US embassy cable - 05HANOI3031

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 003031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EAP/MLS, L, INL/AAE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC, VM, CNARC, CTERR 
SUBJECT:  MPS TO FBI: LET'S UPGRADE RELATIONS 
 
This is an action request.  Please see para 17. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The early November visit of an FBI 
delegation to Hanoi, led by Ms. Deborah Pierce, Deputy 
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), 
and Mr. Thomas Fuentes, Special Agent-in-Charge, Office of 
International Operations, offered the opportunity for the 
Mission to stage two high-level meetings with the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) that resulted in groundbreaking 
proposals from MPS for increased direct cooperation. 
Interspersed in the routine exchanges were several pointed 
suggestions from MPS that the U.S. Embassy and MPS develop 
working-level documents, either memoranda of understanding 
or letters of agreement, to permit us to, in the words of a 
senior police general, "upgrade relations to more real and 
practical cooperation."  The general's proposals, made in 
front of a group of a dozen policy-level Vietnamese MPS 
officers and then seconded by the senior Vice Minister, were 
significant steps forward from the previous Vietnamese 
position, which was to reject practical law enforcement 
cooperation on legalistic grounds. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary, cont'd: Both the Vice Minister and the 
general requested assistance in three areas:  provision of 
training and equipment; cooperation and assistance in 
returning Vietnamese fugitives to Vietnam and in overcoming 
agency-level obstacles to returning those fugitives; and, 
working to help Vietnam apprehend its "terrorist enemies" 
such as Kok Ksor, Nguyen Huu Chanh, Vo Van Duc and Ly Tong. 
The next step is up to us to push our law enforcement 
cooperation agenda forward by proposing the working-level 
agreements that will give MPS the legal framework it needs 
to allow real-time cooperation.  We recommend freeing the 
draft DEA-MPS MOU from its current limbo at State Department 
and presenting it to MPS.  Following that, we should draft 
and present documents to allow FBI and DHS similar 
privileges.  End Summary. 
 
3. (SBU) The FBI delegation visited Vietnam from November 2- 
4, 2005 (see list in paragraph 18).  The Mission 
participants included DEA's Hanoi Country Office head Jeff 
Wanner, RSO Peter Gibbons, and Poloff in the group that met 
with MPS, and the DCM led the discussion.  This emphasized 
to MPS that the priorities and issues raised at the meetings 
concern the entire Mission, not just FBI. 
 
Session One:  Police Major General Thao 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Vietnamese assembled an impressive set of 
counterparts for the meetings.  The leader of the Vietnamese 
delegation for the main meeting was Police Major General 
Tran Van Thao, supported by a team of 12 MPS officials, 
listed in paragraph 19. 
 
5. (SBU) FBI and DEA both made presentations that laid out 
the USG's key concerns in Vietnam: the expanding network of 
relationships and activities between criminal groups in the 
United States and Vietnam and the lack of real, operational 
cooperation between USG and GVN law enforcement agencies, 
due largely to bureaucratic and political unwillingness on 
the part of the GVN. 
 
6. (SBU) In contrast to many previous meetings where MPS 
mouthed platitudes about increased cooperation while laying 
down insurmountable obstacles to real engagement, General 
Thao started out positive and got more specific and 
practical as the meeting progressed.  He opened the meeting 
by highlighting Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's 
June visit to the United States, Vice Minister of Public 
Security Nguyen Van Huong's meetings with security and law 
enforcement agencies in Washington on the margins of the 
PM's trip and the recent letter of appreciation from former 
Presidents Bush and Clinton thanking Vietnam for its USD 
100,000 donation to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.  After 
a recitation of MPS' accomplishments in fighting narcotics 
in Vietnam, Thao added, "I understand that the war on drugs 
needs international cooperation and support.  I highly 
appreciate the views of DEA, and am someone who supports 
upgrading our relations to include more real, practical 
cooperation on drug crimes.  I see that this kind of 
cooperation is confined to a small level dealing with money 
laundering, but it also needs to reach criminals 
themselves." 
 
