US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2292

S E C R E T ALGIERS 002292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINS, PARM, MARR, MNUC, AG 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ARGUES RUSSIA CAN'T SUPPORT 
IRAN SANCTIONS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE IRANIAN RETALIATORY MOVES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman:Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) We do not follow Moscow reporting on the Iran nuclear 
issue but report the following November 7 conversation 
between Russian Ambassador Vladimir Titorenko and Ambassador 
in case it sheds additional light on Russian thinking and 
actions in the leadup to the IAEA board meetings later this 
month. 
 
2.  (S) Over dinner November 7, Russian Ambassador Titorenko, 
a fluent Arab speaker and Middle East specialist, shared his 
analysis of Iran, its nuclear ambitions, and President 
Ahmadinejad's recent call for "wiping Israel off the map." 
On the nuclear issue, Titorenko agreed we should continue to 
work together to persuade Iran not to pursue a nuclear 
weapons capability via mastery of the full nuclear fuel 
cycle.  But he argued that at the end of the day, "as with 
India and Pakistan, it would not/not be possible to prevent a 
determined Iran from going nuclear." 
 
3. (S) During considerable back and forth, Ambassador 
stressed that a nuclear-weapons capable Iran would be a 
highly destabilizing factor in the region.  It was in the 
collective interest of the great powers to join together to 
prevent such a development, including by adopting economic 
sanctions if necessary.  Disunity on this point would be an 
open invitation for Iranian misbehavior and produce the very 
outcome we all wished to avoid.  Ahmadinejad's recent call 
for the destruction of Israel was another reminder why we 
needed to prevent a nuclear-weapons capable Iran.  In the 
absence of strong actions and firm positions by others, it 
could not be assumed that a country like Israel, faced with 
calls for its destruction coming from a country on the verge 
of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability would stand idly 
by. 
 
4. (S) Titorenko went on to argue that Russia could never 
support sanctions against Iran.  In his analysis, Russian 
interests were simply too vulnerable to Iranian retaliatory 
measures to permit this.  For now, Iran was not causing 
problems in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and other 
Muslim areas of direct interest to Russia.  But in the event 
Russia supported sanctions, this could quickly change and 
Iran could retaliate by stirring up serious trouble and 
instability in sensitive areas, including even inside Russia, 
with its increasingly significant Muslim population. 
Titorenko argued as well that economic sanctions against Iran 
were in any case unlikely to work because of Iran's size, 
resources, capabilities, importance, and location.  It could 
not be isolated as Libya was.  He also cautioned that if we 
moved to adopt economic sanctions, Iran would significantly 
step up its unhelpful activities in Iraq, greatly 
complicating stabilization efforts and complicating life for 
us there. 
 
5. (S) Offering a not very flattering glimpse into at least 
how some Russians view French firmness on this and other 
issues, Titorenko argued that the Iranians had also taken 
France's measure.  They "knew" France would ultimately back 
down from any sanctions threats, having concluded that France 
would not want to jeopardize its economic and other interests 
vis a vis Iran.  In this regard, they also knew that they 
were dealing with a country that in World War II had not put 
up much of a fight in response to German attacks, 
surrendering to the Germans in just thirty days. Regarding 
Ahmadinejad's call for Israel's destruction, Titorenko argued 
"he didn't really mean it."  Despite Iran's posturing, Iran 
and Israel were actually natural allies vis a vis the Arabs. 
In this context, Ahmadinejad's statement, he theorized, was 
actually designed to curry favor with Arabs and deflect 
attention away from issues where Iranian behavior provoked 
concern among Arabs. 
 
ERDMAN