US embassy cable - 05DAMASCUS5934

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ASAD SPEECH CONTINUES TO REVERBERATE IN DAMASCUS

Identifier: 05DAMASCUS5934
Wikileaks: View 05DAMASCUS5934 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Damascus
Created: 2005-11-14 13:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL SY
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 141326Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5502
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L  DAMASCUS 005934 
 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SY 
SUBJECT: ASAD SPEECH CONTINUES TO REVERBERATE IN DAMASCUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
1.  (C) Summary and Comment:  Damascus continues to buzz with 
a range of often conflicting reactions to Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad's November 10 speech and with worry over its 
implications for the future.  Most contacts expressed concern 
that the speech had been too confrontational, but noted that 
it included signals that Syria was interested in "making a 
deal," as long as the extended Asad family was protected from 
the Mehlis investigation.  The most pessimistic view of the 
speech, by a contact who knows the regime well, is that the 
regime "has grasped that there is no hope" and is opting for 
defiance.  Another contact close to the regime noted that if 
the international community  humiliated Syria and its armed 
forces by insisting on Beirut as the venue for questioning 
Syrian suspects, it could lead to chaos, a fate Syria would 
share with others, he warned. 
 
2.  (C) Summary continued:  A prominent religious leader 
expressed disappointment with Asad's cynical attempt to use 
the crisis to de-legitimize the need for political and 
economic reform.  Several more populist views applauded 
Asad's assertion of Snational dignity and his refusal to 
submit to Syria's humiliation.  Most contacts called this the 
most successful aspect of the speech but questioned the 
strength of renewed public support for the regime and whether 
Asad would be able to maintain it, given most people's 
economic concerns, anxiety over the future, and long-standing 
antipathy for the regime.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) HARD-LINE SPEECH WITH NO CONCILIATORY PUNCH LINE: 
Contacts offered a range of views on Asad's November 10 
speech, with most acknowledging the speech's strident tone. 
Independent MP Basil Dahdouh called the speech "too 
confrontational."  Some of the rhetoric was expected, as it 
had become increasingly clear that the government felt 
compelled to cease cooperating with Mehlis' demands. 
Nonetheless, Dahdouh and his friends, who watched the speech 
together with increasing alarm, kept waiting for "a 
conciliatory punch line that never came."  Overall, he 
described the speech as "very disappointing," with some of 
the Arab nationalist rhetoric seemingly out of a time warp 
that betrayed a complete lack of appreciation for Syria's 
diminished regional clout and the immense reach of U.S. power 
in the region. 
 
4.  (C) Like others, Dahdouh pointed to indicators in the 
speech that the SARG remains willing "to do a deal," but he 
noted that the independent legal thrust of the Mehlis 
investigation has overwhelmed the political likelihood of 
such a deal.  Dahdouh discounted Asad's implied threats to 
sow chaos if Syria is humiliated, given Syria's weak regional 
position, but acknowledged that Syria was entering "a very 
dangerous period."  The Christian MP questioned whether there 
was any USG interest in communicating to Asad that he would 
be shielded from legal consequences himself, as a way to 
encourage his cooperation, but admitted that in his hard-line 
speech Asad had to a significant degree tied his fate to that 
of the six witnesses summoned to Beirut by UNIIIC head Detlev 
Mehlis.  Dahdouh worried that the speech may indicate that 
Asad has fears that he himself could be in legal (and 
political) jeopardy. 
 
5.  (C) REGIME REALIZES THERE IS NO WAY OUT?: Economist and 
civil-society activist Riyad Abrash also took a gloomy view 
of Asad's speech, insisting that it indicated the regime "has 
finally grasped that there is no hope.  The only option is to 
stand up and confront its fate."  Abrash dismissed Asad's 
half-hearted expressions of willingness to continue to 
cooperate with Mehlis, saying they were there "just to absorb 
the shock" and to soften with "hints" what would otherwise 
have sounded like a blunt refusal.  He noted that the regime 
is trying to get the Saudis and the Egyptians to plead with 
the international community to accept "half measures" such as 
an alternative venue for the interrogations. 
 
