US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK7030

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 BANGKOK 007030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
PACOM FOR FPA FALLON AND J-5 
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN 
JCS FOR GARLAND 
NSC FOR MORROW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, MASS, PTER, PREL, KPAO, TH, Strategic Dialogue 
SUBJECT: U.S.-THAI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On November 7 and 8, following up on the 
President's and Prime Minister Thaksin's commitment, senior 
U.S. officials met with Thai counterparts to inaugurate a 
bilateral dialogue on strategic and security issues.  The 
U.S. side was lead by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Eric John and included representatives from OSD, JCS and 
PACOM.  The Thai delegation was led by MFA Permanent 
Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, and included 
 
SIPDIS 
representatives from Royal Thai Supreme Command, MOD, the 
National Intelligence Agency and the military services. 
Participants discussed a range of bilateral and regional 
issues including China and India's roles in the region, 
regional groupings, promoting democracy in Burma, the Korean 
peninsula, Indonesia, Avian Influenza, trafficking in 
persons, maritime security, educational exchanges, mil-mil 
cooperation and exercises, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), and the continuing unrest in Thailand's far 
South.  The two sides agreed to: 
 
1.  Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US 
Embassy on a draft Plan of Action; 
2.  Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency 
(ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons; 
3.  Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other 
educational exchanges; 
4.  Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at 
Utapao Naval Air Base; 
5.  Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in 
the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand; 
6.  Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense 
Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement; 
7.  Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation 
Initiative (GPOI); 
8.  Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma, led by 
the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Krit noted that the Strategic Dialogue had been 
endorsed by the President and Prime Minister Thaksin during 
their September 19 meeting in Washington and reflected the 
strength and depth of U.S.-Thai relations.  He expected the 
Dialogue to build on other recent events which have served to 
strengthen the relationship including Thailand's designation 
as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003 and the close cooperation 
following the December 2004 Asian tsunami.  He proposed that 
the two sides use the Dialogue to begin work on a joint Plan 
of Action that would outline broad goals toward strengthening 
the relationship and improving people-to-people ties between 
our two countries, as the PM and the President had agreed in 
their joint statement following their September 19 meeting. 
The Thais presented a draft "Plan of Action" for U.S. 
consideration and suggested that both sides work through 
diplomatic channels to conclude a joint document by February 
2006.  DAS John said the U.S. side would need more time to 
look at the Plan of Action in detail and suggested that a 
less structured format be considered.  Both sides agreed that 
Embassy Bangkok and the MFA would continue to consider the 
document. 
 
THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Krit noted that Southeast Asia was experiencing a 
period of dynamic change in part to the rising influence of 
China and India in the region.  While emphasizing the "vital" 
role of the U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to 
intensify U.S. engagement -- he indicated that Thailand would 
also focus on developing stronger relations with both China 
and India.  Bangkok viewed both countries as sources of 
"unlimited consumer demand" and noted they hoped to conclude 
FTAs with both China and India.  Krit hinted that Thailand 
could play a "bridging role" between the U.S. and China and 
India. 
 
4.  (C)  Echoing comments prevalent among Thai academics, 
Krit said that overall China's rise should benefit the 
region, however, there remained several areas of concern, 
including the Taiwan Straits and relations with Japan.  He 
emphasized the Thai view that China's rise is "inevitable," 
which required that they had no choice but to engage Beijing. 
 Thailand would "seize the opportunity" of the 30th 
anniversary of bilateral Sino-Thai relations to enter into a 
"strategic partnership" with China.  Beijing and Bangkok were 
meeting with increasing frequency through such fora as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, and shortly the 
East Asia Summit (EAS).  BGen John Allen of OSD/ISA provided 
a briefing on Secretary Rumsfeld's recent visit to Beijing, 
emphasizing the need for greater transparency within the PLA. 
 DAS John noted that the rise of China was not a zero sum 
game and could benefit both the U.S. and Thailand.  John 
suggested the U.S. and Thailand explore concrete steps to 
engage China, including joint peacekeeping training, 
counternarcotics work and counterterrorism cooperation. 
 
5.  (C)  Turning to India, Krit emphasized the growing 
influence of India in Southeast Asia and New Delhi's 
increasing engagement with countries in the region. 
Describing India's deepening relations with ASEAN countries 
as a policy of "looking west," he said New Delhi was building 
stronger bilateral and security ties through regional fora, 
most notably the ARF.  Royal Thai Naval officials and General 
Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General of Joint Operations at 
the Royal Thai Supreme Command, outlined a number of mil-mil 
operations between India and Thailand in the Andaman Sea and 
the Bay of Bengal.  DAS John suggested that the U.S. and 
Thailand work closely together to engage India, particularly 
in the Andaman Sea. 
 
