US embassy cable - 91MOSCOW10336

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 10336 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV, C-ZOELLICK 
 
E.O.12356:DECL: OADR 
TAGS:  PGOV, UR, PREL, SOCI, PINS 
SUBJECT:  GAMSAKHURDIA CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE MOSCOW 
 
REFS:  A)  STATE 66817  B)  MOSCOW 9932   C)  MOSCOW 1511 
D)  MOSCOW 1050  E)  MOSCOW 5940 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
SUMMARY 
/------ 
 
2.  DURING A MARCH 31 - APRIL 3 TRIP TO TBILISI, 
POLOFF RELAYED THE TALKING POINTS IN REF A TO 
GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN GAMSAKHURDIA AND 
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEKING A MECHANISM FOR 
PEACEFUL DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THE MANY PROBLEMS 
GEORGIA FACES.  GAMSAKHURDIA INSISTED THAT HE HAD 
BEEN FORCED TO TAKE EXCEPTIONALLY HARSH MEASURES 
AGAINST THE OSSETIANS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN LEAGUE 
WITH MOSCOW.  GAMSAKHURDIA EXPLAINED THAT THE CENTER 
HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO FORCE 
GEORGIA TO SUCCUMB TO ITS WISHES AND NOW MOSCOW WAS 
RESORTING TO POLITICAL SABOTAGE.  GAMSAKHURDIA 
CLAIMED THAT THE CENTER WAS ANGRY BECAUSE THE 
REPUBLIC'S CITIZENS HAD VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY FOR 
GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE IN THE MARCH 31 REFERENDUM.  HE 
FELT THAT MOSCOW WOULD MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO 
PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION AS A PRETEXT FOR IMPOSING 
PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN GEORGIA.  GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID 
HE FELT BETRAYED BY YEL'TSIN BECAUSE THE RSFSR LEADER 
HAD RENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT THEY HAD SIGNED EARLIER 
IN MARCH.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF THREE REPORTS ON 
POLITICS IN SOVIET GEORGIA.  THIS CABLE FOCUSES ON 
GAMSAKHURDIA'S CONFRONTATION WITH THE CENTER OVER 
SOUTH OSSETIA AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER REPUBLICS. 
THE SECOND REPORT DEALS WITH GEORGIA'S INTERNAL 
POLITICS.  THE THIRD WILL COVER A TRIP POLOFF MADE TO 
A KGB PRISON AND A CONVERSATION WITH THE LAWYER OF 
THE IMPRISONED OSSETIAN LEADER KULUNBEGOV. 
 
A BIRTHDAY GIFT FOR GAMSAKHURDIA 
/------------------------------- 
 
4. POLOFF ARRIVED IN GEORGIA LATE ON MARCH 31, THE 
DAY OF THE REFERENDUM ON GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND 
ALSO GAMSAKHURDIA'S BIRTHDAY.  GAMSAKHURDIA SENT 
GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGIY KHOSHTARIA TO THE 
AIRPORT TO GREET POLOFF AND WHISK HER AWAY TO A 
BIRTHDAY/REFERENDUM CELEBRATION HELD AT AN OPULENT 
GOVERNMENT HOUSE OVERLOOKING THE CITY.  MANY OF 
GAMSAKHURDIA'S CLOSEST FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS WERE IN 
ATTENDANCE INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER KHOSHTARIA, 
PRIME MINISTER TENGIZ SIGUA, AND ALL OF THE OTHER 
MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. 
 
5.  THE PRELIMINARY REFERENDUM RETURNS WERE ANNOUNCED 
AS THEY CAME IN.  WITH EACH NEW ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT 
THE OVERWHELMING VOTE IN VARIOUS REGIONS IN FAVOR OF 
INDEPENDENCE, THE CELEBRANTS MADE MORE TOASTS AND 
BECAME ALMOST DELIRIOUS WITH THEIR VICTORY.  THE 
BANQUET WAS LAID OUT IN TYPICAL GEORGIAN FASHION WITH 
PLATES FULL OF GEORGIAN DELICACIES AND FREE-FLOWING 
LIQUOR OF ALL SORTS.  POLOFF ARRIVED RATHER LATE INTO 
THE CELEBRATION AND GAMSAKHURDIA WAS ALREADY INTO HIS 
SECOND ROUND OF TOASTS OFFERED TO MOST OF HIS MANY 
GUESTS.  THE TOASTS WERE INTERSPERSED WITH TYPICAL 
GEORGIAN SINGING WHICH CONSISTS OF A FOUR-PART 
HARMONY A CAPPELLA.  ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING 
TOASTS OFFERED BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE BEGAN WITH 
REGRET THAT GEORGIA WAS REMEMBERED ONLY AS STALIN'S 
BIRTHPLACE. 
 
