US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1294

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CHARGE MEETS WITH RANGOON MILITARY COMMANDER

Identifier: 05RANGOON1294
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON1294 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-11-10 11:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ASEC AMGT CMGT PGOV PREL PTER BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101129Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001294 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, DS, M, P, CA/EX, R 
BANGKOK FOR ESC AND COMPANY C 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND J-2 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, CMGT, PGOV, PREL, PTER, BM 
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH RANGOON MILITARY COMMANDER 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1266 
 
     B. RANGOON 1263 
     C. RANGOON 1143 
     D. RANGOON 1140 
 
Classified By: Charge Shari Villarosa, reason 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  Charge met with Burma's Chief of Military 
Affairs Security and Rangoon Military Commander Lt. Gen. 
Myint Swe on November 9 to discuss security issues affecting 
the U.S. Embassy.  Charge outlined specific ways in which 
security could be improved around our Embassy, noting that 
the most effective measure would be closing the street 
entirely.  The General committed to work with the Embassy to 
make adjustments to increase security, including supporting 
twice monthly meetings between Embassy officers and relevant 
Burmese officers.  As evidence of his follow-up, the Embassy 
was informed the morning of November 10 that Embassy 
personnel could use wooden barriers to close the road in 
front of the Embassy at night from 2300 to 0430.  He also 
discussed upcoming plans to move the capital to Pyinmana and 
indicated his willingness to discuss other non-security 
issues.  End Summary. 
2. (C)  After exchanging pleasantries, Charge outlined 
additional measures that needed to be taken to improve 
security in front of the Embassy:  improved lighting across 
the street from the Embassy, prohibition of large trucks, 
traffic controls (lights and police) to prevent the stoppage 
of traffic in front of the Embassy, regular meetings between 
Embassy officers and relevant Burmese police and military 
officers to discuss security matters relating to the Embassy, 
and improved radio communications.  She also reserved the 
right for U.S. Embassy personnel to scan pedestrians walking 
past the Embassy and the right to close the road immediately 
with our own barriers if we received an imminent threat 
warning.  She noted that opening the road made the Embassy 
very vulnerable to car/truck bomb attacks, and the best 
security measure would be to close the street entirely. 
 
3. (C)  Gen. Myint Swe replied that he understood our 
concerns and added, "the terrorists are also attacking us. 
We don't accept terrorist attacking others on our soil - we 
won't let it happen."  The General repeated claims we had 
heard from the Foreign Ministry (reftels) that the street had 
to be opened due to public complaints about the inconvenience 
of this closure of one block.  In fact, he added that the 
public complains frequently about too much security in the 
city and around the railroad station.  Nevertheless, he said 
"on security, we will not compromise or reduce our efforts. 
We always give your security our full attention and use full 
measures.  As Commander of Yangon Command, I won't allow 
anything to happen." 
 
4. (C)  He then reminded us that this is a police state 
saying, "we have covered all of the six main roads coming 
into the city -- we check everything at these six entry 
points.  Yes, it may be possible for small explosive devices 
- someone may sneak them through, but big ones, it is not 
possible.  The truck bombs that happen in other countries, we 
won't let that happen here.  You may not always see it, but 
there is lots of security in your area--police, army and 
others."   Pointing out that his office is close to the 
Embassy, he said that he has personally checked the area 
around our Embassy on numerous occasions, both in uniform and 
out of uniform.  "I have walked all through your area."  He 
said he had just instructed the Ministry of Home Affairs to 
reinforce security on the back of the U.S. Embassy.  Since 
Burmese security officials checked people "from a radius 
far-out from around the embassy," he told Charge that the 
U.S. Embassy did not need to check them again as they walk 
past.  He also said that the GOB was using a list of 
suspected terrorists from 16 countries received from the U.S. 
Embassy to screen people entering the country. 
 
5. (C)  Charge mentioned her previous service in Indonesia 
had heightened her security awareness.  She pointed out the 
improvised explosive devices can be made of common 
ingredients that might not be noticed at checkpoints.  The 
General relied that "we notice terrorist actions in other 
countries, and we study this as Army officers because it's a 
professional responsibility to look at it from every angle." 
The Charge repeated the suggestion of regular meetings 
between U.S. Embassy officers and relevant Burmese to address 
security issues.  The General agreed that twice monthly 
meetings would be welcome.  In addition, he said that Embassy 
officers had the telephone numbers to contact his office at 
any time. 
 
6. (C)  The General said that primary responsibility for 
Embassy security rests with the Minister of Home Affairs, 
Major General Maung Oo, "but I oversee him, so his 
responsibility is my responsibility.  Yesterday and this 
morning I met with him and told him to add more guards.  Have 
you met with MG Maung Oo?"  Charge replied that she had 
requested a meeting several weeks ago, but had not yet been 
given an appointment.  The General replied  "He is 
responsible to me.  I will have him meet with you." 
 
Pyinmana 
 
7. (C)  Changing topics, the Charge inquired what the move of 
the capital to Pyinmana would mean for General Myint Swe as 
Rangoon Commander.  He replied that the Minister and Ministry 
of Home Affairs will move, but all the security and police 
would remain in Rangoon.  He said he would move to Pyinmana 
as the Military Affairs Security Commander.  A new Rangoon 
Commander would be appointed (he did not specify when, but 
implied soon), and he would instruct the new Commander to 
meet with the Charge.  In the meantime, he would stay in 
Rangoon wearing his two hats. 
 
Conclusion 
 
8. (C)  As the meeting concluded, the General mentioned again 
that he always passes by the U.S. Embassy on his way to work. 
 Charge invited him to come in to "have an exchange of 
views--not just about security."   The General said he would 
maintain regular contact with Charge "not just on security, 
but anything else that you need help with." 
 
Comment 
 
9. (C)  Embassy DATT arranged the meeting and accompanied 
Charge.  The Chief of the OCMAS Foreign Liaison Division and 
another FLD staff officer sat in the meeting on the Burmese 
side, along with an interpreter and a notetaker.  DATT is an 
excellent notetaker, so we could provide an extensive readout 
of Gen. Myint Swe's comments to give readers a sense of the 
atmospherics.  Contrary to the messengers on Embassy security 
with whom we dealt in the Foreign Ministry, we finally 
reached a decision-maker in Gen. Myint Swe.  Apart from 
sticking to the principle that the road should be opened, the 
General seemed favorably inclined towards additional measures 
that could improve our security.  In contrast, other 
diplomats in town have failed to get any further attention to 
their security needs since the sudden reduction of security 
presence around all diplomatic missions on October 8 (refs C 
and D). 
 
10. (C)  General Myint Swe, believed to be a protg of SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe, made quite clear that the military has 
supreme authority, including over the cabinet increasingly 
populated by generals.  This is a police state, and he 
intends to keep it that way.  However, we may have an opening 
now to the senior leadership to direct our concerns regarding 
the continued detention of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi 
and other political prisoners, as well as to  press for the 
full participation of all the people and political parties in 
determining Burma's political future. 
VILLAROSA 

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