US embassy cable - 05SANAA3231

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2025 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MASS, MARR, OVIP, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO YEMEN 
 
Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  Welcome back to Sanaa.  Although Yemen remains an 
important regional partner in the GWOT with a post-9/11 
string of CT successes, cooperation on this front has not 
been perfect --  a point that was made clear to President 
Saleh during his visit to Washington last week.  You will be 
the first high-level U.S. official Saleh will meet after his 
departure from the United States, and, although the tone of 
his meetings with senior officials was generally positive, he 
will likely express some disappointment that his visit did 
not generate a coordinated effort to move the U.S.-Yemeni 
relationship to the strategic level he would like.  The 
reality is, however, that the Republic of Yemen Government 
(ROYG) will need to do more in many areas, particularly in CT 
cooperation, in order to raise our relationship to a higher 
level. 
 
2. (C)  Your visit comes against the backdrop of the 
beginning of the campaign season for Yemen's presidential and 
local council elections, which are scheduled to take place 
next year.  Saleh has announced that he will not seek a third 
term, but most observers expect the ruling party to formally 
nominate him at their general conference in December -- and 
for Saleh to reluctantly accept.  At that point, Saleh is 
expected to name a caretaker cabinet until the elections, a 
long overdue move that will alter the political landscape, 
but will not likely have a major impact on the ROYG's 
foreign, defense or CT policies. 
 
3. (C)  With regard to the U.S.-Yemeni security relationship, 
there are several items we can list on the positive side of 
the ledger.  For example, the USG and the ROYG have succeeded 
in creating out of whole cloth Yemen's two premier CT forces 
since 2001:  the Central Security Forces - Counter Terrorism 
Unit (CSF-CTU) and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) within the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI).  With USG training and equipment, 
CSF-CTU and YCG have become capable and professional forces 
that have already logged notable successes in a short period 
of time.  The ROYG has stepped up its own efforts against 
terrorist cells, leading to significant arrests over the past 
few months. 
 
4. (C)  Spurred on by MOI's successes, the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) has recently moved to expand and normalize its 
cooperation with Embassy military offices.  Despite a slow 
start as they learned the intricacies of the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) program, MOD is beginning to use FMF funds 
more effectively to purchase spare parts, training, and other 
items.  We are encouraged by the MOD's recent submission of a 
3-5 year CT and Border Security Plan, and the establishment 
of an MOD Working Group, to help focus FMF resources on 
shared areas of interest. 
 
5. (C)  Despite continuing difficulties in obtaining access 
to the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF), there have 
been improvements in cooperation between YSOF and CSF-CTU. 
CJTF-HOA's Special Operations Forces Liaison Element - Yemen 
(SOFLE-Y) coordinated joint YSOF and CSF-CTU platoon/squad 
training, and two YSOF observers accompanied the CSF-CTU 
fly-away training mission to Djibouti in August. 
 
6. (C)  Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations, conducted by 
CJTF HOA elements, have also increased sharply over the past 
year.  Only one project had been implemented as of February 
2005, but as of today four projects have been completed, six 
are underway, and many more are planned for 2006. 
 
7. (S)  The ROYG has also taken measures to stem the flow of 
fighters to Iraq.  These include stopping at the airport 
young, single men who are bound for Saudi Arabia, Syria or 
the UAE, and interviewing them.  Many of those stopped for 
questioning are ultimately barred from leaving the country. 
 
8. (C)  Despite these positive developments, there remain 
several obstacles to building a stronger CT partnership. 
Chief among these is the proliferation of Small Arms/Light 
Weapons (SA/LW), which remains an important and growing 
threat to regional security that Saleh is reluctant to 
address.  The President has yet to follow through on a 
private promise in April -- made public just before his visit 
to Washington -- that only ROYG procurement officials would 
be authorized to purchase weapons abroad and that the private 
importation of arms would be criminalized. 
 
9.  (C)  Saleh told Washington officials last week that an 
upcoming weapons purchase from Ukraine is the last transfer 
through private brokers in the pipeline, and that after the 
conclusion of this deal, he would implement Yemen's new 
policy. At our insistence, Saleh has made his commitment on 
the arms trade public.  There is still no evidence, however, 
that the arms dealers have received the message.  Despite 
persistent high-level offers of assistance, Saleh has failed 
thus far to create a weapons inventory system -- ulltimately 
the best way to verify how imported weapons are being used. 
 
10. (C) A major underlying factor complicating our CT 
cooperation is the delicate balancing act that Saleh has been 
performing between competing interests for decades.  He 
clearly recognizes the threat terrorist elements pose to 
regime stability and is appreciative of USG support to 
strengthen the security forces.  At the same time, he is 
careful not to provoke arms dealers, tribal leaders, 
islamists and others who oppose closer ties to the United 
States.  Saleh maintains power through a complex network of 
deals and alliances, and has been less than enthusiastic 
about engaging in more comprehensive and consistent bilateral 
cooperation that could threaten that precarious network. 
 
