US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1940

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, CE, Elections, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: AS ELECTION APPROACHES, AMPARA RESIDENTS ASK: 
CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG? 
 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle.  Reason: 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (U)  Summary:  The district government in the 
Muslim-majority East coast district of Ampara appears to have 
logistics for the November 17 presidential election in order. 
 Community members feel that Tamils in the district are not 
taking the election seriously enough.  Tamils are unconvinced 
that voting will solve their issues but, if they do vote, 
would overwhelmingly support Ranil Wickremesinghe.  Muslims 
are divided, but interlocutors in Ampara believe that more 
than half will vote for Mahinda Rajapakse.  All want 
prosperity and peace in the North and East.  End Summary. 
 
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District Government Ready for Election Day 
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2.  (U)  Poloff and pol FSN traveled to Ampara on Sri Lanka's 
eastern coast November 7-9 to assess preparations for the 
November 17 presidential election.  The Ampara government 
agent (GA) Herath Abeyweera assured poloff that all polling 
procedures for the presidential election had been finalized 
and that contingency plans are in place for the two 
challenges he saw as most threatening to the voting: 
monsoonal rains and ballot security.  Intense rain would 
render some areas of Ampara inaccessible by car, but the 
district was prepared to transport people to and from polling 
stations by tractor, boat, or Air Force-provided helicopters. 
 Abeyweera noted that "safehouses" near the main roads would 
be available to overnight polling staff in isolated areas if 
they were to feel threatened in any way, but he emphasized 
that he did not expect any security issues to arise. 
(Abeyweera was alluding to political party thugs intent on 
rigging the election rather than interference by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)).  Polling staff are 
required to man the station the night before the election, 
making them potentially vulnerable to intimidation. 
 
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To Vote or Not To Vote, That Is the Question 
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3. (U)  Community members in Ampara town, Akkaraipattu, 
Kalmunai, and Pottuvil repeatedly told poloff that Tamils 
and, to a lesser extent, Muslims are not taking the 
presidential election as seriously as they should.  The 
prevailing attitude among those uninterested in the election 
is that the government in Colombo has done little to help 
minorities in the wake of the tsunami, lacks the political 
will to forge a permanent peace settlement in the country, 
and the selection of a new Sinhalese president likely would 
not change the situation.  Many interlocutors viewed Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate and current Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and United National Party (UNP) 
candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe as two sides of the same 
coin--interested only in promoting the Sinhalese Buddhist 
majority.  Voters are more interested in replacing Ampara's 
12 parliamentary seats (out of 225) with legislators willing 
to speak out on behalf of the welfare of the minority 
community and funnel development projects into the district. 
Several interlocutors said that the district's current 
representatives are useless puppets of the Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) and by implication the LTTE, but no one could 
say how parliamentary elections would change this. 
 
4.  (U)  Some Muslim, Tamil, and even Sinhalese community 
members expressed concern that the lack of interest in the 
presidential election would backfire.  They predicted that a 
Tamil boycott, whether official or de facto, would give 
Rajapakse the edge and subject minorities to six years of 
disenfranchising Sinhalese chauvinist policies.  Since the 
election would determine the development of Sri Lanka for the 
better part of the next decade, many interlocutors stressed 
that Tamils should think less about what the government has 
not done for them in the past and think more about which 
candidate could offer the best deal for the future. 
 
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Tamils Demand Peace, Prosperity, and Rights:  A Nod for Ranil 
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5.  (U)  Tamils in Ampara clearly want improved tsunami aid, 
permanent peace, an end to politically-motivated abductions 
and killings, government assistance with economic and 
agricultural development,  and equal rights in employment and 
education.  Although all of poloff's contacts expressed 
frustration with the pace of reconstruction and the 
allocation of funds that seemingly benefits the Sinhalese 
South over the North and East, each harbored the opinion that 
the tsunami relief provided thus far would not be a relevant 
factor in this election.  Tamils instead would focus on who 
is offering the most benefits for the future.  Many Tamil 
interlocutors said Wickremesinghe is the lesser of two evils, 
given Rajapakse's alliance with the Sinhalese chauvinist 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). 
6.  (SBU)  Representatives from the Peace Forum of Ampara 
District wondered why the JVP, itself a party born out of 
militancy, could be allowed to enter mainstream politics but 
be so blatantly anti-Tamil and opposed to negotiating with 
the LTTE.  Other Tamil voters said that they consider 
Wickremesinghe more likely to achieve a permanent settlement, 
improving not only Sinhalese-Tamil relations but also 
solidifying Tamil-Muslim and Muslim-Sinhalese relations. 
Residents described a climate of fear in Ampara, citing three 
killings in the district in the first week of November and 
several abductions that have taken place since August. Most 
residents blame the LTTE, but police have been unable to 
prove the identities or the motivations of the perpetrators. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Tamil farmers interviewed at the Peace Alliance 
office in Akkaraipattu believe that Wickremesinghe would help 
reduce the price of fertilizer and stabilize the price of 
rice, as promised in his manifesto.  (This differs from the 
view of most Sinhalese farmers elsewhere in the country, who 
believe that Rajapakse is the man for agricultural benefits.) 
 Residents of Akkaripattu, comparing previous UNP 
presidencies to the current SLFP rule, said they experienced 
more employment and development activities--including free 
lunch in schools--under the UNP.  They told poloff that the 
incumbent SLFP president received 86% of the votes in the 
1999 presidential election in a Tamil-dominated division in 
Ampara, but her perceived failure to live up to her promises 
gives the impetus for Tamils to vote UNP.  Other Tamils at 
the Peace Alliance and at the Maha Shakthi Foundation 
expressed hope that Wickremesinghe would end 
standardization--a quota system that restricts the number of 
Tamils admitted to universities--and discriminatory hiring 
practices.  A Peace Forum representative told poloff that 
over 70% of employed university graduates in the district are 
Sinhalese, and they have permanent positions and set 
salaries.  The remaining 30% are Tamils and Muslims who are 
mostly employed on a temporary basis with salary levels not 
yet set. 
 
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Mahinda May Have the Advantage with Muslims 
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8.  (U)  Muslims in Ampara share Tamils' hopes for peace and 
prosperity, but--like elsewhere in the country--they are both 
more enthusiastic and more divided about the candidates than 
Tamils are.  At a lunch meeting, a group of Muslims in 
Kalmunai told poloff that Muslims favor Rajapakse because 
they fear attacks from the LTTE if Wickremesinghe were to 
win.  They pointed out that the UNP was in power in 1990 when 
the LTTE forced Muslims out of Jaffna, and that 
Wickremesinghe was Prime Minister in 2002 when the LTTE 
attacked Muslims in Mullaittivu and Mutur (on the 
northeastern coast) without government intervention.  One 
Muslim noted that his compatriots supported Wickremesinghe's 
efforts with the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) in 2002 but were 
now disillusioned by the accord's deterioration. 
Interlocutors in Kalmunai estimated that 60-65% of Muslims in 
all of the North and East would vote for Rajapakse, while 
only slightly more than a third would follow Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress leader Rauff Hakeem and support Wickremesinghe. 
 
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Comment 
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9.  (C)  Discussions in Ampara district revealed that even 
people who support a common goal--e.g. peace negotiations 
with the LTTE or better benefits for agriculture--have 
varying ideas about which candidate can best achieve that 
goal.  The near-monolithic UNP support expressed by Tamils in 
Ampara district underscores the importance to Wickremesinghe 
of getting out the Tamil vote in the North and East--a 
prospect that appears increasingly tenuous (septel). 
LUNSTEAD