7. (SBU) Later in the meeting, responding to a briefing by 
the FBI representatives, Thao expanded his offer further. 
"If American criminals of any kind have connections or 
networks in Vietnam, we are more than willing to help you. 
We can give you their identification information if we have 
it, or whatever else is in our files.  If a Vietnamese 
person commits a crime in your country and escapes, you will 
have our support in pursuing him and then handing him back 
over to you. 
 
8. (SBU) Thao then focused on the issue that has held up all 
offers of cooperation in the past:  Vietnamese legal 
obstacles.  "We are both law enforcement agencies, and we 
have to abide by the law.  Everything we do together has to 
be in strict compliance with the law.  This means that we 
need a legal framework for both sides to facilitate 
cooperation, such as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or 
some other mutual agreement to combat crimes together." 
 
9. (SBU) Explicitly recognizing that an MLAT is not a short- 
term possibility, Thao proposed a practical short-term 
alternative:  "In the long term, yes, we want a State-to- 
State MLAT.  But we know that takes a very long time.  For 
the short term, we can come up with an MOU or LOA at a lower 
level to fix problems in our cooperation.  In our 
cooperation with other countries, we have found that we can 
find a more simple and convenient method to create a direct 
MOU or LOA or other arrangement for cooperation.  In terms 
of the legal procedures, it is much simpler.  And it would 
suffice to allow our experts to work together directly." 
 
10. (SBU) Clearly reading a well-prepared talking point, and 
with the representative from the General Department of 
Security nodding in agreement, Thao concluded:  "I want to 
deliver this message:  MPS has come to absolute agreement to 
upgrade its relations with the United States to a higher 
level."  He then assigned his International Cooperation 
Department to work with the U.S. Embassy to discuss the 
details of the necessary arrangements. 
 
11. (SBU) Thao raised two issues as Vietnamese concerns: 
MPS lack of equipment and capacity, and the need for the USG 
to reciprocate when MPS assists in handing over wanted 
fugitives.  Thao's request for training and assistance was 
somewhat perfunctory, delivered hurriedly.  He was more 
concerned about the reciprocity issue.  "When we hand over a 
criminal," he said, "we do so unconditionally.  But when we 
ask you for assistance in returning a wanted fugitive, we 
get lots of conditions before you will give him up."  Thao 
cited the case of Nguyen Khac Son as an example.  "You may 
not understand that, when it comes to finding and returning 
a U.S. fugitive, there are many agencies involved in the 
process.  MPS becomes the advocate for the United States and 
takes charge of the process of obtaining interagency 
consensus on the decision to return a fugitive.  We need you 
to be the advocate for us that way, instead of telling us 
that other agencies are preventing you from helping us." 
 
12. (SBU) Thao also touched on the issue of anti-GVN 
activists operating from the United States and asked for 
continued U.S. assistance in these cases.  He expressed his 
appreciation for what he called "encouraging developments" 
concerning the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh, Vietnam's public 
enemy number one and the patron of the anti-Vietnam 
organization Government of a Free Vietnam. 
 
Session Two:  Vice Minister Toan 
-------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Later, the delegation, led by the Ambassador, met 
with Standing Permanent Vice Minister of Public Security 
Nguyen Khanh Toan.  Toan, himself a former investigator, 
received the delegation warmly and expressed explicit 
support for Thao's earlier proposals.  "I find these 
proposals necessary and practical and in accordance with 
Vietnam's needs," Toan said.  "I think that with this first 
high-level FBI visit, there is a good chance for us to meet 
and raise understanding on both sides for real functional 
cooperation."  He cautioned, however, that "any cooperation, 
police or security, will be in accordance with the 
principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal 
affairs.  We have orders to protect the Vietnamese 
population, and you should keep in mind that we have only 
modest experience in dealing with outsiders." 
 
