US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA3400

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 003400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, IR, IZ 
SUBJECT:  US-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST 
 
REF: (A) OTTAWA 3283 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.   On October 26 in Ottawa, NEA DAS Gordon 
Gray and a U.S. delegation exchanged views with EU Troika 
officials on developments in Iran and countries in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  Tri-lateral consultations 
with the EU and Canada on Iran are reported reftel.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) U.S. Participants: 
- Gordon Gray, NEA DAS 
- Jason Bruder, Iran desk officer 
- Roopa Rangaswamy, nuclear nonproliferation officer (ISN/RA) 
- Patricia Kim-Scott, Embassy polmil officer (notetaker) 
 
EU Commission Participants: 
- Julian Evans, UK Deputy High Commissioner for the 
Presidency 
- Peter Bainbridge, UK FCO 
- Patrick Laurent, European Commission 
- Bjorn Larsson, European Council Secretariat 
- Chris Kendall, EC Representative Ottawa 
- Martin Gaertner, Austrian Permanent Mission to the EU 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
3. (C) UK Deputy H/C Evans briefly summarized the morning 
discussion about Iran (reftel/NOTAL), noting that the EU 
generally was on the same page as Canada.  EU shared 
perceptions about what it could (and could not) do vis-a-vis 
Iran.  As Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Canada was 
obliged to take a tougher line on Iran's nuclear activities 
but had been very supportive of EU efforts. 
 
4. (C) Laurent stated that Western efforts to publicly 
isolate Iran merely served to whip up nationalistic fervor. 
The key to changing Iran's nuclear ambitions lay in the 
internal dynamics of the country.  Evans said the challenge 
was getting Iran to engage constructively, as they seemed to 
be in permanent "transmit mode." 
 
5. (C) Gray said the U.S. goal was to modify Iran's behavior. 
 We want to avoid creating the impression that our policy 
differences with Iran are the result of U.S.-Iranian 
disagreements.  India's IAEA vote helped shake the perception 
that these are first versus third world issues. 
 
U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON REFORM IN ARAB COUNTRIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
6. (C) Drawing on his recent posting in Cairo, Gray shared 
insights into the progress of political reform in Egypt.  The 
upcoming parliamentary elections would be a good indicator of 
the government's commitment to democratic reform; civil 
society was gaining confidence.  Assistance from the West was 
still needed, particularly in areas such as electoral 
monitoring, and he encouraged EU involvement. 
 
7. (C) Regarding Palestinian elections, Gray said Hamas 
participation was a key issue; it was difficult to envision a 
democratic process that included militias.  Such groups would 
have to decide between engaging in the political process and 
continuing armed conflict.  That being said, Hamas was 
unlikely to disarm by the January 26, election. 
 
8. (C) Gray welcomed EU participation in and financial 
support for the Forum for the Future conference in Bahrain, 
November 11-12.  He noted that cooperation among the U.S., EU 
and G-8 countries had been very good. 
 
9. (C) As in the rest of the region, there were positive 
signs that democracy was taking root in Lebanon.  Despite the 
legacy of civil war and the Syrian occupation, Lebanon seemed 
to be moving in the right direction in that the Lebanese had 
greater freedom to determine their future. 
 
EU COMMENTS 
----------- 
 
10. (C) Representing the incoming Austrian presidency, 
Gaertner said the EU broadly shared the U.S. view of 
developments in the region and thanked Gray for his 
on-the-ground perspective of progress in Egypt.  At the same 
time, in ten years of trying to bring reform to the 
Mediterranean Arab world (the Barcelona process) it was 
dismaying to observe the continuing insistence of some 
governments on "non-interference in internal affairs."  EU 
Presidency thinking on this was evolving, Gaertner said. 
Every country in the region had unique experiences and 
challenges in undertaking reform.  Some cases turned out 
better than expected, such as Turkey.  Europe's Christian 
democrat tradition was a model that could be adapted to a 
Muslim country to help steer reform.  The risk of following 
"our" own agenda, he said, was another Algeria. 
 
11. (C) In dealing with Islam, it was important to maintain a 
dialogue between civilizations in order to convey a vision of 
Islam in a pluralistic world.  Conferences that promoted 
Christian-Islamic dialogue and dialogue among Jews, 
Christians and Muslims were an important tool to illustrate 
the benefits of "co-existence." 
 
12. (C) The EU's efforts to promote economic reforms had 
produced mixed results.  While countries in the MED dialogue 
complained about the lack of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from Europe, they had failed to create the conditions on the 
ground to facilitate FDI. 
 
13. (C) Alluding to the EU-Canadian discussion of 
Syria/Lebanon the previous day, Evans noted that while there 
was no "smoking gun" evidence in the Mehlis report on the 
Hariri assassination, there were interesting implications. 
The next move was up to Syria, he said.  Evans flagged EU 
concern for Yemen as one of the poorest countries in the 
Middle East.  The EU had held some discussions on drug 
trafficking and economic/social reforms but with mixed 
results. 
 
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------------ 
 
14. (C) Peter Bainbridge provided a briefing on the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Barcelona Process), the EU's 
main tool for outreach to the near Middle East and North 
Africa.  In the ten years since the launch of the Barcelona 
Process, bilateral agreements had been made with a majority 
of the countries in the region to implement work plans in a 
number of areas, including education, economic reform, 
governance and migration.  Nonetheless, illiteracy rates 
remained high, especially among women.  The EU hoped to 
establish a governance fund from which monies would be 
allocated as Mediterranean countries met their targets; the 
approach might spur healthy competition among contenders. 
The Euro-Med electoral observer system had proved a useful 
tool to engage civil society.  Bainbridge noted that in all 
its approaches, the EU increasingly sought to promote its 
image as a "player, not a payer." 
 
