US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1600

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

CZECH REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP

Identifier: 05PRAGUE1600
Wikileaks: View 05PRAGUE1600 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Prague
Created: 2005-11-10 12:24:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: IN KNNP PARM PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: IN, KNNP, PARM, PREL 
SUBJECT: CZECH REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL TO ENABLE CIVIL 
NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 190856 
 
     B. SECSTATE 203310 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Steve Tagai for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
 1. (C) On 9 November, PolOff met with Pavel Klucky, new MFA 
deputy director for international organizations with primary 
responsibility for non-proliferation, and reviewed Ref 
demarches.  Klucky stated that the Czech government was in 
general agreement with the U.S. proposal, noting the 
potential economic value of any resulting trade agreements 
for the development of peaceful, civilian Indian programs. 
Klucky said that the initial reaction to the proposal was 
very positive though specific technical details and 
safeguards would need to be provided prior to receiving the 
Czech endorsement.  The Czech government did not want to be 
seen as getting out in front on the proposal without the 
assurance that the legitimacy of international agreements and 
the framework of the NPT would be preserved. 
 
2. (C) Klucky stressed that a proposed agreement must contain 
robust safeguards to prevent the diversion of fissile 
materials from civilian to military programs, extremely 
strict lines of demarcation preventing the use of spent fuel 
for military purposes, a commitment to apply NPT-like 
safeguards to the civilian program, and a clear definition of 
the types of material and equipment that could be provided to 
the Indian civilian program. 
 
3. (C) Klucky also expressed the concern that the U.S. 
legislative process would impede the negotiations process. 
He was especially interested to learn if the proposal was 
receiving broad bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. 
 
4. (C)  Klucky said that in his opinion, the proposal 
recognized the realities in the region, offered a means by 
which some form of international control could be extended to 
the Indian civilian program, while potentially constraining 
the further expansion of Indian military programs. 
CABANISS 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04