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE -- THE EAS AND ACD 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Krit suggested that the East Asia Summit (EAS) was 
moving away from its original concept, which envisioned it as 
an "East Asia Community," turning more into a forum to 
exchange views on major issues.  Many details needed to be 
worked out before the EAS would be able to address 
substantive issues and not "just be a talk shop."  Krit noted 
that the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), which PM Thaksin 
has called "the missing link" in Asia's regional 
architecture, was continuing to expand into a true 
"pan-Asian" forum.  The ACD currently has 28 members, 
including most recently Saudi Arabia and Russia.  Bangkok 
hoped the ACD would evolve into an informal setting for 
discussions following the APEC model. 
 
INDONESIA 
--------- 
 
7.  (C)  Both sides agreed on the many positive recent 
developments in Indonesia, including progress on democracy 
and Aceh.  DAS John emphasized that the U.S. would continue 
to support progress on democracy and economic development 
while expanding military and counterterrorism cooperation. 
Krit said that Thailand was looking for Indonesia to resume 
its leadership role within ASEAN and noted that cooperation 
between Thai and Indonesian intelligence on CT issues had 
been especially good.  The image of the U.S. in Indonesia had 
improved dramatically following the tsunami, which was one of 
the most significant -- and positive -- recent developments 
in the region.  Both sides agreed to continue close 
consultations through Embassy Bangkok on further support for 
Indonesia policy. 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND BURMA 
-------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador Boyce expressed the USG's concern about 
the worsening situation in Burma.  It was important to 
recognize that the situation in Burma continued to 
deteriorate.  Aung San Suu Kyi and other key democratic 
leaders remain in detention, the sham of the National 
Convention continues, and the dire human rights situation 
continues to support the flow of refugees, AIDS, and 
narcotics.  The sudden and "inexplicable move" of the capital 
250 miles north to Pyinmana had baffled the diplomatic corps. 
 The Ambassador expressed his concern that Thailand was often 
perceived as an apologist for Rangoon.  He further noted that 
in conversations with the President, Secretary of State and 
Secretary of Defense, Thai officials had promised to take a 
 
SIPDIS 
more publicly critical stance if Burma made no progress 
towards meaningful reform.  As Burma continued to show no 
sign that they are willing to engage with the opposition or 
make any other concessions, the Ambassador said that the time 
had come for Thailand to take a stronger stance. 
 
9.  (C) Krit stated that he had "no quibbles" with the 
Ambassador's assessment.  It was "very true" that the U.S. 
and Thailand shared common concerns about the situation in 
Burma, and the joint statement between President Bush and PM 
Thaksin was a testament to the "unanimity of views" between 
the two countries.  Krit admitted that Rangoon was becoming 
more difficult to talk to, that the economic situation was 
worsening and that there were increasingly visible strains 
between the government and minority ethnic groups. However, 
he explained, Thailand continued to believe in a policy of 
constructive engagement.  General Kemarat noted that the RTG 
was well aware of the danger of the collapse of the Burmese 
regime, and had plans in place in case it happened.  Both 
delegations agreed that, in response to the joint statement 
issued by the President and PM Thaksin, we would have more 
regularized exchanges of views on Burma. 
 
THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
-------------------- 
 
10.  (C)  Both sides discussed recent developments on the 
Korean Peninsula.  DAS John provided a brief readout on the 
current status of Six Party Talks and the challenges ahead as 
the U.S. and other participants pursue the goal of a nuclear 
free Korean Peninsula.  Krit said that Thailand remained 
particularly interested in the Six Party Talks, noting 
Foreign Minister Kantathi's recent visit to Pyongyang.  The 
Thais -- as they have in past meetings with senior USG 
officials -- suggested that Thailand could play a mediating 
role between the DPRK and the U.S. 
 
