US embassy cable - 05DAMASCUS5887

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 005887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU; 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SY 
SUBJECT: ASAD DELIVERS HARD-LINE SPEECH, PREPARING SYRIANS 
FOR THE WORST 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Syrian President Bashar al-Asad gave a 
strident speech at Damascus University today (November 10). 
While Asad did not completely close the door on further 
cooperation with UNIIIC head Detlev Mehlis, he indicated that 
Syria had little faith in the fairness of the process and 
noted that future cooperation would be guided by Syrian 
national interests, so as to protect "national stability." 
He pointed to several recent offers of SARG cooperation with 
UNIIIC head Detlev Mehlis that he said had been rejected. 
The tone of the speech seemed designed to legitimize an 
anticipated rupture with the international community over 
further cooperation with the UN investigation and to prepare 
the Syrian public for the prospect of deeper isolation and 
eventual international sanctions.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) In his 90-minute speech, combining strident 
language with a relatively diffident delivery, Asad insisted 
that Syria had continually cooperated in the past, whether on 
UNSCR 1559, the Fitzgerald investigation, or with Mehlis and 
UNSCR 1595.  Nonetheless, the UNSC had passed resolution 1636 
and accused Syria of not cooperating.  Bashar said Syria 
would continue to "play along" and "cooperate" because it is 
innocent of the crime of killing Hariri and is respectful of 
"international legitimacy." 
 
3.  (SBU) However, Asad pointed out several general limits to 
that cooperation:  Syria will not allow the process to 
disturb national stability or cause the sacrifice of national 
interests.  He noted that the investigation needed to be 
conducted within the framework of reaching the facts about 
the crime.  (Note:  Asad also seemed to contradict his offer 
of cooperation, Bashar noting that "small tactics are no 
longer useful these days.  We should hold our ground from the 
start, and eventually we will prevail. . . in the interest of 
the country." ) 
 
4.  (C) Even in the context of accepting the principle of 
further cooperation, Bashar used language of defiance and 
attempted to fuel popular suspicions about the fairness and 
transparency of the investigation.  He noted that when people 
are attacked by criminals, they must resist, adding that "we 
will not allow anyone to enter our house and tamper with our 
national stability."  He also noted that Syria has two 
options:  resistance or chaos, and noted that resistance is 
the cheaper price to pay.  At several points Bashar pointed 
to the threat of chaos, often using Iraq to warn that such 
chaos could come to Syria if "superpowers" and their agents 
in Lebanon and elsewhere are allowed to have their way.  He 
insisted that the outcome of the investigation of the Hariri 
assassination was pre-determined outcomes and was but one 
step in a series of developments controlled by "superpowers" 
to target Syria and "redraw the map" of the Middle East. 
Repeatedly Bashar indicated that Israel is the beneficiary of 
such developments.  He also noted that Syria faces an 
"imminent danger" and maintained that Syria was a small 
country being forced to pay the price for the mistakes and 
conflicts of foreign powers. 
 
5.  (C)  On the specifics of further cooperation, he claimed 
that Syria has offered several possibilities to Mehlis, 
including inviting Mehlis to come to Syria to meet with the 
Foreign Minister and separately with the head of the Syrian 
Investigative Commission, and offered the possibility of 
Mehlis holding meetings at any UN office in Damascus.  In 
addition, after meeting with Arab League SYG Amre Moussa, and 
consulting by phone November 10 with Egyptian President 
Mubarak, he said that Syria had offered Mehlis the option of 
conducting his investigation at AL offices in Cairo.  Mehlis 
had rejected all these options, said Bashar. 
 
6.  (C) In his introduction, Bashar noted that Syria has 
entered a difficult political stage, similar to the period in 
the 1980's.  He noted that Syria was paying the price for its 
long-standing support for the Lebanese resistance, for the 
Palestinian Intifada, and for its opposition to the 
occupation of Iraq.  Bashar laid out the familiar positions 
on SARG willingness to cooperate on Iraq-related issues, its 
support for Abu Mazen, and its withdrawal from Lebanon of its 
military forces, in compliance with UNSCR 1559. 
 
7.  (C) He was especially harsh about political developments 
in Lebanon.  He distinguished between the Lebanese people, 
who he said stood with Syria in support of the Lebanese 
resistance (Hizballah) and against conspiracies against 
Syria, and professional politicians and media interests who 
were serving foreign interests in targeting Syria.  Bashar 
accused Lebanese PM Siniora of being "the servant of a 
servant" (presumably referring to Sa'ad al-Hariri).  Before a 
brief conclusion, Asad launched a harsh attack against 
certain elements in the Arab media that were serving the 
interests of foreign powers. 
 
 
Seche