US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1601

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001601 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PHUM, KDEM, PGOV, BO, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECHS PROVIDE RECIPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS 
 
REF: A. STATE 188900 
 
     B. PRAGUE 1399 
 
Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. The Czechs have been working for years to 
promote democracy in Belarus. Thus, talking to the Czechs 
about Belarus is like preaching to the choir.  The Czech MFA, 
in the words of their Transition Promotion Unit Coordinator, 
supports U.S. policy toward Belarus without hesitation. She 
also gave her unvarnished assessment of the political 
situation in Belarus (guarded optimism that a transition will 
take place); described Czech support of Belarusian opposition 
leader, Alesandr Milinkievich (unconditional); and summarized 
the Czech approach to promoting democracy in Belarus (a 
formula based on experience). In short, the Czechs are ready, 
willing, and able to support U.S. efforts to promote 
democracy in Belarus. End summary. 
 
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Czechs support U.S. policy on Belarus 
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2. (C) Poloff met recently with Czech MFA officials Gabriela 
Dlouha, Transition Promotion Unit Coordinator, and Ivana 
Kuranianova, Department of Southwestern and Eastern Europe, 
to discuss Czech efforts to promote democratic transition in 
Belarus, and to deliver ref A talking points. Dlouha said the 
Czechs strongly support the U.S. policy, and she endorsed 
each point articulated in the talking points. Note, however, 
that while Dlouha agreed Russia is an important player, she 
was pessimistic that Russia can be persuaded to turn its back 
on the Lukashenko regime. In her view, Russia is not 
interested in regime change because any turn toward the west 
means losing importance in the region. 
 
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Election in Belarus: cause for optimism 
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3. (C) Dlouha predicted that Lukashenko will try to steal the 
election, and thinks Russia and some western countries are 
nave on this point. However, the election would be close 
even without fraud. She estimated that 45-50% of the voters 
actually support Lukashenko, citing social stability and the 
country's good economy as reason for their support. 
 
4. (C) Nevertheless, she also saw reasons for guarded 
optimism that the opposition could win the election. First, 
the very fact that the three major opposition groups elected 
one common candidate, Alesandr Milinkievich, is a major 
success. Second, Milinkievich could win the election on his 
own merits. He has measurable support, and the Czechs think 
he is qualified to lead (Dlouha noted he is an economist and 
a good manager). Moreover, Milinkievich says he can bring 
people to the streets if there is fraud. (Unlike Ukraine, 
however, Dlouha predicted violence if such an event occurs.) 
Third, the political conditions in Belarus are more favorable 
for transition then the conditions in Czechoslovakia before 
1989: Belarus has a formal opposition party with a 
presidential candidate, a shadow government, and an 
established political system. 
 
5. (U) To increase the chances for a successful transition, 
the Czechs have launched pro-democracy initiatives in Belarus 
that read like a how-to manual: (1) promote free elections by 
strongly supporting the opposition and taking a tough stand 
against the dictatorship; (2) promote free press; and (3) 
rebuild civil society by training Belarusian democracy 
advocates. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Promoting Free Elections, Step 1: Support the Opposition 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6. (U) The Czechs were among the first to publicly support 
the opposition. In the days following the election of 
Milinkievich as the elected common opposition candidate, 
Czech PM Jiri Paroubek announced unconditional support for 
him. Former Czech president Vaclav Havel immediately invited 
Milinkievich to visit Prague to meet with Czech FM Cyril 
Svoboda. The former Czech Ambassador to the U.S., Alexandr 
Vondra, will travel to Belarus in November to meet with him. 
The Czechs also encouraged the EU to recognize Milinkievich. 
 
7. (U) In addition, the opposition requires financial 
support. Therefore, the Czechs have urged the EU to change 
its funding requirements to permit EU funds to go directly to 
civil society rather than through Belarusian NGOs (controlled 
by the GOB). The Czechs have also urged the EU to invite 
Milinkievich to come to Brussels to explain what he needs in 
the way of EU support. 
 
8. (C) An important aspect of supporting the opposition is 
denouncing the regime. The Czechs therefore supported the 
U.S. proposal that the EU should call on Lukashenko not to 
run again for the presidency. The Czechs submitted the 
proposal to the EU working group in advance of the Nov 7 
GAERC. However, according to Petr Kaiser, Director of the 
Czech MFA's CFSP Department, the Czechs were the only 
supporters of the proposal. Although the proposal failed to 
pass, the EU did ultimately issue strong statements against 
the GOB after the GAERC. The Czechs have also urged the EU to 
impose political sanctions on members of the Lukashenko 
regime (but not to impose economic sanctions). 
 
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Step 2: Promote Independent Media Channels 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Dlouha said the success of Milinkievich,s campaign 
depends on whether he can get his message to the voters. 
Unfortunately, the government-controlled media is closed to 
the opposition. Therefore, Milinkievich is conducting an 
old-fashioned, door-to-door campaign. Dlouha said this 
approach will be effective because the opposition can reach 
"every day" people this way. She added that the Belarus 
pro-democracy radio project (financially supported by the 
Czechs, Poles, EU, and USAID, ref B) will play a critical 
role in the election by supporting opposition outreach 
efforts. Because timing is crucial, the Czechs aim to have 
radio programming on the air by the end of 2005. At a 
conference in Prague on Oct 10 attended by Poloff, 
Milinkievich expressed gratitude for the radio project, and 
added that the opposition "desperately" needs paper to 
distribute campaign fliers and samostat newspapers. 
 
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Step 3: Rebuild Civil Society 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (U) Drawing on their own peaceful transition from 
communism to democracy, the Czechs recognize the need to 
educate civil society to prepare it to govern. Accordingly, 
the Czechs have launched a number of initiatives that provide 
educational, financial and political support to Belarusian 
democracy advocates. For example: 
 
--- The Czechs provide seminars and study trips for 
Belarusians involved in democratic reform (e.g., journalists, 
lawyers, local politicians, educators, economists, etc.). 
Lectures take place in the Czech Republic, and address human 
rights, defense, education, good governance, institution 
building, etc. 
 
--- Scholarships in the Czech Republic for persecuted 
students who are forced out of Belarusian colleges because of 
their views. 
 
--- Financial assistance for victims of political repression. 
 
--- Election monitoring. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment. Democracy promotion in Belarus is a 
priority for both the Czech Republic and the U.S. This 
creates considerable opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. 
will find in the Czechs a committed partner -- one that can 
provide needed support, expertise, and inspiration for U.S. 
efforts to promote democracy in Belarus, Cuba, and other 
non-democratic states. 
CABANISS