US embassy cable - 02ANKARA8586

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 008586 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2007 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: AK PARTY ANNOUNCES SWEEPING HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM 
PLAN 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  PM Gul announced Nov. 23 a broad plan 
including sweeping legal changes designed to bring Turkey 
into full compliance with EU human rights standards.  The GOT 
is also preparing to introduce a 36-article legislative 
reform package in support of the plan.  The administration 
intends to draft a new constitution, improve the judicial 
system, and combat torture and discrimination.  Gul also 
pledged expanded cooperation with the U.S. and support for 
Cyprus negotiations.  The reform program, rich in substance, 
signals the AK Government's determination to govern -- and to 
introduce fundamental and much-needed democratic changes in 
the way political and economic life is conducted and ordered 
in Turkey.  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------ 
PM Announces Action Plan 
------------------------ 
 
 
2. (U) PM Gul read out portions of the GOT's new "Emergency 
Action Plan" before Parliament Nov. 23.  The plan promises 
sweeping changes to Turkey's laws and practices designed to 
quickly meet the EU's Copenhagen Criteria.  In the field of 
human rights, elements of the 64-page plan include: 
 
 
-- Development of a new, "more pluralist and liberalist" 
constitution, replacing the current 1982 constitution, which 
was drafted in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup and 
contains authoritarian language. 
 
 
-- A broad, government program to end torture and other human 
rights abuses. 
 
 
-- Amendments to laws inconsistent with the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the European Convention on Human Rights, or the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a commitment to 
enforce the law according to the spirit of these conventions. 
 
 
-- Amendments to laws restricting freedom of expression and 
the right to own property. 
 
 
-- Strengthening of civil society and an enhanced role for 
NGOs. 
 
 
-- Legal amendments designed to make political parties more 
democratic and transparent. 
 
 
-- Legal amendments designed to strengthen the independence 
of the judiciary. 
 
 
-- Replacing the controversial State Security Courts with a 
new court system for handling terrorism, organized crime, and 
economic crime. 
 
 
-- Establishment of more streamlined trial procedures to 
expedite trials. 
 
 
-- Elimination of state discrimination in regard to religion, 
race, gender, or political belief. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Enhanced U.S. Relations, Cyprus Negotiations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (U) In addition, Gul said the GOT would build on Turkey's 
close strategic and military relations with the U.S. to 
expand cooperation in trade, investment, and technology.  He 
also pledged improved relations with Greece, said a solution 
for Cyprus "has to be found," and welcomed UNSYG Annan's 
proposal as a basis for Cyprus negotiations.  Gul's comments 
followed statements by AK Party leader Tayyip Erdogan 
November 21 that Turkey's EU candidacy was tied to progress 
on Cyprus and ESDI.  Rejecting past GOT refusals to accept 
links among the three issues, Erdogan said, "hawkish policies 
will get us nowhere." (Comment: Erdogan's and Gul's remarks 
continue to irritate Cyprus hardliners in the press and 
elsewhere -- septel.  End comment). 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Legislative Package in the Wings 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) The GOT is also preparing to introduce a 36-article 
legislative reform package in support of the plan.  The 
package has not been released, but according to press reports 
and local EU representatives, it will include: 
 
 
--  Expanding the right of retrial pursuant to rulings of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  D/PM Yalcinbayir, in 
charge of the human rights portfolio, has indicated the 
amendments would enable currently incarcerated convicts to be 
retried in a Turkish court if the ECHR rules/has ruled in 
their favor. (Note:  In August 2002, Parliament passed an 
amendment allowing for retrial based on ECHR rulings, but the 
measure was not retroactive and would apply only to cases 
brought to the ECHR starting in 2003.  EU representatives 
have criticized the August amendment as inadequate, noting 
that the Copenhagen Criteria specifically require Turkey to 
address the issue of prisoners currently jailed for 
non-violent political activities.  End note.) 
 
 
-- Removing obstacles to prosecuting public servants.  (Note: 
Under current law, prosecutors must obtain the approval of a 
public servant's supervisor in order to prosecute. End Note). 
 
 
-- Providing an amnesty for students banned from universities 
for demanding education in Kurdish, as well as for those 
banned for wearing Islamic headscarves. 
 
 
-- Re-drafting the regulation on minority foundations, making 
it easier for non-Muslim foundations to own property. 
 
 
-- Relaxing rules governing the operations of international 
and domestic NGOs. 
 
 
-- Revising the Law on Political Parties to make it more 
difficult to close parties. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Procedural/Timeline Issues 
-------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Two senior AK officials -- one close to Erdogan, the 
other close to Gul -- told us Nov. 25 that there is as yet no 
definite timeline for introducing and passing the reform 
package, nor is it clear yet specifically which of the 
elements of the package will be first on the agenda.  They 
asserted that the AK-dominated Parliament could pass 
"everything" prior to the Dec. 12 EU Copenhagen summit. 
Turhan Comez -- formerly Erdogan's Chef de Cabinet, now an 
M.P. from Balikesir -- said that Gul and Erdogan are working 
out the details together, and the process will accelerate 
after Erdogan returns from abroad this week.  Comez also 
noted that the Parliament will soon determine the roster and 
leadership of relevant committees, adding that, with its huge 
majority and "unwavering determination," the AK Government 
will be able to get all of the Copenhagen Criteria-related 
elements of its plan through the legislature by Dec. 12. 
 
 
6. (C) A long-serving Supreme Court Justice told D/Polcouns 
Nov. 22 that in his opinion there are no procedural obstacles 
to rapid passage of AK's program.  In terms of the 
formalities of legislative practice, "AK can have all the 
changes it wants in a month without much difficulty," even 
after factoring in procedural details including committee 
assignments and scheduling debates.  The important unresolved 
questions are largely political, he said.  In fact, AK seems 
to be moving relatively slowly in order to protect its flanks 
politically from the elected Parliamentary opposition, the 
bureaucracy, and a suspicious Deep State.  (Note: The Justice 
also thought that Erdogan is happy to have Gul in place as 
P.M. to deflect some of the flak that might be directed at AK 
by the Kemalist Establishment.  However, regarding 
constitutional matters, the Justice asserted that it is 
imperative for the sake of democracy that Erdogan's current 
ineligibility for public office be rescinded and that he take 
his place in the formal government as soon as possible. End 
Note). 
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Comment 
------- 
 
 
7. (C) The AK GOT's bold new plan is rich in substance.  It 
builds on both the 9-point human rights program Erdogan 
submitted Nov. 6 to EU-member-state Ambassadors, and the 
economic "Emergency Action Plan" he announced Nov. 16.  While 
designed to bolster Turkey's EU candidacy, the AK 
Government's proactive approach also signals its 
determination to govern Turkey, rather than simply to take 
cues from traditional power centers. 
 
 
8. (C) Indeed, the AK Government is trying to introduce 
fundamental and much-needed changes in the way political and 
economic life is conducted and ordered in Turkey.  It is 
staying on message, reiterating a desire to end the 
longstanding Kemalist practice of "guiding" (or interfering 
in) the private lives of Turkish citizens.  The new GOT is 
also insisting on democratizing changes designed to force an 
out of touch Kemalist Establishment to recognize Turkish 
realities -- and accord official respect not only to 
secularist elites, but also to more conservative and other 
"undesirable" elements long relegated to the political, 
social, and economic sidelines. 
PEARSON