6.  PRIME MINISTER SIGUA (PROTECT) SAT NEXT TO POLOFF 
AND TOLD HER THAT IT WAS HIS IDEA THAT GAMSAKHURDIA 
ATTEND THE MARCH 16 DINNER IN MOSCOW WITH SECRETARY 
BAKER.  SIGUA SAID THE CENTER HAD DISCOURAGED ALL 
REPUBLIC LEADERS FROM ATTENDING AND THAT WAS WHY 
GAMSAKHURDIA HAD ARRIVED AFTER ANNOUNCING OVER THE 
TELEPHONE THAT HE WAS NOT COMING.  SIGUA SAID THAT 
GORBACHEV HAD SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURED MOST OF THE 
OTHER REPUBLIC LEADERS TO DECLINE THE SECRETARY'S 
INVITATION. 
 
GEORGIA'S DISPUTE WITH THE CENTER INTENSIFIES 
/-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  POLOFF MET WITH GAMSAKHURDIA SEVERAL TIMES DURING 
THE VISIT TO DISCUSS GEORGIAN POLITICS AND THE 
DEVELOPING POLITICAL DRAMA BETWEEN GEORGIA AND 
MOSCOW.  POLOFF DREW ON POINTS OUTLINED IN REF A 
DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH GAMSAKHURDIA AND EMPHASIZED 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A PEACEFUL MECHANISM FOR 
THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.  GAMSAKHURDIA FELT THAT 
HE HAD OFFERED MORE THAN ONCE TO RESOLVE HIS DISPUTES 
WITH THE CENTER THROUGH PEACEFUL DIALOGUE BUT WAS 
REBUFFED BY MOSCOW.  HE RECOUNTED SEVERAL RECENT 
CONFRONTATIONS WITH USSR LEADERS OVER THE UNION 
TREATY, SOUTH OSSETIA, AND THE GEORGIAN MVD. 
 
8.  GAMSAKHURDIA REFERRED TO A FEBRUARY 25 
CONVERSATION WITH GORBACHEV IN WHICH THE SOVIET 
LEADER REPORTEDLY WARNED GAMSAKHURDIA THAT IF HE DID 
NOT SIGN THE UNION TREATY, GEORGIA WOULD FACE EVEN 
MORE VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL UNREST.  HE ALSO SHOWED 
POLOFF COPIES OF TELEGRAMS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM 
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS BORIS PUGO AND GORBACHEV 
WARNING HIM TO COMPLY WITH USSR DECREES OR FACE THE 
CONSEQUENCES.  GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE STILL HAS NO 
INTENTION OF SENDING EVEN OBSERVERS TO THE UNION 
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET 
WOULD NOT EVEN BE DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT. 
 
9.  ON APRIL 7, THE GEORGIAN SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM 
PASSED A RESOLUTION PROTESTING THE ADDITION OF 
FURTHER SOVIET TROOPS IN SOUTH OSSETIA AS A "RUDE 
VIOLATION OF GEORGIAN SOVEREIGNTY," ACCORDING TO 
GEORGIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGIY KHONELIDZE 
(PROTECT), WHO CALLED POLOFF THAT SAME DAY.  THE 
RESOLUTION DECRIES THE USE OF TROOPS AGAINST SOCIETY 
AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE CENTER WOULD REFRAIN 
FROM FURTHER DESTABLIZING THE SITUATION IN THE 
REPUBLIC.  THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLS FOR A PEACEFUL 
DIALOGUE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE OSSETIAN 
PROBLEM.  THE RESOLUTION EMPHASIZED GEORGIA'S INTENT 
TO LEGALLY SEEK INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATE DIRECT 
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE 
RSFSR, ARMENIA, AZERBAYDZHAN AND OTHER REPUBLICS. 
KHONELIDZE ALSO TOLD POLOFF THAT GEORGIA'S WORKERS 
WERE PREPARING TO CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE MINERS AS A RESULT OF THE PRICE RISES 
AND CONTINUED PARTIAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. 
 
