US embassy cable - 05HARARE1537

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ASCENDANT AS MDC STRUGGLES CONTINUE 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1534 (B) HARARE 1527 (C) HARARE 1512 
 
     (D) HARARE 1508 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) At a meeting with diplomats at party headquarters 
November 10, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai confirmed the 
party's planned boycott of scheduled November 26 senate 
elections but left the door open for reconciliation with the 
Ncube faction that had supported participation.  However, 
despite key swing players within the party lining up behind 
Tsvangirai, the Ncube faction continues to show little 
 
SIPDIS 
inclination to reconcile.  Party leaders also confided that 
the party has been heavily involved in the NCA and ZCTU 
demonstration (refs A and B) and said internal tensions would 
not keep the party from increasing its public opposition to 
the regime.  End Summary. 
 
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Tsvangirai Sustained on Boycott 
 
SIPDIS 
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2.  (U) At his November 10 briefing, Tsvangirai confirmed the 
results of the party's National Council meeting on November 5 
(N.B. Attended by 54 out of 66 NEC members but not by the 
four party leaders who have favored participation in the 
Senate elections).  The Council had passed four resolutions 
by consensus: (1) it approved a party boycott of the senate 
elections, thus rescinding its vote of October 12, (2) the 
party would remain united in democratic principles in 
opposition to the "real enemy", ZANU-PF, (3) the party would 
engage civil society to partner on next steps, and (4) the 
party would conduct its National Congress before the end of 
February 2006. 
 
3.  (U) Tsvangirai added that individuals purporting to stand 
as senate candidates for the MDC had seven days within which 
to withdraw their nominations or they would be 
"auto-expelled" from the party because of their status as 
independents.  He explained that the initial vote to 
participate had not been within the competence of the 
National Council, since it had no authority to change party 
policy, and the MDC's policy was to support comprehensive 
rather than piecemeal consitutional reforms.  The vote to 
participate was therefore null and void.  Tsvangirai noted 
that a committee of four had been deployed to meet with Ncube 
faction representatives on November 11 in a continuing effort 
to heal internal divisions. 
 
4.  (SBU) Queried by the Ambassador, Tsvangirai noted that 
the Ncube faction had no attractive options other than 
returning to the fold; collaboration with ZANU-PF or Moyo's 
United Peoples Movement or going it alone offered little 
prospect of meaningful influence and he expected the 
rebellious faction would return to the fold after the 
November 26 elections.  Responding to other inquiries, 
Tsvangirai reported that he had told South African President 
 
SIPDIS 
Mbeki that he was open to dialogue with other party elements 
but did not see any point to burdening Mbeki himself with 
involvement in internal party matters.  He also asserted the 
party had not received any foreign funding. 
 
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Polarization Deepening 
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5.  (C) MDC MP and Shadow Minister for Economics Tendai Biti 
on November 9 told poloff that party divisions were deepening 
but that the MDC,s center of gravity had shifted decisively 
behind Tsvangirai.  Noting that he had long been in the 
middle and suspected by each camp of leaning toward the 
other, Biti said he had endeavored to play a mediating role 
until he came to the conclusion that the Ncube faction had an 
agenda that precluded reconciliation.  He noted that 
Tsvangirai had earlier agreed to a compromise along the lines 
 
SIPDIS 
proposed by mediator Brian Raftopolous (ref D), but that 
Ncube's group had then refused to meet to discuss it. 
 
6.  (C) Citing the Ncube faction's absence from the 
constitutional vote in parliament, its opposition to a 
popularly supported Senate election boycott, its "lies and 
manipulations" with South African President Mbeki, and its 
refusal to meet with Tsvangirai on key occasions, Biti said 
he feared that some or all of the faction must have made some 
accommodation with the ruling party that revolved around 
isolating Tsvangirai.  He said the Ncube faction had made 
strong pitches to draw in himself, MP and Secretary for Youth 
Affairs Nelson Chamisa and ex-MP Roy Bennett, but their 
duplicity and intransigence had only alienated all three. 
 
7.  (C) Biti said he had always been critical of Tsvangirai's 
acting outside the constitution but came to recognize that 
"everybody" - especially Secretary-General Ncube - was 
ignoring the party constitution willy-nilly, so why should 
Tsvangirai be held to a higher standard?  In spite of the 
 
SIPDIS 
real procedural grievances, the situation now required a 
political rather than a legalistic solution, and Tsvangirai 
held the commanding political position. 
 
8.  (C) Over breakfast November 10, Chamisa essentially 
corroborated Biti's account to poloff.  He added that Job 
Sikhala had told him in confidence that Ncube had advised him 
to file the lawsuit against Tsvangirai over his suspension 
grievance.  Chamisa concluded that opening the party up to 
disruption and manipulation by the GOZ-controlled courts was 
political lunacy and further evidenced Ncube's malign agenda. 
 
 
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Fallout in Matabeleland 
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9.  (C) Chamisa maintained further that the party could 
afford to slough off the three Ndebele in the "Top Six" 
because there were other prominent Ndebele who would then 
rise to MDC leadership roles.  Tsvangirai's ongoing rallies 
in Matabeleland (next one scheduled in Bulawayo on November 
13) would be key to substantiating his appeal to the masses 
there and to further isolating the Ncube faction.  Chamisa 
anticipated that Ncube faction might try to boycott or 
disrupt the National Congress and acknowledged that assuring 
provincial structures did not follow the faction was a 
priority. 
 
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Civil Action 
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10.  (C) Chamisa and Biti predicted that street protests 
opposing the regime, with the MDC playing a leading role, 
would grow significantly within the next two months.  Chamisa 
maintained that Tsvangirai had long been held back by Ncube's 
influence and could not "follow his heart."  He asserted that 
the party had been responsible for getting at least 75 
percent of the ZCTU street presence out on November 8 and was 
heavily involved in the NCA rallies on November 5.  Party 
planners had yet to decide whether the party should have an 
overt street presence before or after the November 26 Senate 
elections.  However, Biti added that internal tensions would 
not distract the party leadership from increasing its public 
opposition to the regime. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) The latest developments appear to be leading the MDC 
further down the path to catharsis and renewal.  Biti and 
Chamisa are among the few MDC luminaries who reinforced their 
credibility with strong responses to Operation Restore Order. 
 Their lining up behind Tsvangirai dealt a significant blow 
to the Ncube faction, which is desperate for more ethnic 
diversity and for more support within the party. 
Tsvangirai's growing confidence, buoyed by his success in 
 
SIPDIS 
winning the intra-party struggle over the Senate elections, 
is a potentially important positive trend as the MDC steps up 
its opposition activities and renews its credibility with 
ordinary Zimbabweans. 
DELL