AVIAN INFLUENZA 
--------------- 
 
11.  (SBU)  Noting they were a "front line country," the 
Thais emphasized the seriousness with which they were 
approaching Avian Influenza (AI).  Krit described plans to 
monitor possible outbreaks of the diseases within Thailand 
and RTG efforts to work closely with other ASEAN members and 
the WHO on AI.  Thai Ministry of Public Health officials 
noted that on November 3 the Prime Ministers of Cambodia, 
Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand met in Bangkok to develop 
a common approach to combating AI and related diseases. 
(NOTE:  The leaders met under the auspices of the 
"Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy 
(ACMECS).  END NOTE)  Krit said that Thailand hoped to become 
an anti-viral production center in the future, and asked for 
U.S. technical assistance on stockpiling anti-viral drugs. 
 
12.  (SBU)  DAS John emphasized the seriousness with which 
the U.S. government was approaching AI, noting that it is a 
global challenge.  John commended Thai efforts thus far and 
requested that the RTG expand its cooperation on monitoring 
with neighboring counties, particular Burma.  John said the 
U.S. would seek collaboration with Thailand for future 
vaccine trials. 
 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
---------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  Both sides briefly discussed Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP).  DAS John commended Thailand for progress on 
TIP issues, but suggested that even stronger legislation was 
required to provide greater legal protection for victims 
related to labor trafficking.  The two sides agreed to 
explore ways to improve ILEA's anti-TIP programs. 
 
EDUCATION EXCHANGES 
------------------- 
 
14.  (U)  The Thais emphasized the importance they placed on 
the long-standing educational exchanges between the U.S. and 
Thailand, and their hope that these exchanges be expanded. 
Thai Ministry of Education officials said they would 
particularly like to expand the Fulbright Program and the 
Peace Corps presence, improve English language instruction, 
develop greater links between universities, and expand 
teacher education in science and technology.  Additionally, 
the Thai military hopes for greater military training 
opportunities and would like to increase the number of Thai 
cadets at U.S. military academies.  DAS John said that 
Embassy Bangkok would continue to look for ways to expand and 
support educational cooperation.  He strongly advocated that 
the RTG correct the funding disparity of the Thai Fulbright 
Program -- currently funded almost entirely by the U.S. -- by 
matching the U.S. contribution. 
 
UTAPAO UPGRADES 
--------------- 
 
15.  (C) General Allen noted that the quick decision by the 
RTG to allow the U.S. to use Utapao as a regional hub for 
tsunami relief operations was a prime example of how 
 
SIPDIS 
increased military access could benefit the region -- 
furthering our joint interests.  The USG remained sensitive 
to the fact that the RTG would prefer the extent of U.S. 
access to Utapao remain relatively quiet.  Focusing on the 
continued strategic importance of Utapao, Allen explained 
that the USG wished to maintain access to the base and was 
ready to work with Thailand to upgrade existing facilities. 
Rear Admiral Narongpol Na Bangchang of the Royal Thai Navy 
noted that land at Utapao is limited and any plans to upgrade 
base facilities should be done with Cobra Gold operations in 
mind.  He further noted that a full upgrade of Utapao would 
cost approximately 17 million dollars.  The Thai side also 
explained that it hoped to build a UN Emergency Logistics 
Response Facility near Utapao to improve capabilities to 
respond to future emergencies, and sought U.S. support for 
this designation.  Allen explained that PACOM components had 
examined Utapao with an eye towards potential improvement. 
These findings were being consolidated now and PACOM would 
share them with the Thai in the near future. 
 
MARITIME SECURITY 
----------------- 
 
16.  (C)  Both sides acknowledged that maritime security was 
an issue of enormous importance.  Royal Thai Navy 
representatives noted that the RTG cooperated with many 
countries in the region to monitor maritime traffic in the 
Andaman Sea and the South China Sea, including joint maritime 
patrols with Vietnam and Malaysia.  General Kemarat described 
shortcomings in the "Eyes in the Sky" (EITS) program. 
Implemented in September, EITS seeks to mobilize the combined 
resources of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to maintain 
maritime security in the Strait of Malacca.  Kemarat 
explained that, in practice, EITS is of limited utility 
because it only involves token patrol flights by one plane 
each from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.  Kemarat was 
much more hopeful of an Indonesian proposal to set up ship 
patrols coupled with reporting stations in the region to be 
part of a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture.  This 
architecture would be multi-national and interagency -- 
running in parallel with EITS -- and would divide the Strait 
into five reporting zones, with reporting stations in Phuket 
(Thailand), Lumut and Sabang (Indonesia), Dumai (Malaysia) 
and Changi (Singapore).  Although, there would be no single 
command and control center, each country would receive a full 
activity report from all sectors.  Kemarat explained that 
this project was currently in the "working-group" stage and 
the Thai side did not know when it would be fully 
implemented.  Kemarat suggested, however, that the Phuket 
node of such an architecture could provide tactical feed from 
all of the stations into a Thai-U.S Maritime Operations 
Intelligence Fusion capability, now in the planning stages. 
The two sides agreed to work more closely to improve our 
joint ability to monitor ship traffic in the Andaman Sea and 
the Gulf of Thailand.  Kemarat indicated his willingness to 
work with JUSMAGTHAI to endorse a statement of intent with 
JIATF-West to set up a Maritime Fusion capability. 
 
DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
----------------------------------- 
 
17.  (SBU) Noting that in previous weeks the USG had briefed 
the Thai on Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS), 
General Allen asked whether Thailand was ready to begin 
implementation of the program.  PermSec Krit and LTG Naraset 
Israngkura, Deputy Director General of MOD's Office of Policy 
and Planning, asked for more time to study the proposal. 
Privately, Naraset seemed frustrated at MFA's unwillingness 
to commit to the initial assessment phase of the DRMS. 
General Allen suggested that the Thais visit the Philippines 
to view the results of a particularly successful DRMS 
program. Dennis Lawrence of the Institute for Defense 
Analysis reiterated that DRMS came with no strings attached, 
emphasizing that once the assessment was completed the Thai 
could decide whether they wished to proceed with the program. 
 Failing to win a commitment to endorse DRMS, the U.S. side 
promised to work to answer any remaining concerns in the 
hopes that Thailand will be able to participate in DRMS in 
2006. 
 
NATIONAL TRAINING FACILITY AND GPOI 
---------------------------------- 
 
18.  (C)  General Kemarat gave a detailed briefing outlining 
Thai plans to build a National Training Facility (NTF) 
capacity at Lop Buri, Prachuap Kirikhan, and Kanchanaburi. 
He said that the facility at Lop Buri would include a 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility, a joint 
live fire training range and a PKO/counter-insurgency 
training area.  Kemarat explained that the NTF would be used 
by the three services and Thai police to improve skills and 
that the facility at Lop Buri would be an integral part of 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) under which 
concerned countries would work to train 15,000 peace keepers 
in the Asia-Pacific region.  General Allen noted that 
Thailand was a global leader in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations (UNPKO) and that the United States welcomed the 
establishment of the NTF, which was consistent with the aims 
of GPOI.  Allen did, however, caution that the Thai side 
should seek to centralize as much as possible the final NTF 
site.  Both Krit and Kemarat confirmed that Thailand fully 
endorses GPOI and stands ready to work with the United States 
to make it a success. 
 
COBRA GOLD AND COPE TIGER 
------------------------- 
 
19.  (C)  Air Vice Marshal Ittahaporn Subhawong, Director of 
Operations for the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), noted with 
concern that there were plans to combine the annual Cobra 
Gold exercise with Cope Tiger.  The RTAF views Cope Tiger as 
instrumental in improving Thai air capabilities and that it 
was important to maintain Cope Tiger as a separate entity not 
focused on PKO like Cobra Gold.  General Allen cautioned no 
final decision about consolidating the two exercises had been 
made and promised to relay the RTAF concerns to the 
appropriate authorities.  Brig. Gen. David Snyder, PACOM 
Deputy J-5, explained that U.S. strategic lift remained a 
serious concern and that the United States was looking for 
ways to better use this valuable commodity. 
 
20.  (C) The Thai delegation endorsed the U.S. proposal to 
make Cobra Gold 2007 a GPOI Capstone event.  General Kemarat 
also promised that Thailand would send a platoon to Khaan 
Quest 2006 in Mongolia, also a GPOI Capstone event, to study 
ways to make Cobra Gold 2007 and GPOI in Thailand a success. 
General Allen asked Thailand to continue to think of creative 
ways to use Cobra Gold and our bilateral exercise program as 
a way to enhance regional cooperation with key countries such 
as Japan, Indonesia and Australia.  On the margins of the 
meeting, several Thai officials indicated a willingness to 
work with the Chinese PLA in future GPOI or peacekeeping 
events. 
 