GAMSAKHURDIA SEES CENTER'S HAND IN SOUTH OSSETIA 
/-------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10.  GAMSAKHURDIA INSISTED THAT THE CENTER WAS 
FUELING THE OSSETIAN PROBLEM AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD 
REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN ANY KIND OF DIALOGUE ON THE 
PROBLEM.  THE GEORGIAN LEADER ACCUSED USSR COUNCIL OF 
NATIONALITIES CHAIRMAN RAFIK NISHANOV OF 
MASTERMINDING THE CENTER'S MANIPULATION OF OSSETIA. 
GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT ARRESTING OSSETIAN LEADER 
KULUNBEGOV WAS "THE ONLY WAY TO STOP THE BLOODSHED 
AND DEFUSE THE SITUATION." (SEE SEPTEL FOR FURTHER 
INFORMATION ON KULUNBEGOV'S DETENTION.) 
 
11.  GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT GEORGIA WOULD BE 
WILLING TO ALLOW THE OSSETIANS TO HOLD A REFERENDUM 
ON AUTONOMY BUT ONLY AFTER GEORGIA ACHIEVED 
INDEPENDENCE.  HE SAID THAT NOW THEY COULD NOT BE 
SURE WHETHER THE OSSETIANS GENUINELY WANTED POLITICAL 
AUTONOMY OR WHETHER THEY WERE BEING DRIVEN BY THE 
CENTER TO DEMAND THIS AUTONOMY.  AS IN PAST 
CONVERSATIONS (REFS C-E), HE ROUTINELY REFERRED TO 
THE OSSETIANS AND THEIR LEADERS AS "CRIMINALS" AND 
"TERRORISTS."  HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ORDERED AN END 
TO THE GEORGIAN BLOCKADE OF TSKHINVALI BUT THAT 
"BANDS OF CRIMINALS" CONTINUED TO SABOTAGE THE 
OSSETIANS. 
 
12.  WHEN POLOFF SUGGESTED THAT INNOCENT OSSETIANS, 
SUCH AS TSKHINVALI'S CHILDREN, MIGHT BE SUFFERING, 
GAMSAKHURDIA AGAIN BLAMED THE OSSETIANS FOR THE 
PROBLEM.  HE CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BROUGHT THIS FATE 
UPON THEMSELVES BY CONTINUING TO DEMAND AUTONOMY.  HE 
ALSO ASSERTED THAT "BANDS OF OSSETIAN CRIMINALS" WERE 
FIGHTING AGAINST EACH OTHER --A POINT THE OSSETIANS 
DENY. 
 
13.  ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 2, POLOFF SAT WITH 
GAMSAKHURDIA IN HIS OFFICE IN THE GEORGIAN SUPREME 
SOVIET AND WATCHED THE SOVIET NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA" 
WHICH WAS FEATURING AN ITEM ON THE VIOLENCE IN 
TSKHINVALI.  "THEY ARE ANGRY BECAUSE WE HAD SUCH AN 
OVERWHELMING VICTORY IN THE REFERENDUM ON 
INDEPENDENCE.  NOW THEY ARE PREPARING THE GROUND TO 
SEND IN TROOPS TO TAKE OVER OSSETIA AND MAYBE THE 
REPUBLIC," HE SAID. 
 
