US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2492

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOTE BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS. GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, NP 
SUBJECT:  CPN-UML LEADER: DIALOGUE, NOT ALLIANCE, WITH 
MAOISTS 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2384 (EXDIS-NOTAL) 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 2400 
     C. KATHMANDU 2388 (EXDIS-NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1. (C) In a November 15 meeting with CPN-UML General 
Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Ambassador emphasized that 
 
SIPDIS 
the USG was not against dialogue between the political 
parties and the Maoists with the goal of bringing the Maoists 
into the political mainstream.  While not clearly admitting 
or denying that his party had initialed an agreement (ref A) 
with the Maoists, the CPN-UML leader refuted reports that his 
party had formed an alliance with the Maoists and claimed 
that it would not do so unless the Maoists renounced 
violence.  He argued that CPN-UML was engaged in a dialogue 
with the Maoists in an attempt to transform the latter's 
ideological thinking and bring them into the political 
mainstream.  He said he was encouraged by recent contacts 
with the Maoists, believing that the Maoist leadership, or at 
least Baburam Bhattarai, understood that the Maoists were 
losing political support and thus needed to seek a political 
solution.  MK Nepal requested support from the international 
community in monitoring any resulting peace process, 
explaining that the political parties knew that they needed 
guarantees as the Maoists might be bluffing.  He admitted 
that the Parties could only enter the villages and districts 
if the Maoists allowed them to.  His party planned to hold 
demonstrations against the King's autocratic actions in the 
five regions beginning November 19 and culminating about 
December 5 in Kathmandu.  End Summary. 
 
Dialogue, Not Alliance 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador underlined to CPN-UML General Secretary 
Madhav Kumar Nepal that the USG did not oppose dialogue 
between the political parties and the Maoists, but also 
strongly supported the political parties' assertion that they 
would not enter into an alliance with the Maoists while the 
latter still engaged in violence.  The Ambassador explained 
that, in addition to the obvious dangers of being ultimately 
devoured by the Maoists, such an alliance could cost the 
Parties domestic political support.  It could also provide 
grounds to the Palace to take action against UML as an 
organization that was cooperating with a totalitarian 
movement using violence to overthrow the government.  MK 
Nepal was categorical in asserting that CPN-UML would not 
form an alliance with the Maoists until the latter renounced 
violence.  He clarified that, at this time, they were only 
engaged in a dialogue.  Abandoning talk of an alliance, MK 
Nepal cited the UML Ninth Central Committee meeting September 
decision to pursue a policy of "dialogue, struggle and 
transformation" with the Maoists as the basis for his party's 
actions. 
 
Give Maoists Space, Time to Transform 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) MK Nepal stated that he wanted to give the Maoists 
"the benefit of the doubt."  He also believed that the Maoist 
leadership, specifically Baburam Bhattarai, had realized that 
the Maoists have not been able to win the support of the 
people.  The "people's revolts" in Dailekh and elsewhere over 
the summer had made them realize something was wrong and they 
recognized they had alienated the people.  Given this 
recognition, MK Nepal hoped that the Maoists would transform 
their thought and genuinely accept multi-party democracy.  He 
acknowledged that they would not change their actions or 
tactics until this change had occurred, and he wanted to give 
them the time and space to allow for this "transformation." 
 
But Still Worried By Maoists 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Admitting the strong possibility that the Maoists 
could be engaging in dialogue as part of a ploy to further 
their objectives, MK Nepal called on the international 
community to monitor and verify both the process to reach an 
understanding with the Maoists as well as any resulting peace 
process.  He discounted the possibility of India or the EU 
playing a monitoring role, insisting the UN should do so.  He 
explained that the international community needed to get 
involved to act as a guarantor in case the Maoists violated 
their commitments.  MK Nepal suggested that the Maoists would 
have to hand over their weapons if they reached an agreement 
about elections for a constitutional assembly.  He also noted 
that if the Maoists chose to join the interim government that 
would organize elections to a constitutional assembly, they 
would have to surrender their arms at that point.  He added, 
however, that Maoist participation in an interim government 
could be problematic.  At all junctures, the international 
community could help determine whether the Maoists had 
resorted to their old practices of using violence. 
 
5. (C) MK Nepal said that the Maoist threat was still alive 
and well.  He recognized that the Maoists could prevent the 
Parties from entering the villages and mobilizing the people. 
 He indicated that was one of the reasons his party was 
engaged in a dialogue with the insurgents.  He explained that 
the Maoist army was a force that could continue to intimidate 
and threaten local villages.  MK Nepal reported that the 
degree of Maoist interference in party activities varied from 
district to district and that his party still encountered 
difficulties, including abductions, in some places. 
 
Maoist Cease-fire to Continue? 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) The CPN-UML leader said that his party had encouraged 
the Maoists to continue the cease-fire, but he was unsure 
whether they would do so.  He noted that the increased 
domestic and international sympathy that the Maoists gained 
from their unilateral cease-fire outweighed any physical 
losses they may have suffered.  Noting he had no specific 
information on Maoist intentions, he speculated that if there 
were no municipal elections, the Maoists might extend their 
cease-fire; or, if a fully-empowered multi-party government 
were put in place, the Maoists might move to an indefinite 
cease-fire. 
 
Possibility of Reconciliation with the Palace? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador urged MK Nepal to explore talks with 
the King, if the King reached out to the political parties. 
MK Nepal only acknowledged that there "needed to be some kind 
of balance" (implying that the Parties would need to balance 
their relations with the Maoists with their relations with 
the Palace), but would not commit to anything more.  The 
Ambassador pointed out that the international community would 
support elections only if they could be credible, which 
seemed doubtful in the current environment.  He cautioned, 
however, that the international community would never condone 
Maoist assassination attempts against candidates.  (Note: UML 
Acting General Secretary Bamdev Gautam said in a late October 
interview that the Maoists would make candidates in the 
elections "six inches shorter."  End Note.) 
 
Party Plans Regional Demonstrations 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) MK Nepal set forth his party's plans for the near 
future.  In addition to continuing to review Maoist documents 
to determine their intentions and pulsing district cadres for 
their experiences and suggestions, the party would hold 
demonstrations against the King's autocratic rule in the 
regional areas.  MK Nepal expected at least 50,000 cadres to 
participate in each.  He outlined the schedule: November 19 
in Butwal (in the west); November 26 in Pokhara (also in the 
west); November 28 in Janakpur (near the Indian border in the 
Central region); December 2 in Biratnagar (in the east); and 
December 5 in Kathmandu.  He also indicated that the 
Seven-Party Alliance would meet this month to discuss 
mobilizing in Kathmandu. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (C) On November 14, MK Nepal had told reporters that the 
CPN-UML was ready to surrender their weapons under UN 
supervision if there were consensus about constituent 
assembly elections; the Maoists have thus far been silent on 
the issue.  In private, MK Nepal was not as positive about 
Maoist intentions, requesting the international community's 
involvement.  A November 16 editorial in the English-language 
daily "The Kathmandu Post" suggested that Maoist leaders 
should speak for themselves rather than through CPN-UML 
leaders. 
 
10. (C) MK Nepal seemed uncomfortable at times and evaded 
many of the Ambassador's questions.  He seemed to have gotten 
our message, however, as he remained firm on the point that 
his party would not enter into an alliance with the Maoists 
until they renounced violence.  He is looking for some kind 
of way out, and seeing no signs from the Palace, is looking 
to the Maoists and grasping at straws. 
MORIARTY