US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1943

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Elections 
SUBJECT: LTTE DISCOURAGES TAMILS FROM VOTING, BLOW TO 
RANIL'S CHANCES 
 
 
Classified By: AMB Jeffrey Lunstead. Reason: 1.4 (B,D) 
 
 1.  (U) SUMMARY: Ending weeks of speculation about the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stance in the 
November 17 presidential election, the LTTE met late on 
November 10 with their Tamil National Alliance (TNA) proxies 
in Kilinochchi and announced that the Tamil people would "not 
benefit from showing interest in the forthcoming election." 
The LTTE/TNA statement, followed by calls for an election 
boycott by several other LTTE-linked organizations, is being 
widely interpreted as a message (and a threat) to Tamil 
voters to stay home on election day.    This, combined with 
the November 9 Supreme Court decision requiring that polling 
stations be moved further away from border crossings, may 
handicap the United National Party candidate Ranil 
Wickremesinge.  In a November 14 Co-chairs meeting, the 
European Union Ambassador-designate revealed that EU Election 
monitor Lord Cushnahan might declare the election flawed if 
Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse 
won by a narrow margin.  Co-chairs will meet Cushnahan prior 
to his public statement.  Suggested language to cover two 
possible scenarios -- a free and fair election or a flawed 
election -- will follow Septel. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (SBU)  A meeting between the LTTE and TNA leaders to 
discuss the election, postponed since November 4, concluded 
late on November 10 with an announcement by TNA 
parliamentarian R. Sampanthan that Tamil grievances and 
aspirations had not been addressed when either of the two 
major Sinhalese parties had been in power and that any 
interest in the elections would be "a futile exercise." In an 
apparent attempt to ameliorate the negative tone of the 
announcement and their reputation as an undemocratic 
organization, the LTTE and TNA muddied the waters by adding 
that "neither the TNA nor the LTTE would advise people not to 
vote."  In the weeks preceding the meeting at the LTTE 
headquarters in Kilinochchi, over 30 LTTE front organizations 
called for boycotting the election.  When asked for an 
explanation of what the TNA announcement means, M.P.K. 
Gajendran of the TNA told an embassy FSN bluntly, "When 
people come to ask us, we tell them not to vote." 
 
3.  (C) Conventional wisdom holds that Tamils in general and 
particularly those in LTTE -controlled areas would support 
opposition United National Party (UNP) candidate Ranil 
Wickremesinge, particularly when faced with the option of 
Rajapakse and his Sinhalese chauvinist allies. A November 9 
Supreme Court decision requiring that polling stations be at 
least 500 meters from the military check points and that a 
voter may be detained in police custody if his identity is 
questioned might have an additional -- although not equal -- 
effect on suppressing the estimated 250,000 Tamil voters 
living in uncleared areas.  UNP insider G.L. Peiris glumly 
told the DCM November 11 that Sampanthan's statement could 
only be interpreted as a call for a Tamil boycott of the 
election.  All but conceding defeat for the UNP, Peiris said 
the statement "will make the numbers very, very difficult for 
us." 
 
4.  (C)  The Co-chairs met on November 14 and concluded that 
a statement criticizing the LTTE action would inevitably be 
seen as favoring one candidate and hence interfering with the 
election. At the meeting, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar 
related that he had detected a sharp change in attitude 
regarding the elections from the LTTE in Kilinochchi over the 
last month.  EU Ambassador-designate Julian Wilson EU chief 
election monitor John Cushnahan was concerned that a victory 
of 50,000 votes or less for Rajapakse would oblige him to 
declare the election flawed because of the negative impact 
the Supreme Court decision might have on potential 
Wickremesinge votes.  Cushnahan will meet the Co-chairs prior 
to any announcement the evening of November 18.   The 
Co-chairs agreed that in case of a clear winner they should 
individually prepare statements calling on the victor to 
support the cease-fire agreement (CFA) and work with all 
parties to move the peace process forward. We will send 
suggested language for a statement Septel. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  The LTTE kept its cards close to its chest 
until the eleventh hour.  Even the TNA MPs were telling us 
just a few weeks ago that they believed the LTTE would 
quietly support Wickremesinge.  For some reason, however, the 
LTTE has decided to discourage Tamil participation.  Why is 
difficult to say.  One theory is that a Rajapakse victory -- 
and the hard line on the peace process he is likely to adopt 
-- would gain the LTTE some sympathy from the international 
community.  Another is that the LTTE is genuinely concerned 
that no Sinhalese leader will meet their aspirations. 
Whatever its motivation, the LTTE's words of discouragement 
are certain to depress voter turn out in the north and east. 
In a race that remains too close to call, this could prove 
decisive. 
 
6.  (C) We are concerned by the possibility that Cushnahan 
might issue a statement condemning the election as flawed on 
the basis of the Supreme Court decision.  If the voter 
turn-out is low in the north and east, we believe the 
LTTE/TNA announcement -- rather than the Supreme Court 
decision -- will have been the key factor. 
LUNSTEAD