14.  THOSE WORDS PROVED TO BE PROPHETIC BECAUSE 
GORBACHEV BEGAN TO SEND IN ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO SOUTH 
OSSETIA THE NEXT DAY.  ON ALRIL 3, GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD 
POLOFF HE HAD SPOKEN TO USSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN 
LUK'YANOV BY TELEPHONE ABOUT THE TROOPS BEING SENT TO 
SOUTH OSSETIA.  GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE HAD WARNED 
LUK'YANOV THAT MORE TROOPS WOULD INCREASE BLOODSHED 
IN THE REGION AND THAT HE AND GORBACHEV WOULD BE HELD 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THIS BLOODSHED.  LUK'YANOV REPLIED 
THAT HE WOULD PASS THIS MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV. 
LUK'YANOV ALSO TOLD GAMSAKHURDIA THAT THE RSFSR 
CONGRESS' RESOLUTION CALLING ON GORBACHEV TO "TAKE 
URGENT MEASURES TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH 
OSSETIA" HAD HEAVILY INFLUENCED GORBACHEV'S DECISION 
TO SEND MORE TROOPS.  GAMSAKHURDIA ASKED LUK'YANOV, 
"WHAT RIGHT DOES THE RSFSR HAVE TO TELL THE CENTER 
WHAT TO DO IN GEORGIA?"  THE GEORGIAN LEADER SAID HE 
CONSIDERED THIS INTERFERENCE IN GEORGIA'S INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS.  HE SAID LUK'YANOV HAD NO ANSWER AND WAS 
SILENT. 
 
15.  GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD POLOFF THAT ACCORDING TO THE 
GEORGIAN MVD COMMANDANT IN TSKHINVALI, THE CENTER 
PLANNED TO SEND IN THE DZHERZHINSKIY DIVISION TO 
IMPOSE ORDER IN SOUTH OSSETIA.  THIYSPARTICULAR 
DIVISION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BRUTAL TREATMENT OF 
AZERBAYDZHANIS IN BAKU IN JANUARY 1990. 
 
16.  GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT THE CENTER WAS 
FUNNELING WEAPONS THROUGH THE SOVIET ARMY TO THE 
OSSETIANS.  HE TOOK POLOFF TO A ROOM WITH A DISPLAY 
OF SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED FROM THE 
OSSETIANS.  THE GEORGIAN LEADER ALSO SHOWED POLOFF A 
ROCKET WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN USED IN AN ATTACK ON 
A GEORGIAN VILLAGE NEAR TSKHINVALI.  THE ROCKET HAD 
KILLED A GEORGIAN FAMILY OF FIVE AND WAS THE SAME 
TYPE USED IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, ACCORDING TO A 
GEORGIAN VETERAN OF THAT WAR.  GAMSAKHURDIA USED THIS 
EXHIBIT TO ILLUSTRATE THAT OSSETIANS WERE NOT THE 
ONLY ONES SUFFERING IN THIS CONFRONTATION.  THE 
GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO HAD SEVERAL GEORGIAN 
REFUGEES FROM TSKHINVALI ON DISPLAY IN THE LOBBY OF 
THE INTOURIST HOTEL IVERIA WITH SIGNS WRITTEN ONLY IN 
ENGLISH PROTESTING OSSETIAN ACTS AGAINST GEORGIA. 
ALTHOUGH THE REFUGEES' SUFFERING APPEARED TO BE 
GENUINE, THEIR USE AS PAWNS IN A POLITICAL PROPAGANDA 
GAME WAS OBVIOUS AND A BIT CRUDE. 
 
17.  INTERESTINGLY, GEORGIAN REPUBLIC OPPOSITION 
LEADERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE OSSETIANS ARE "TOOLS OF 
THE KGB" AND THAT OSSETIAN LEADER CHOCHIYEV IS A KGB 
OFFICER.  LIKE GAMSAKHURDIA, THE GEORGIAN NATIONAL 
CONGRESS LEADERS BELIEVE THAT OSSETIANS SHOULD BE 
GRANTED CULTURAL BUT NOT POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 
 
ECONOMIC PRESSURE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST GEORGIA 
/-------------------------------------------- 
 