15. (C) Bainbridge echoed Gray's assessment of positive 
change in Lebanon and the opportunity that is now before the 
Lebanese people.  The European Neighborhood Policy Action 
Plan included incentives for undertaking reforms that 
hopefully would encourage the Lebanese government. 
 
MAGHREB REGION 
-------------- 
 
16. (C) Laurent said that the "Basra Process" involving the 
countries of the Maghreb region was on track.  He gave good 
marks to Morocco and Jordan, and a "relatively good" for 
Tunisia, noting that it was not up to par on human rights and 
governance.  In Lebanon, there was a "resurgence" of 
difficulties in governance.  Hopefully, the progress of 
Morocco and Jordan would serve as an accelerator in the 
region. 
 
17. (C) The EU thought that Egypt was "playing" the Basra 
Process to avoid being driven to reforms; this manipulation 
put a damper on the speed of reforms.  At the same time, 
however, Laurent agreed with Gray that the creation of 
"political space" in Egypt needed to be encouraged.  The U.S. 
and EU differed in their respective approaches, Laurent 
observed, with the U.S. emphasizing change through civil 
society and the EU seeking to work both the government and 
civil society simultaneously.  The EU had found that the Arab 
world was open to importing "technical" knowledge but 
remained closed to advances in human rights, particularly 
women's rights. 
 
18. (C) Gray welcomed the EU's engagement of civil society in 
Egypt. The Egyptian diplomatic corps, for example, was "old 
school" and often out of touch with the leanings of its own 
government.  As in the case of dealings with Iran, it was 
important to de-associate calls for reform from government 
efforts to label these as U.S. or U.K.-driven.  It was 
important to diversify the voices calling for reform not only 
in Egypt, but the region as a whole. 
 
YEMEN 
----- 
 
19. (C) Gray said the USG shared EU concerns about Yemen. 
The Yemeni government aspired to taking the bilateral 
relationship to the next level, but the USG saw impediments, 
including a lack of consistency in its commitment to reform. 
While Yemeni cooperation on counter-terrorism was "not bad," 
it could be improved.  The same was true of cooperation on 
eradication of SA/LW, where minimal progress had been 
achieved only after a great investment of time and effort. 
Yemen had a talent for calculating the minimum it needed to 
do in order to "skate." 
 
20. (C) Laurent expressed the EU's disappointment in light of 
expectations regarding Yemen, at one time the only Arab 
country with a "germination" of democracy.  Now the country 
was so fragile it risked becoming a failed state.  It was not 
liked by the rest of the Arab world; in fact, the GCC 
countries "despised" Yemen.  The EU planned to enhance its 
classic development assistance program to improve governance. 
 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
21. (C) Evans praised the positive referendum on Iraq's new 
constitution as the best result that could have been hoped 
for.  Iraqi citizens were pleased about their autonomy and 
were now talking about ensuring that it would last.  Canada 
had been a big help in this process, and Elections Canada 
director Pierre Kingsley was already working on the next 
round of elections.  Financial assistance for Iraq remained 
crucial. The EU was a major donor, having contributed 200 
million Euros to reconstruction and another 30 million Euros 
for parliamentary elections.  Gray welcomed the EU's 
contributions to Iraq. 
 
22. (C) Laurent expressed a less positive view of Iraq 
following his recent visit to Baghdad to advance the European 
Commission's eventual offices within the premises of the UK 
mission.  Though matters were moving apace on the financial 
plan, bilateral activities had been delayed.  It was 
regrettable that the security situation was not better. 
While the constitution had been voted, a number of political 
leaders were concerned that Iraq was too weak in the center. 
This imbalance contained the seeds of future discontent.  The 
constitution had failed to achieve full inclusion of the 
Sunnis and thus polarized the country.  Europe was worried 
about the increased degree of violence.  In Iraq, everything 
was linked, from the political process to the constitution. 
There were conflicting signals on the Iraqi forces' ability 
to take their destiny into their own hands.  The infiltration 
of the civil police by insurgents was disconcerting.  Laurent 
sought U.S confirmation that some Iraqi army units were being 
reconfigured along sectarian lines.  Gray said he was unaware 
that this was the case and would look into it. 
 
23. (C) Gray noted the interconnection between security, 
political progress, and reconstruction.  Training the Iraqi 
army was a critical element.  Gray agreed that improving the 
security situation on the ground was crucial to 
reconstruction efforts.  Being able to address the basic 
quality of life issues such as access to potable water, 
housing and schooling, would make a difference. 
24. (C) At the same time, even the most optimistic observers 
could not have predicted the degree of progress achieved to 
date. The run-up to the October 15 vote was encouraging, with 
the number of predicted attacks off by two thirds.  Roughly 
fifty per cent of the electorate turned out for the elections 
in January.  Gray recommended to his EU interlocutors 
Secretary Rice's testimony of October 19 which both 
 
SIPDIS 
supporters and detractors had said provided a clear and 
articulate vision of the Administration's policy in Iraq. 
 
25. (C) Evans agreed that statistics demonstrated impressive 
progress in Iraq.  The picture on reconstruction was much 
better than one might be led to believe from the media. 
 
26. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Gray. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS