US embassy cable - 05DUSHANBE1812

S E C R E T  DUSHANBE 001812 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P, EUR, SA, DRL, S/P 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
ALMATY PASS TO USIAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PROP, ECON, EAID, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI 
SUBJECT: DESPITE RUSSIAN PRESSURE, THE UNITED STATES CAN PROMOTE ITS 
POLICY GOALS IN TAJIKISTAN 
 
REF: A. A) DUSHANBE 1805 
 
     B. B) DUSHANBE 1762 
     C. C) DUSHANBE 1646 
     D. D) DUSHANBE 1352 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy 
Dushanbe. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  Although we now de-emphasize its previous 
Cold-War primacy in U.S. foreign policy, Russia still requires 
clear-eyed scrutiny for the havoc it can play with the 
President's democracy agenda and larger goals for 
transformational diplomacy in the former Soviet republics.  We 
believe Russia is exerting consistent and strong pressure on 
Tajikistan to reduce the U.S. and Western role and presence. 
Although Tajikistan's "open-door" foreign policy seeks to 
balance competing foreign pressures for its own best interests, 
Moscow's pressure is beginning to take a toll.  To promote 
democracy and economic and political reform in Tajikistan, we 
need to develop new ways to overcome negative Russian actions 
and influence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHY IS RUSSIA FOCUSING ON TAJIKISTAN? 
 
2.  (S) Russia is paying special attention to Tajikistan because 
of its military base and other strategic interests, including 
the Nurek Space Tracking Center.  Moscow is determined to do 
everything possible to prevent a "color revolution" in 
Tajikistan that could threaten its perceived strategic 
interests.  Working from the "siloviki" zero-sum-game worldview 
of current geo-politics, some in Moscow seem to believe that the 
United States wants additional and permanent U.S. military bases 
in Central Asia and sees Tajikistan as a prime candidate, 
especially after the U.S. loss of Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
3.  (S) Despite the fact that Tajiks are war-weary and 
opposition-leary, and President Rahmonov is still genuinely 
popular, Moscow truly fears a "color revolution" in Tajikistan. 
Elsewhere, "color revolutions" have tended to bring 
Western-oriented leaders to power, although in Tajikistan no 
Saakashvili or Yushchenko is waiting in the wings.  A "color 
revolution" in Tajikistan, the "siloviki" fear, would open the 
door for a U.S. military base, or even more devastating to 
Moscow, for Dushanbe to kick out the Russians and give the 
Russian military base to the United States.  The nightmare of 
the "siloviki" is that the United States would then have a 
string of bases from Afghanistan, through Tajikistan, and into 
Kyrgyzstan to weaken Russia and dominate Central Asia, which 
Russia persists in calling its "sphere of influence." 
 
4.  (S) This may sound like easily dismissed fringe paranoia, 
but the "siloviki" do not play by our rules of fact-based logic. 
 It is worth recalling that Moscow and the Russian Embassy in 
Dushanbe consistently put out the irrational rumor in 2004 that 
the United States had secretly convinced Tajikistan to demand 
that the Russian Border Force leave the Tajikistan-Afghanistan 
border which Russia had controlled back to the 19th century. 
 
WHAT IS RUSSIA DOING? 
 
5.  (C) Because Russia is militarily weak, it uses other means 
to assert its authority in Tajikistan.  After years of 
inconclusive negotiation, Russia and Tajikistan rapidly reached 
 
 
agreement in 2004 (following Tbilisi's Rose Revolution) to 
forgive Tajikistan's bilateral debt and to establish the legal 
basis for the Russian military base in perpetuity. 
 
6.  (C) The symbolic culmination was President Putin's October 
16, 2004, visit to Tajikistan.  To set the hook in Rahmonov's 
jaw, Putin also announced major investments, variously described 
as $1.2 billion to over $3 billion, in Rahmonov's pet interests 
- hydropower (primarily Sangtuda-1 and secondarily Rogun) and 
the old Soviet aluminum tolling industry.  Until then, no 
nation, especially in the West, took Rahmonov's pleas seriously 
to invest in these Soviet-era behemoths, although it is now 
evident that they had some economic merit, especially for South 
Asia. 
 
7.  (C) Since Russia made its commitment-in-principle, Iran has 
expressed interest in creating the financial consortium for 
Sangtuda-2, and China has said it will invest in the Nurek 
Hydroelectric Station.  These potential investments, especially 
Russia's, could be seen as economically positive for Tajikistan 
and the region, or at least politically benign - except that 
Russia appears recently to be working to exclude Western 
participation in them (septel). 
 
8.  (C) Through the second half of 2004 and 2005, Russia has 
mounted a campaign to prevent "color revolutions" in the CIS. 
In overt media propaganda and in private and covert 
communications with governments like Tajikistan's, Moscow has 
asserted that U.S. democracy NGOs - specifically, National 
Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, 
Freedom House, and Internews - are U.S. covert tools whose job 
is to prepare the local populations to overthrow "legal 
governments" in the CIS.  More recently, the goal of Russian 
pressure seems to be to limit the presence of not just U.S. 
democracy NGOs but all Western elements present in Tajikistan. 
 
9.  (C) On the ground in Tajikistan, the Russian position seems 
to be hardening.  The previous Russian Ambassador, Maksim 
Peshkov, was reasonable, amiable, and accessible.  He worked the 
diplomatic circuit and was always available for reasonably 
frank, even if inconclusive, discussions with the U.S. and other 
Western ambassadors. 
 
10.  (C) Since the arrival in early summer of the high-level 
political appointee, Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov, the Russian 
Embassy has become a closed bastion.  The U.S. Embassy's 
previous access to different sections of the Russian Embassy has 
nearly dried up, and Abdulatipov very seldom appears in public. 
He continues to accept diplomatic invitations, but almost 
invariably at the last minute pleads an unexpected visitor from 
Moscow or that he is indisposed.  The rare times that he is seen 
in public - e.g., at important countries' national days - he 
ostentatiously huddles in a corner with the most senior Tajik 
officials present. 
 
11.  (C) At the same time, we and other Western embassies hear 
that Russian Embassy officers have unlimited free access at any 
time to Tajik Government offices, sometimes even barging in 
without appointments.  This is especially telling because all 
other embassies are required to submit diplomatic notes, to 
which the responses are often long delayed, for appointments to 
conduct even the most mundane mid-level daily business. 
 
12.  (S) Most important, the Russian intelligence services 
thoroughly dominate Tajikistan's Ministry of Security.  Ministry 
of Security views often take precedence in the Presidential 
 
 
Apparat and key ministries like Justice that is responsible for 
registering foreign NGOs and Tajik media outlets and political 
parties. 
 
BUT RAHMONOV IS NOT A SIMPLE PAWN 
 
13.  (C) Tajikistan describes its foreign policy as "open door," 
and balances its relations with the United States, Russia, 
China, Iran, and the European Union seeking what is best from 
each for its own national interests.  During the last six 
months, President Rahmonov has repeatedly let us know he is 
"satisfied" with the U.S.-Tajik relationship.  He is especially 
pleased with the security relationship - primarily U.S. funding 
and training to increase Tajik capabilities for border control, 
counter-narcotics, and counterterrorism. 
 
14.  (C) Even on the contentious issue of U.S. democracy NGOs, 
Rahmonov has appeared to split the baby - refusing legal 
registration for National Democratic Institute and Freedom 
House, but allowing them, nonetheless, to operate most of their 
programs.  Another positive sign is that he has just approved 
for the national school curriculum a civic-education textbook 
that has been a long-term project of the International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).  For some reason, IFES 
is the only U.S. democracy NGO that escaped Tajik scrutiny and 
operates unfettered. 
 
INCREMENTALLY CLOSING IN ON WESTERN NGO'S AND OTHERS 
 
15.  (C) More recently, though, we detect an incremental 
hardening of the Tajik position.  Although no new Tajik anti-NGO 
legislation is pending like in Kazakhstan and Russia, the Tajik 
Government is consistently working to gain greater control over 
all NGOs, not just democracy ones. 
 
16.  (C) The Tajik Government argues that during the 1992-97 
Civil War and in its aftermath, Western NGOs flooded into 
Tajikistan without limit or supervision.  Dushanbe now wants to 
find out who is actually in Tajikistan and what they are doing. 
For any country concerned about security, this is reasonable. 
But we also believe it is a Ministry of Security response to 
Russian prodding to prevent a "color revolution" and limit 
Western influence. 
 
17.  (C) Further, Tajikistan has recently been floating a new 
policy position, including during Secretary of State Rice's 
October visit and more recently with the European Union.  The 
Tajik Government suggests it is time for foreign assistance 
delivered via NGOs to cease and be replaced by direct foreign 
investment in infrastructure projects (like the hydroelectric 
stations and roads) and business "joint ventures." 
 
18.  (C) Foreign Minister Nazarov has told us that this is, so 
far, a Tajik Government "desire, not a policy" (reftel B). 
Tajikistan argues that NGOs are both expensive, because of their 
high overhead to support foreign advisers, and sometimes 
ineffective.  This, Tajikistan says, is an unacceptable waste of 
foreign assistance.  While this argument has some merit, it 
suggests a worrisome trend, and will scare off the very 
international investors they are trying to attract. 
 
INCREASING VISA DELAYS - MALEVOLENCE OR JUST INCOMPETENCE? 
 
19.  (C) Even more worrisome, obtaining Tajik visas is becoming 
more difficult - not just for U.S. NGO staff, but also for 
European NGO workers, foreign business people, and even staffs 
 
 
of international financial institutions.  Being an "inscrutable 
Eastern country," Tajikistan never likes to say "no."  It just 
drags things out until reasonable but impatient people give up. 
There is a credible view in the Western diplomatic community 
that these new visa problems are a result of Russian prodding to 
limit Western influence in Tajikistan.  It is worth noting the 
Ministry of Security vets all visa applications. 
 
20.  (C) However, another explanation is possible - corruption 
and incompetence.  The previous reasonably professional chief of 
the Foreign Ministry's Consular Office was replaced this past 
summer by a Rahmonov relative (reftel D), and that's when the 
new problems started.  It could be that he has the job to assure 
loyalty to a new restrictive visa policy.  However, the Rahmonov 
"cousins, nephews, and in-laws" have a reputation for gaining 
lucrative positions, few with any real qualifications, and then 
going wild with unrestrained corruption.  That could be 
happening with visas.  The most famous example this year was a 
son-in-law appointed as Chief of Border Control at Dushanbe 
International Airport.  Flagrantly incompetent and corrupt, he 
lasted only a few months before he was quietly "reassigned to 
another position." 
 
BOOST THE ECONOMY TO PREVENT A "COLOR REVOLUTION" 
 
21.  (C) Russia's anti-U.S. stance in Tajikistan and Dushanbe's 
incremental moves against U.S. and other Western NGOs may be 
coincidental.  However, we know Russia agitates for countries 
like Tajikistan to curtail, if not expel, U.S. NGOs.  More 
indirectly, Russia does not deliver "foreign assistance" via 
Russian NGOs in Tajikistan.  Moscow's promises of massive direct 
investment in hydropower and aluminum may have emboldened 
Rahmonov to begin to draw the line against NGO-provided Western 
foreign assistance. 
 
22.  (C) We know Rahmonov understands clearly that one of the 
key trip-wires for "color revolutions" is chronic economic 
stagnation.  While he has been reasonably open to economic 
reform that would eventually create the conditions for Western 
economic investment, he may now be impatient with how long that 
process takes and that it comes with no tangible promises of 
investment.  He may believe that to survive, he has to give 
Tajikistan concrete economic improvement and growth, and do it 
fast. 
 
23.  (C) From the West, Rahmonov receives painful and 
long-drawn-out economic restructuring and seemingly endless and 
inconclusive feasibility studies.  From Russia (and Iran and 
perhaps China), he receives promises of large-scale investment 
that could potentially lift the entire economy.  He has no 
extensive experience in the West and no deep understanding of 
the complexities and realities of the global economy.  He wants 
Tajik economic growth, and he wants it now.  If he has to take a 
little extra political baggage from Moscow, that's a price he 
may be willing to pay.  At the same time, we do not believe that 
he will abandon Western-style economic restructuring and reform. 
 He wants to hedge his bets. 
 
WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO? 
 
24.  (C) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:  Our short-term focus will be to 
protect the interests of U.S. NGOs as deliverers of 
developmental assistance.  A mid-level Foreign Ministry official 
recently told us that the Tajik Government generally does not 
understand what U.S. NGOs really do and simply listens to Russia 
on these matters (reftel A).  (COMMENT:  This may not be as 
 
 
absurd as it seems.  All written communication with any part of 
the government must be conducted by diplomatic note, and the 
Ministry of Security screens all diplomatic notes.  We suspect 
the Ministry of Security does not pass forward diplomatic notes 
with which it does not agree.  END COMMENT.)  Embassy Dushanbe 
plans to arrange information roundtables to bring together 
senior government officials and major U.S. developmental NGOs. 
We will also start a public diplomacy campaign of press releases 
focusing each week on one U.S. NGO and its achievements for 
Tajikistan.  Print media reach a miniscule percentage of the 
population; but we know that the Ministry of Security and 
Presidential Apparat carefully study each and every U.S. Embassy 
press release, and that's what counts. 
 
25.  (C) SUPPORT FOR TAJIK HYDROPOWER IN GREATER CENTRAL ASIA: 
In brief, the U.S. Government needs to make clear to the 
Government of Tajikistan, in international fora and in public, 
that the United States supports the development of Tajikistan's 
hydroelectric potential for export to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to create new Central-South Asian links.  See septel. 
 
26.  (C) ENGAGEMENT:  We cannot and should not attempt to 
compete with the constant back and forth of Russian and Tajik 
officials between Moscow and Dushanbe - and even less should we 
attempt to emulate their drinking bouts.  However, building on 
Secretary Rice's successful October 13 visit, we would 
 
SIPDIS 
definitely benefit from more frequent and - this is important - 
longer senior U.S. visits.  Rahmonov does indeed listen, but he 
needs to have U.S. interlocutors willing to spend more than a 
few hours in Tajikistan every six months or so.  He especially 
needs interlocutors who do not focus on the relatively stable 
security side of the bilateral relationship but who can tackle 
the harder parts of the relationship, including economic 
development. 
 
27.  (SBU) U.S. ASSISTANCE REVIEW:  We do not want to appear 
like iconoclasts seeking to reinvent the wheel of U.S. 
assistance for Tajikistan.  But we do suggest for consideration 
two possibilities: 
 
28.  (C) (A) For democracy NGOs, we need to consider whether 
current partners' approaches have been overtaken by events.  For 
example, if Internews can no longer be effective with its 
current programs because Tajikistan is using its licensing 
regulations to strangle the broadcast of non-government 
information (reftel C), we need to consider whether a refocus on 
training journalists and helping "independent" media outlets to 
become financially independent might be a better way to meet our 
media goals.  Any NGO will likely find successes to justify its 
current programs, but we may need a review council with 
political-level participation to determine whether current 
assistance is promoting U.S. core policy goals - or if we are on 
self-defeating autopilot. 
 
29.  (C) (B) It may be useful to convene an off-cycle senior 
assistance review with both U.S. and Tajik participants who are 
decision makers, not just at the technical level.  We need to 
listen as well as to preach.  What does Tajikistan want?  How 
can we make what Tajikistan wants support core U.S. policy 
objectives?  We believe that if we make this effort, and 
especially if we can jointly reach consensus, there will be less 
pressure on U.S. development NGOs.  This, in turn, will provide 
a wider space for the United States to promote its core policy 
goals and objectives. 
 
30.  (C) COMMENT:  Tajikistan has brought this latest crossroads 
 
 
on itself.  There is the requisite political stability for 
Tajikistan to continue on its modest path of democratic, 
economic, and political reform.  However, thanks to Russian 
pressure, Tajikistan is embarking on a potentially 
confrontational approach that will slow development and 
encourage the Tajikistan Government's worst instincts.  Now is 
the time to encourage Tajikistan to stay on track.  END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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