11. (C)  Saleh's primary method of influence over the other 
power centers in Yemen -- the tribes and the military -- is a 
system of opaque, off-the-books financial patronage.  Decades 
of this practice have fostered a culture of corruption at all 
levels of the ROYG, and is itself beginning to pose a threat 
to stability.  International donors' efforts in most areas 
have been hampered by corruption, leaving most Yemenis in the 
same grinding poverty that has always plagued the country. 
Yemen is facing a looming social crisis, as the country 
continues to suffer from one of the highest birth rates in 
the world, and more than 47 percent of its population is 
currently under the age of 15. 
 
12. (C)  Ordinary Yemenis are having increasing difficulty 
coping with the economic suffering brought on by high 
inflation and reductions in government subsidies.  At the 
same time, grand corruption, diminishing oil reserves, and 
meager outside investment have severely limited the ROYG's 
ability to respond to these hardships and Yemenis have 
resorted to violence to express their frustrations. The 
second al-Houthi rebellion in Saada earlier this year -- 
which was eventually put down by CSF-CTU and other forces -- 
and riots in which dozens died, sparked by the reduction of 
fuel subsidies in August, portend an uncertain future for 
Yemen's internal social stability absent the undertaking of a 
major reform program. 
 
13. (C)  Despite nearly 30 years in power and a certain 
amount of tolerance for democratic dissent not seen in other 
countries in the region, Saleh has yet to demonstrate a 
long-term vision for addressing Yemen's economic woes.  This 
is particularly concerning at a time when the Yemeni state is 
on the brink of failure -- a sobering prospect with serious 
implications for regional stability and the GWOT.  If Saleh's 
greatest achievement -- the stability and unity of the 
country -- is to survive beyond his rule, he must take bold 
steps to strengthen and reform Yemen's military, democratic, 
and financial institutions.  One important step in this 
direction is a closer CT partnership with the United States 
that is characterized by routine access and cooperation at 
all levels. 
 
14.  (C)  Your meeting with the President will offer an 
important opportunity to firmly reinforce the message he 
heard in Washington about the need for better cooperation on 
CT efforts to safeguard Yemen's stability.  Previous 
U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation offers a good foundation, and 
Saleh will argue that the record shows that he has responded 
to every request the USG has made of him.  What he does not 
yet seem to understand is that true partners do not wait to 
be asked or cajoled.  It is critical that Yemen make the 
transition from ad hoc cooperation to a fully developed 
partnership.  In the past, Saleh has done enough, relative to 
his neighbors, to remain in our good graces.  With Yemen 
facing a looming economic and social crisis, however, words 
and occasional progress will no longer suffice.  If Yemen 
continues to merely tread water, it will drown -- with 
serious consequences for regional and international security. 
 
15. (S)  Suggested talking points for your meeting with the 
President: 
 
--  Congratulations on your recent successful visits to the 
United States, Japan and France.  I am visiting Yemen to 
review our impressive achievements together and to ask your 
views on ways we can attain an even higher level of strategic 
engagement. 
 
--  As we continue to fight hand-in-hand against terrorists 
who want to bring harm to Yemen, we must also recognize the 
threat posed by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. For your country's interests and ours, the arms 
trade in Yemen must end. 
 
--  As you know, weapons of Yemeni origin have found their 
way into the hands of terrorists.  Your public and private 
assurances that only government officials will be allowed to 
buy weapons abroad are encouraging. 
 
--  Without a viable weapons inventory system, however, it 
will be difficult to assess the impact of your new policy. 
CENTCOM stands ready to assist you in creating an inventory 
system so that we can both be sure that weapons are being put 
in the right hands. 
 
--  Equally dangerous for both of our countries is the 
problem of foreign fighters in Iraq.  I commend you for the 
measures you have taken to help stem the flow of young 
Yemenis to Iraq, but I strongly urge you to redouble your 
efforts. 
 
--  Those fighters who are not killed in Iraq may return to 
Yemen with greater ability to harm the Yemeni people and your 
government.  CENTCOM is ready to help you in addressing this 
problem, because it is as threatening for U.S. national 
security as it is for yours. 
 
--  As we move forward on our cooperation, we can point to 
many successes.  One example is the Yemeni Coast Guard.  With 
our assistance and your determination, you now have a force 
capable of protecting your key ports. 
 
--  We look forward to helping to expand their operations and 
provide protection for the Safer Oil Terminal and the 
terminal in al-Sahir.  I urge you to make it a top priority 
to support the Coast Guard in this endeavor to protect all of 
Yemen's shores. 
 
--  We look forward to building a close relationship with MOD 
forces, as well.  MOD's 3-5 year plan provides an important 
blueprint and MOD Working Group meetings help us to focus our 
assistance, and we hope that this will lead to direct 
engagement between our military trainers and MOD personnel, 
particularly the Special Operations Forces. 
Khoury