18.  GAMSAKHURDIA ASSERTED THAT THE CENTER'S ATTEMPTS 
TO USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST GEORGIA HAD FAILED 
FOR SEVERAL REASONS.  HE SAID THAT GEORGIA HAD BEEN 
ABLE TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE CENTER'S ATTEMPTS TO 
USE ECONOMIC PRESSURE BY THREATENING TO CLOSE THE 
REPUBLIC'S RAILWAYS AND PORTS.  HE SAID THAT THIS 
TACTIC HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE DURING THE REPUBLIC'S 
DISPUTES WITH MOSCOW LAST SUMMER WHEN GEORGIA WAS 
ABLE TO FORCE THE CENTER TO GIVE INTO ITS DEMANDS ON 
SOVEREIGNTY.  GAMSAKHURDIA POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE 
OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAYDZHANI CONFLICT, GEORGIA'S 
RAILWAYS WERE THE ONLY ONES FULLY FUNCTIONING IN THE 
CAUCASUS AND THEREFORE CONSTITUTED A CRITICAL 
TRANSPORTATION LINK TO THE REST OF THE USSR. 
GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MANY SOVIET 
MILITARY FAMILIES LIVED IN GEORGIA AND THEY TOO WOULD 
SUFFER FROM ANY MORE SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND ENERGY. 
IN ADDITION, THE NON-GEORGIANS IN THE REPUBLIC WOULD 
PAY A PRICE FOR ANY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR DEPRIVATION 
IMPOSED ON GEORGIA. 
 
19.  GAMSAKHURDIA OBSERVED THAT THE ECONOMIC WEAPON 
WAS NOT GEORGIAN-SPECIFIC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BE 
USED EFFECTIVELY TO STEM GEORGIAN NATIONALISM AND THE 
DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE.  HE MAINTAINED THAT THE 
CENTER WAS MORE LIKELY TO USE A COMBINATION OF 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE SUCH AS IMPOSING 
PRESIDENTIAL RULE, INSTEAD OF ECONOMIC THREATS WHICH 
HAD PROVEN INEFFECTIVE. 
 
BETRAYED BY YEL'TSIN 
/------------------- 
 
20.  GAMSAKHURDIA SAID HE COULD NO LONGER TRUST RSFSR 
LEADER BORIS YEL'TSIN "BECAUSE ONE DAY HE SAYS ONE 
THING AND THE NEXT DAY HE SAYS THE OPPOSITE." 
GAMSAKHURDIA WAS REFERRING TO THE PROTOCOL HE HAD 
SIGNED WITH YEL'TSIN ON MARCH 23.  THE PROTOCOL 
STIPULATED RSFSR-GEORGIAN COOPERATION IN QUELLING THE 
OSSETIAN CONFLICT WITHOUT THE CENTER'S INTERFERENCE. 
THE PROTOCOL ALSO CALLED FOR CLOSER POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS IN THE 
FUTURE.  GAMSAKHURDIA AND OTHER GEORGIAN OFFICIALS 
SUCH AS GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHOSHTARIA ON 
PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HAD EMPHASIZED THE GREAT 
IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROTOCOL FOR GEORGIA'S FUTURE (REF 
B). 
 
21.  GAMSAKHURDIA TOLD POLOFF THAT YEL'TSIN WAS 
"FIGHTING FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE IN THE RSFSR 
CONGRESS AND HE HAD TO GIVE UP HIS AGREEMENT WITH US 
IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE."  THE 
GEORGIAN LEADER SAID YEL'TSIN HAD REJECTED THE 
PROTOCOL AS A SOP TO THE RSFSR COMMUNIST PARTY. 
GAMSAKHURDIA CONTINUED TO LAMBAST YEL'TSIN AND HIS 
PERSONAL CHARACTER SAYING THAT THE RSFSR LEADER IS A 
"DRUNKARD AND OBVIOUSLY UNTRUSTWORTHY."  "YEL'TSIN 
WILL DO ANYTHING TO SAVE HIS SKIN," GAMSAKHURDIA 
SAID.  INTERESTINGLY, ONLY A COUPLE WEEKS BEFORE, 
GAMSAKHURDIA HAD BEEN SINGING YEL'TSIN'S PRAISES AND 
STRESSING THAT YEL'TSIN WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S ONLY 
HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.  GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO CRITICIZED 
USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTY GALINA STAROVOYTOVA FOR HER ROLE 
IN BACKING THE SOUTH OSSETIANS' CAUSE. 
 
22.  LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
 
MATLOCK