PSI AND NON-PROLIFERATION 
------------------------- 
 
21. (C)  DAS John opened the non-proliferation discussion by 
noting that over sixty countries had endorsed the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), signaling their 
commitment to halting the spread of WMD.  In particular, he 
noted Philippine President Arroyo's public statement at UNGA 
this year in support of PSI.  Krit responded by noting 
Thailand's support for U.S. efforts to interdict illegal 
transfers of WMD, but explained that the RTG was looking for 
the right time to subscribe to PSI.  Thailand would like to 
announce its support for PSI with another ASEAN country, 
preferably an Islamic one.  In the meantime, RTG officials 
would appreciate some clarification on issues of Thai concern 
regarding the initiative.  MFA's Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, 
who will be the DG for International Organizations in 2006, 
asked for U.S. assistance in answering a series of technical 
and legal questions about PSI. 
 
22.  (C)  DAS John responded that, on implementation, 
regardless of whether Thai law allows specific actions or 
not, PSI does not obligate participating states to do 
anything.  On potential political concerns, PSI interdiction 
activities are not publicized and thus pose little potential 
public downsides.  Moreover, the benefits of forward action 
in halting the spread of WMD should outweigh any potential 
negative political concerns.  DAS John thanked the Thai for 
their support of the IAEA additional protocol and inquiring 
whether the RTG had considered supporting the Hague Code of 
Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND 
-------------------------------------- 
 
23.  (C)  Krit noted that Thailand has ratified five of the 
twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions, and hopes to complete 
the remaining seven.  Although Thai officials had reached out 
to UN experts to help them draft new laws to ratify the 
conventions, these drafts had been rejected by different 
parts of the RTG, slowing the process.  On the broader war on 
terror, Krit emphasized Thailand's willingness to continue 
cooperation, citing current efforts such as PISCES and CSI. 
In the region, terrorism must be viewed in the broader 
political context of rising Islamic extremism, and the 
increasing influence of conservative political Islam in 
Indonesian and Malaysia. 
 
24.  (C)  Turning to the situation in Southern Thailand, Krit 
reaffirmed that the RTG remains concerned about the potential 
for external actors such as Al Q'aida and Jemaah Islamiya 
(JI) to become involved, but as of yet had not seen such 
activity.  The flare-up of violence in the last couple of 
years was due to domestic factors and driven by three groups: 
 separatists, narco-traffickers, and local politicians, who 
are using the violence for their own ends.  The RTG is 
worried that casting the violence in Islamic terms only 
serves to increase the militancy of youth in the South. 
 
25.  (C)  Given these concerns, the RTG has embarked on a 
comprehensive, long-term effort to attack the root causes of 
the violence.  Krit claimed the government has been 
successful in preventing the situation from being portrayed 
as a Buddhist-Muslim conflict, and to ensure that it is not 
internationalized.  The recent war of words with Malaysia 
over the 131 Thai who fled their homes to Malaysia was an 
unfortunate affair, but the two sides are moving beyond this 
spat to improve their cooperation.  Krit expressed some 
frustration, however, with the role of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) which sent a delegation to the 
South.  In their statement of concern over the treatment of 
Thai Muslims who have been arrested, OIC representatives 
missed the point that the nearly 1,000 people who have died 
in the violence are victims too. 
 
26.  (C)  Ambassador Boyce responded by reiterating that this 
was an internal Thai matter, and one that demands a Thai 
response.  That said, the USG remains concerned about the 
potential for external terrorist involvement in the South. 
The formulation of the National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) to examine the causes and potential solutions to 
violence in the South was to be applauded, and the U.S. looks 
forward to its final report.  The Ambassador noted that 
improving Thai-Malaysian cooperation is also a welcome step 
and that geography dictates the necessity of this 
collaboration.  For the RTG this is indeed their southern 
problem, but for the Malaysians it is their northern problem. 
 Finally, the Ambassador repeated his offer for appropriate 
types of assistance to the Thai effort, a sentiment echoed by 
General Allen. 
 
27.  (C)  General Kemarat presented a brief powerpoint 
presentation outlining the RTA's plan of action in the South, 
which emphasizes the use of military, police, and civilian 
resources to secure peace and order, improve the economy, 
strengthen local governance, and combat the ideology of 
extremism.  The RTG has considered construction of an 
electronic fence along the 647 kilometer Thai-Malaysian 
border, but each kilometer cost nearly 2 million U.S. 
dollars, leading the RTA to focus on the use of ground 
sensors to secure the border instead.  Thai forces were also 
making use of an Israeli-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) in the South (Note:  for what purpose remained unclear. 
End Note.), but needed more UAVs.  Finally, the RTA is 
focused on improving its C4I infrastructure in the South, but 
this would take time. 
 
