US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2767

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, RP, MNLF 
SUBJECT: DUNANT CENTRE FACILITATING PHILIPPINE-MNLF TALKS 
 
 
Classified By: Humanitarian Counselor Piper Campbell, reason 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
 1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue briefed interested Missions November 2 on its 
efforts to mediate final implementation of the 1996 peace 
agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF).  The effort grew out of 
concern that clashes on Sulu Island in February could 
undermine the agreement.  The parties will launch a "Peace 
Working Group" November 17 to work on security arrangements. 
A separate discussion of political issues is expected to 
resume in January, possibly in Geneva.   END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(formerly the Henri Dunant Centre, or HDC) briefed interested 
Missions November 2 on its role in mediating talks aimed at 
completing implementation of a 1996 peace agreement that 
largely ended 30 years of fighting between the Government of 
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the once-powerful 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  Mediation Advisor 
David Gorman said HDC had become involved at GRP request 
after battles on Sulu island in February between GRP security 
forces and a group consisting largely of MNLF fighters left 
up to 300 people dead and threatened to unravel the 1996 
agreement. 
 
3.  (C) After extensive interviews with the parties involved, 
Gorman said HDC concluded the February violence had disparate 
causes.  While clan disputes and a general lack of law and 
order were contributing factors, MNLF grievances over its 
perceived limited role in implementing the autonomy 
arrangement provided for by the 19996 peace agreement and 
over the continued detention of MNLF leader Nur Misuari 
played an important role.  Gorman said HDC's report on the 
violence and recommendations to the GRP had led to four 
rounds of direct talks so far this year between the GRP and 
MNLF and to the formation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Working 
Group, which will be formally launched on November 17. 
 
4.  (C) The GRP-MNLF Peace Working Group will include 5 MNLF 
representatives as well as two representatives from local 
government bodies and one representative each from the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National 
Police (PNP), and the Social Welfare Department.  Under HDC 
mediation, its goal is to produce a regional security plan to 
address, among other things, issues such as disarmament and 
integration of MNLF fighters into government security forces. 
 This effort will take place in parallel with separate 
discussions of political issues. 
 
5.  (C) Gorman said HDC expects to convene the next round of 
political discussions in January, possibly in Geneva.  The 
meeting will have limited objectives, given HDC's hope to 
include for the first time all five major factions of the 
MNLF as well as a representative from the Organization of 
Islamic Conferences (OIC).  The goal will be to reach some 
common understanding of what elements of the 1996 agreement 
have in fact been implemented and what still needs to be 
done.  The meeting will not address the fate of Nur Misuari, 
which Gorman said will be discussed in separate meetings in 
Manila.  Based on his meetings with Nur Misuari, GRP 
officials and MNLF leaders, Gorman thought Nur Misuari's 
eventual exile might be a mutually acceptable solution. 
 
6.  (C) Gorman outlined a number of possible pitfalls ahead, 
including: 
 
-- the challenge of ensuring consistency and parity with 
whatever autonomy and other concessions the GRP eventuall 
grants in its separate ongoing peace negotiations with the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
-- the likelihood that the GRP will refuse to roll back 
changes to the 1996 agreement that it unilaterally imposed 
under Republic Act 9054, which is a major sore point for the 
MNLF 
-- the challenge of coordinating elements of the peace 
agreements with proposed Philippine constitutional reforms 
(charter change) 
-- the problem of MNLF factionalism and the risk of further 
MNLF splintering. 
 
7.  (C) Gorman saw some reason for optimism, nevertheless. 
The MNLF is militarily a shadow of what it once was, with an 
ageing command, a limited popular base, and the ability to 
field at most a few thousand fighters.  For its part, the GRP 
is more concerned about the more powerful rebel groups that 
have emerged, including the MILF, the Abu Sayaf Group, and 
the New People's Army.  Gorman suggested the GRP is motivated 
to seek a lasting solution with the MNLF both so that it can 
focus on these more threatening organizations and to gain 
favor with the OIC, whose assistance Manila believes it needs 
in managing relations with the Muslim south. 
Cassel