14. (SBU) Toan was even more concerned with the issue of 
anti-Vietnam activists, launching into a long diatribe about 
Montagnard Foundation head Kok Ksor, Nguyen Huu Chanh and 
convicted bomber Vo Van Duc.  He reserved his most bitter 
vitriol for AMCIT Ly Tong, currently imprisoned in Thailand 
for having hijacked a small plane and using it to drop pro- 
democracy leaflets over Ho Chi Minh City during President 
Clinton's visit there in 2000.  Towards the end of his rant, 
Toan revealed that he had been in charge of security for the 
Clinton visit, which would explain his vehemence on the 
subject.  "I explained to Ambassador Pete Peterson that I 
would take care of everything on security for the visit. 
But I never expected that," he said.  The Ambassador noted 
that the USG has no higher priority than the war on terror, 
and that the United States "absolutely supports" the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam.  The USG 
is aware of the statements and activities of some of the 
anti-Vietnam groups and continues to monitor them to ensure 
that political speech does not become political violence, he 
added. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
15. (SBU) General Thao and Vice Minister Toan delivered the 
most positive message we have heard on the subject of law 
enforcement cooperation.  The next step, however, is to test 
their sincerity by actually proposing letters of agreement 
or memoranda of understanding that would accomplish what the 
two generals promised.  We have one MOU already in the 
pipeline:  a draft DEA-MPS MOU that we submitted to 
Washington for Circular 175 authority in early August of 
this year.  We understand that this MOU is still under 
discussion between the legal offices of DEA and State, but 
we hope that Washington will be able to expedite approval of 
this MOU so we can propose it to MPS as soon as possible. 
 
16. (SBU) The next step we can take is to modify the MOU 
that FBI recently signed with China for use in Vietnam.  We 
will work with LEGATT in Bangkok to obtain a copy of that 
MOU and then submit our proposed modifications to the FBI, 
EAP and L for clearance before we bring it to the GVN.  If 
that works, we can then apply the same language to a 
document that would cover DHS/ICE-MPS interaction.  We 
understand that these MOUs would likely not address the 
GVN's concerns regarding smoothing the process of returning 
their most wanted criminals to Vietnam.  This outcome does 
not require (or, probably, allow) an MOU-centered approach, 
unless it is to provide simple assurances that the USG will 
do its best under U.S. law to facilitate returns.  The main 
benefit of any document is to free up the Vietnamese 
agencies to work with us; we are already free to work with 
them. 
 
17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Please advise as to the timetable 
for completion of Washington consultations on the DEA-MPS 
draft MOU we submitted for consideration. 
 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
-------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) The senior officials in the FBI delegation were 
Ms. Pierce and Mr. Fuentes.  Charles Cunningham, Section 
Chief, Transnational Criminal Enterprises, CID; James Stern, 
Unit Chief, Asian Criminal Enterprises (ACE), CID; Kevin 
Humphreys, Supervisory Special Agent, ACE, CID; Charles 
Bevan, Unit Chief, Office of International Operations; 
Michael Reilly, Foreign Operations Specialist, Office of 
International Operations; Truc Kim Dang, Language 
Specialist; Robert Cahill, Legal Attache, Bangkok; Robert 
Burkes, Assistant Legal Attache, Bangkok; and Daniel Kelly 
Supervisory Special Agent, Bangkok, also attended. 
 
19. (SBU) The MPS participants were: 
 
- Senior Colonel Tran Gia Cuong, Director, Department of 
International Cooperation; 
- Senior Colonel Hoang Cong Tu, Director, Counter-Terrorism 
Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen The Cong, Deputy Department 
Director, General Security Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen Xuan Bich, Deputy Director, Office 
of the General Police Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen Manh Te, Deputy Director, Criminal 
Investigation Department; 
- Senior Colonel Le Van Nghenh, Deputy Director, Office of 
the Investigation Bureau; 
- Senior Colonel Bui Van Ha, Deputy Director, Economic 
Investigation Department; 
- Senior Colonel Le Van Ngenh, Deputy Director, National 
Investigative Agency and Counternarcotics Department (C-17) 
- Senior Colonel Cong Van Hieu, Expert on External 
Relations, Department of International Cooperation; 
- Colonel Tran Van Thanh, Interpol Office; 
- Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chieu, Deputy Division 
Chief, Department of International Cooperation; 
- Captain Le Hoang Duong, Expert, Department of 
International Cooperation (interpreter). 
 
MARINE