28.  (C)  General Allen stated that the U.S. offer of 
assistance could be focused by a DRMS and potential 
opportunities that may become available through 
transformation initiatives from the Joint Forces Command.  He 
invited those RTA to travel with him to the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command in Norfolk to see how inter-force cooperation worked. 
 Identifying the specific needs of the Thai forces in the 
South is the key to determining appropriate U.S. assistance. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
29.  (C)  In closing, the two sides agreed to the following 
next steps in the dialogue (which should be considered C/Rel 
Thai). 
 
1.  Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US 
Embassy on a draft Plan of Action; 
2.  Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency 
(ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons; 
3.  Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other 
educational exchanges; 
4.  Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at 
Utapao Naval Air Base; 
5.  Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in 
the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand; 
6.  Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense 
Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement; 
7.  Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation 
Initiative (GPOI); 
8.  Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma between 
Embassy Bangkok and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
30.  (C)  After an almost ten year hiatus, this was the first 
time we have brought Thai civilian and military officials 
together with U.S. counterparts to discuss strategic issues. 
Thai problems with interagency "stovepiping," the MFA's lack 
of a grasp of military issues, and the corresponding lack of 
understanding by the Thai military of regional fora and the 
complexities of Burma policy were obvious.  Several officials 
told us privately that this was the first time they had 
worked with counterparts from other agencies on these sorts 
of issues.  Despite the often tedious pace of the talks, we 
believe the enhanced interaction among the Thai and the 
endorsements we received for GPOI, Utapao upgrades, improved 
maritime surveillance and talks on Burma were worth the 
effort.  END COMMENT. 
 
DELEGATION LIST 
--------------- 
 
U.S. SIDE: 
 
1.   Eric John, Delegation Head, Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary, Department of State 
2.   Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, Bangkok 
3.   BGen. John Allen, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
4.   Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Remington, Office of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff 
5.   Brig. Gen. David "Tanker" Snyder, Deputy J-5, PACOM 
6.   Alexander A. Arvizu, DCM Bangkok 
7.   Col. Steven McKeag, Defense Attach, Bangkok 
8.   COL Kevin Clark, Chief, JUSMAGTHAI 
9.   Mark B. Lambert, Political/Military Affairs, 
     Bangkok 
10.  Jessica Powers, Office of the Secretary of 
     Defense, Department of Defense 
11.  Melanie Higgins, Thailand Desk Officer, Department 
     of State 
12.  Lt. Col. Kyle Garland, Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, Department of Defense 
13.  Lt. Col. Seshagiri Munipalli, FPA, PACOM 
14.  LTC Timothy Dunne, J-7, PACOM 
15.  Jane Bocklage, PM/Regional Security and Arms 
     Transfers, Department of State 
16.  Dennis L. Lawrence, Institute for Defense Analysis 
     (IDA) 
 
RTG SIDE: 
 
1.   H.E. Dr. Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, Permanent 
     Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
2.   Mrs. Nongnuth Petcharatana, Director General, 
     Department of American and South Pacific Affairs 
3.   General Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General, Joint 
     Operations Supreme Command 
4.   Lt. General Noraset Israngkura, Deputy Director 
     General, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of 
     the Permanent Secretary of Defense 
5.   Major General Surapan Wongthai, Director General of 
     Operations, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army 
6.   Major General Padejkarn Jantsawek, Director General, 
     Office of Policy and Planning, Joint Operation, Supreme 
Command 
7.   RADM Bongsak Singnarong, Director General, Joint and 
     Combined Exercises Planning Office, Supreme Command 
8.   AVM Ittahaporn Subhawong, Director of Operations, 
     Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters 
9.   Colonel Surasit Thanadtang, Director for Policy and 
     Strategy, Joint Operations, Supreme Command 
10.  Colonel Jirawat Punsawat, Directorate of Operations, 
     Royal Thai Army 
11.  Colonel Thikarmporn Chulilung, Director, Office of 
     Policy and Planning, Office of the Permanent Secretary 
     of Defense 
12.  Group Captain Songtam Chokkanapitag, Directorate of 
     Operations, Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters 
13.  Mr. Choombhon Lertrattakarn, Senior Specialist in 
     International Relations, National Security Council 
14.  Ms. Ratchanee Sornsiri, Office of Foreign Affairs, 
     Narcotics Control Board 
15.  Ms. Rarinthip Sirorat, Director of Policy and 
     Strategic Planning, Ministry of Social Development 
     and Human Security 
 
31.  (U)  DAS John has cleared this message. 
BOYCE