US embassy cable - 05SANSALVADOR3215

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 003215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2015 
TAGS: ES, PGOV, PREL, KCOR, ELECTIONS 2006 
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: FDR LOSES BATTLE FOR OFFICIAL STATUS 
 
REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 1079 
 
     B. SAN SALVADOR 1673 
     C. SAN SALVADOR 1747 
     D. SAN SALVADOR 1803 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael A. Butler, Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  On October 27, El Salvador's Supreme 
Electoral Council (TSE) threw out some 12,000 invalid 
signatures out of approximately 49,000 total signatures 
obtained by the moderate FMLN splinter group Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (FDR) in its efforts to obtain legal 
recognition as a party.  FDR activists submitted additional 
signatures November 3, but the TSE was unable to validate 
sufficient signatures to qualify the party for official 
status prior to a November 11 deadline, and the Legislative 
Assembly declined to intervene in the matter.  Any FDR 
participation in March 12 municipal and Legislative Assembly 
elections must now be pursued via alliances with established 
parties and coalition candidates.  Their absence from the 
official slate may preserve FMLN incumbents' seats in races 
where the FDR would otherwise have split the leftist vote. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (C)  The birth of the FDR had its roots in a continuing 
process of disintegration within the FMLN during 2005.  In 
its April 3 national convention, the FMLN passed a number of 
"reforms" that included the virtual abolishment of open 
primaries, and their replacement by a hardliner-controlled 
process of "consensus" that lacked transparency (see ref. A). 
 (Note:  These "reforms" further consolidated control of the 
FMLN by orthodox hardliners, who had become locked in a 
bitter internal struggle with moderates in the wake of 
Schafik Handal's resounding defeat at the polls in March 2004 
presidential elections.  End note.)  In June (see ref. B), 
moderate Legislative Assembly Deputies Ileana Rogel and Jorge 
Escobar, accompanied by moderate former TSE Magistrate Julio 
Hernandez, Santa Ana Mayor Orlando Mena, and others, marched 
to FMLN headquarters to tender their resignations from the 
party.  Resignations before and since have left the FMLN with 
only 24 of the 31 deputies with which it began the current 
Legislative Assembly--no longer even sufficient to block 
legislation requiring a two-thirds supermajority of 56 votes 
(such as those regarding assumption of foreign debt, or 
confirmation of officials such as the Attorney General). 
 
3. (C)  On June 15, the FMLN dissidents who had resigned took 
initial steps in the lengthy process of registering a new 
party, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), submitting 
its constitution, bylaws, and official logo to the TSE.  The 
group's National Coordinator Julio Hernandez outlined that 
the choice of name, once used by the FMLN's political wing 
during the 1980-1992 conflict, was an effort to deflect 
disparaging characterizations of FMLN moderates as "Leftist 
Lite" (see ref. C).  The FDR then began collecting signatures 
in support of its being granted official status; under 
Article 159 of the Electoral Code, valid signatures must 
total at least three percent of voter turnout in the most 
recent (2003) municipal and Legislative Assembly elections, 
or approximately 42,000 signatures. 
 
4. (C)  On October 27, the TSE announced that it had found 
nearly 12,000 of the 49,000 signatures submitted invalid, 
leaving the FDR almost 5,000 signatures short of the required 
42,000.  Some 1,752 names submitted featured nonexistent 
national identity document (DUI) numbers; 1,274 names and DUI 
numbers were duplicates; 316 had missing DUI numbers, and 239 
names submitted differed from those on voter registration 
lists.  An additional 6,387 signatures did not match those on 
registration lists, while in 1,775 cases, either a signature 
was missing from the FDR document, or a signature submitted 
by the FDR corresponded to a voter (unable to read and write) 
who had used a thumbprint on his/her voter registration, or 
vice versa.  The FDR was given until November 11 to collect 
sufficient signatures to offset these shortfalls. 
 
4. (C)  In an October 25 meeting with poloff, Hernandez and 
Rogel outlined what they characterized as an attempt at 
political "blackmail" on the part of the ruling ARENA party, 
which they alleged offered to "fix" things with the TSE in 
exchange for the FDR's support in confirming incumbent 
Attorney General Belisario Artigas for a second term--which 
requires a two-thirds (56-vote) supermajority of the 
Assembly's 84 seats.  (Note:  Having formed a loose 
center-left coalition with others on June 22, the FDR and its 
allies have pursued an independent course, allying themselves 
with ARENA and the PCN when it suited their purposes.  The 
FDR's key role has been in votes requiring a two-thirds 
majority.  See ref. D.  End note.) 
 
5. (C)  FDR officers announced November 1 that they had 
already succeeded in gathering the required 5,000 signatures, 
but that they would seek to submit a total of 8,000 
additional signatures before the November 11 deadline in 
order to make up for any invalidations during the rolls' 
certification by the TSE.  (Note:  In the end, the FDR had 
submitted a total of approximately 9,000 signatures by 
November 3.  End note.)  On November 8, ARENA TSE President 
Walter Araujo continued to speak of the "difficulty" of the 
FDR's qualifying in time for the deadline, and on November 9 
the FDR announced that it would seek legal status as a party 
via a Legislative Assembly decree.  November 10 marked the 
last day possible for new parties to be officially registered 
prior to the formal opening of four-month campaign season, 
and as the week drew to a close, it became clear that the 
FDR's legal registration stood little chance.  ARENA, the 
FMLN, PCN, and PDC indicated that they would not support any 
move to grant legal status via Legislative Assembly decree, 
and although the TSE had enlisted additional workers and 
extended its hours of operation, it managed to certify only 
3,200 of 9,088 signatures submitted prior to the deadline. 
The Christian Social Populist Party, (PPSC, a PDC splinter 
group), Salvadoran Workers Party (PTS), and Salvadoran 
Patriotic Brotherhood (FPS) likewise failed to obtain 
official status. 
 
6. (C)  COMMENT:  To most political observers, it was clear 
that FDR certification would have benefited ARENA in the 
March 2006 national elections, by splitting a significant 
number of potential voters from FMLN mayoral and deputy 
candidates.  In fact, many predicted the presence of a strong 
FDR candidate in San Salvador would have given the ARENA 
candidate an excellent chance to take the city back after it 
was held by the left for so many years.  This view, however, 
was clearly not shared by Saca or his party's pundits, who 
apparently calculated that the FDR could actually peel center 
voters away from ARENA, and could pose a longer term threat 
to ARENA.  It further appeared that Saca was frustrated by 
futile negotiations with the FDR deputies over the 
re-election of Artiga, and came to the conclusion that the 
FDR was an even more difficult negotiating block in the 
Assembly than the FMLN itself.  For its part, the FDR trusted 
early on that it would be certified by the ARENA-controlled 
TSE by virtue of the FDR's support for Artiga, and, as such, 
 
SIPDIS 
did not go through the trouble of securing the full 42,000 
legitimate signatures.  As a matter of fact, one FDR 
strategist told Polcouns that they had basically copied 
information from civil registry lists unto voter registration 
forms because they felt, at that point, that the TSE would 
not bother to go through the certification process. Had the 
FDR done its work and gathered the signatures it needed, it 
would have been virtually impossible for the TSE to deny them 
their certification.  Now the FDR will have to try to survive 
through coalition building. 
Barclay