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| Identifier: | 05DAMASCUS5934 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05DAMASCUS5934 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Damascus |
| Created: | 2005-11-14 13:26:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL SY |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 141326Z NOV 05 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5502 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD CIA WASHDC NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 005934 PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SY SUBJECT: ASAD SPEECH CONTINUES TO REVERBERATE IN DAMASCUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 1. (C) Summary and Comment: Damascus continues to buzz with a range of often conflicting reactions to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's November 10 speech and with worry over its implications for the future. Most contacts expressed concern that the speech had been too confrontational, but noted that it included signals that Syria was interested in "making a deal," as long as the extended Asad family was protected from the Mehlis investigation. The most pessimistic view of the speech, by a contact who knows the regime well, is that the regime "has grasped that there is no hope" and is opting for defiance. Another contact close to the regime noted that if the international community humiliated Syria and its armed forces by insisting on Beirut as the venue for questioning Syrian suspects, it could lead to chaos, a fate Syria would share with others, he warned. 2. (C) Summary continued: A prominent religious leader expressed disappointment with Asad's cynical attempt to use the crisis to de-legitimize the need for political and economic reform. Several more populist views applauded Asad's assertion of Snational dignity and his refusal to submit to Syria's humiliation. Most contacts called this the most successful aspect of the speech but questioned the strength of renewed public support for the regime and whether Asad would be able to maintain it, given most people's economic concerns, anxiety over the future, and long-standing antipathy for the regime. End Summary. 3. (C) HARD-LINE SPEECH WITH NO CONCILIATORY PUNCH LINE: Contacts offered a range of views on Asad's November 10 speech, with most acknowledging the speech's strident tone. Independent MP Basil Dahdouh called the speech "too confrontational." Some of the rhetoric was expected, as it had become increasingly clear that the government felt compelled to cease cooperating with Mehlis' demands. Nonetheless, Dahdouh and his friends, who watched the speech together with increasing alarm, kept waiting for "a conciliatory punch line that never came." Overall, he described the speech as "very disappointing," with some of the Arab nationalist rhetoric seemingly out of a time warp that betrayed a complete lack of appreciation for Syria's diminished regional clout and the immense reach of U.S. power in the region. 4. (C) Like others, Dahdouh pointed to indicators in the speech that the SARG remains willing "to do a deal," but he noted that the independent legal thrust of the Mehlis investigation has overwhelmed the political likelihood of such a deal. Dahdouh discounted Asad's implied threats to sow chaos if Syria is humiliated, given Syria's weak regional position, but acknowledged that Syria was entering "a very dangerous period." The Christian MP questioned whether there was any USG interest in communicating to Asad that he would be shielded from legal consequences himself, as a way to encourage his cooperation, but admitted that in his hard-line speech Asad had to a significant degree tied his fate to that of the six witnesses summoned to Beirut by UNIIIC head Detlev Mehlis. Dahdouh worried that the speech may indicate that Asad has fears that he himself could be in legal (and political) jeopardy. 5. (C) REGIME REALIZES THERE IS NO WAY OUT?: Economist and civil-society activist Riyad Abrash also took a gloomy view of Asad's speech, insisting that it indicated the regime "has finally grasped that there is no hope. The only option is to stand up and confront its fate." Abrash dismissed Asad's half-hearted expressions of willingness to continue to cooperate with Mehlis, saying they were there "just to absorb the shock" and to soften with "hints" what would otherwise have sounded like a blunt refusal. He noted that the regime is trying to get the Saudis and the Egyptians to plead with the international community to accept "half measures" such as an alternative venue for the interrogations. 6. (C) Abrash, a Sunni who served as a Deputy Minister of Planning two decades ago, maintains by his own account -- despite his pro-U.S., pro-economic reform tendencies -- relatively close ties with senior security service elements and has served as an informal advisor to Asad on occasion. He claimed to have heard from his sources that in the run-up to the speech, there had been "very active family discussions" about how to proceed, often led by the President's sister, Bushra, whom he described as very strong and active behind the scenes. (Note: She is married to Shawkat.) Abrash recounted that Shawkat had been heard saying to associates "I will set Damascus on fire before I am sent out of here." 7. (C) POLITICAL DEAL POSSIBLE, MINUS THE FAMILY: Al-Hayat Damascus bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi attempted to put a more positive gloss on the speech, terming it "Asad's most sophisticated speech to date," while acknowledging doubts that "Washington is listening to any nuances." Hamidi said the speech was full of signals that Asad was looking for some kind of deal and that "everything, except the family, is on the table." He pointed to Asad's expressed willingness to cooperate on Iraq and to be supportive of whatever the Palestinians accept as a political deal. The biggest mistake in the speech was Asad's harsh language towards Lebanese PM Siniora and towards Lebanon in general, said Hamidi, although he noted that Asad, reflecting his strong feelings on the subject, had over the past 18 months adopted a consistently strident tone in public when speaking about Lebanon. 8. (C) ASAD BATTLING FOR SYRIA'S HEARTS AND MINDS: Asad's repeated point that Syria is being targeted and humiliated, its dignity under attack, was his attempt to yoke the fate of Syria with that of the regime and to battle with the U.S. and the international community for the hearts and minds of Syrians. Like others, Hamidi termed the effort partially successful. Hamidi said that MFA legal advisor Riyad Daoudi, who had met with the Syrian leadership a few days before the speech, said that he had urged full cooperation with Mehlis as the only alternative. Daoudi told Hamidi that his view had not prevailed. 9. (C) Foreign affairs analyst Dr. Imad Shueibi, who can be counted on to speak for the regime, also pointed to "positive signals" of cooperation in the speech, especially the President's extended remarks on Iraq. Shueibi acknowledged what he called "the fiery rhetoric" in the speech, saying it was meant as a warning: If the international community wants to humiliate Syria and its armed forces by insisting the suspects be questioned in Lebanon, that means "you want a weak regime and chaos. If there is chaos for us, there will be chaos for everybody," Shueibi warned. 10. (C) WHAT HAPPENED TO REFORM? Sunni religious leader Sheikh Salah Kuftaro expressed disappointment with the speech, highlighting in particular Asad's cynical attempt to de-legitimize the need for political and economic reform by pointing to outside influence and condescension from the West. The consensus among elite opinion is that Asad's speech is a clear sign that the regime is "leading the country to catastrophe," said Kuftaro. (Note: Kuftaro noted efforts by the regime and its proxies to spread scurrilous rumors about Mehlis, such as that Mehlis is a paid asset of the CIA. He gave Polchief a copy of a CD that he described as full of such propaganda, saying that a Syrian businessman close to the regime was distributing 20,000 copies of the CD.) 11. (C) Human rights activist Anwar al-Bunni told Poloff the speech was "frightening." He expressed deep concern about the future of Syria and about what the regime might do to critics like himself, in order to keep its hold on power. 12. (C) ASAD SCORES POINTS ON SYRIAN DIGNITY: More populist views indicated that Asad's speech was effective to a limited degree in rallying Syrian public opinion to support the regime. Several Syrians with whom Polchief spoke, including a part-time UN driver and an Arabic language teacher, pointed with approval to Asad's proud assertions of Syrian dignity and refusal to submit to humiliation. One acquaintance, not known for defending the regime, noted that Syrians had been waiting to hear this note of defiance after a long period in which their country had been insulted and unfairly singled out, while neighboring Israel flouted with impunity Security Council resolutions. SECHE
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