so far as to order that 
medical care be withheld from a heart attack victim until he 
signed over his company. 
 
------------------- 
After the Elections 
------------------- 
 
12. (C) Tazhin observed that the real question was not who 
would win the presidential elections, given Nazarbayev's 
consistently high ratings, but which camp within the current 
government would come out on top -- the conservatives or the 
modernizers.  The Ambassador commented that the program of 
democratic reforms that Tazhin had outlined during his 
meeting with USOSCE Ambassador Finley (Ref B) was impressive. 
 Tazhin agreed that a real plan existed, but cautioned that 
it would be necessary to see how it was implemented.  In his 
view, it was already "a bit late" for such reforms.  He 
informed the Ambassador that local akims, even those known to 
be conservative, were generally in favor of direct elections. 
 Tazhin pointed out that without giving local leaders more 
control over the budget, however, it would be pointless to 
implement direct elections.  Of the 28 local akims elected in 
the recent experimental elections, he noted, many had already 
resigned because they were not able to govern effectively 
without such authority. 
 
13. (C) Summing up the conversation, Tazhin told the 
Ambassador that he was "calm" about the elections.  If the 
voting was conducted in a procedurally clean way and the 
opposition received the expected amount of votes, there would 
be a basis for future work. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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