6.  (C) Abrash, a Sunni who served as a Deputy Minister of 
Planning two decades ago, maintains by his own account -- 
despite his pro-U.S., pro-economic reform tendencies -- 
relatively close ties with senior security service elements 
and has served as an informal advisor to Asad on occasion. 
He claimed to have heard from his sources that in the run-up 
to the speech, there had been "very active family 
discussions" about how to proceed, often led by the 
President's sister, Bushra, whom he described as very strong 
and active behind the scenes.  (Note:  She is married to 
Shawkat.)  Abrash recounted that Shawkat had been heard 
saying to associates "I will set Damascus on fire before I am 
sent out of here." 
 
7.  (C) POLITICAL DEAL POSSIBLE, MINUS THE FAMILY:  Al-Hayat 
Damascus bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi attempted to put a more 
positive gloss on the speech, terming it "Asad's most 
sophisticated speech to date," while acknowledging doubts 
that "Washington is listening to any nuances."  Hamidi said 
the speech was full of signals that Asad was looking for some 
kind of deal and that "everything, except the family, is on 
the table."  He pointed to Asad's expressed willingness to 
cooperate on Iraq and to be supportive of whatever the 
Palestinians accept as a political deal.  The biggest mistake 
in the speech was Asad's harsh language towards Lebanese PM 
Siniora and towards Lebanon in general, said Hamidi, although 
he noted that Asad, reflecting his strong feelings on the 
subject, had over the past 18 months adopted a consistently 
strident tone in public when speaking about Lebanon. 
 
8.  (C) ASAD BATTLING FOR SYRIA'S HEARTS AND MINDS: Asad's 
repeated point that Syria is being targeted and humiliated, 
its dignity under attack, was his attempt to yoke the fate of 
Syria with that of the regime and to battle with the U.S. and 
the international community for the hearts and minds of 
Syrians.  Like others, Hamidi termed the effort partially 
successful.  Hamidi said that MFA legal advisor Riyad Daoudi, 
who had met with the Syrian leadership a few days before the 
speech, said that he had urged full cooperation with Mehlis 
as the only alternative.  Daoudi told Hamidi that his view 
had not prevailed. 
 
9.  (C) Foreign affairs analyst Dr. Imad Shueibi, who can be 
counted on to speak for the regime, also pointed to "positive 
signals" of cooperation in the speech, especially the 
President's extended remarks on Iraq.  Shueibi  acknowledged 
what he called "the fiery rhetoric" in the speech, saying it 
was meant as a warning:  If the international community wants 
to humiliate Syria and its armed forces by insisting the 
suspects be questioned in Lebanon, that means "you want a 
weak regime and chaos.  If there is chaos for us, there will 
be chaos for everybody," Shueibi warned. 
 
10.  (C) WHAT HAPPENED TO REFORM?  Sunni religious leader 
Sheikh Salah Kuftaro expressed disappointment with the 
speech, highlighting in particular Asad's cynical attempt to 
de-legitimize the need for political and economic reform by 
pointing to outside influence and condescension from the 
West.  The consensus among elite opinion is that Asad's 
speech is a clear sign that the regime is "leading the 
country to catastrophe," said Kuftaro. (Note:  Kuftaro noted 
efforts by the regime and its proxies to spread scurrilous 
rumors about Mehlis, such as that Mehlis is a paid asset of 
the CIA.  He gave Polchief a copy of a CD that he described 
as full of such propaganda, saying that a Syrian businessman 
close to the regime was distributing 20,000 copies of the 
CD.) 
 
11.  (C) Human rights activist Anwar al-Bunni told Poloff the 
speech was "frightening."  He expressed deep concern about 
the future of Syria and about what the regime might do to 
critics like himself, in order to keep its hold on power. 
 
12.  (C) ASAD SCORES POINTS ON SYRIAN DIGNITY:  More populist 
views indicated that Asad's speech was effective to a limited 
degree in rallying Syrian public opinion to support the 
regime.  Several Syrians with whom Polchief spoke, including 
a part-time UN driver and an Arabic language teacher, 
pointed with approval to Asad's proud assertions of Syrian 
dignity and refusal to submit to humiliation.  One 
acquaintance, not known for defending the regime, noted that 
Syrians had been waiting to hear this note of defiance after 
a long period in which their country had been insulted and 
unfairly singled out, while neighboring Israel flouted with 
impunity Security Council resolutions. 
 
SECHE 

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