US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2751

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JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON TRIDENT ISSUES, CASTOR-PK AND VANDENBERG, NOVEMBER 7, 2005

Identifier: 05GENEVA2751
Wikileaks: View 05GENEVA2751 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Mission Geneva
Created: 2005-11-10 05:49:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
TRIDENT ISSUES, CASTOR-PK AND VANDENBERG, NOVEMBER 7, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017) 
     B. GENEVA 2748 (JCIC-XXVII-042) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-043. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 7, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:40 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting, followed by a 
Working Group meeting, were held at the Russian Mission on 
November 7, 2005 to discuss the U.S. and Russian proposals 
for Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) 
procedures (REF A), Peacekeeper (PK) Elimination, Castor 120 
Stages, the attribution of silo launchers to the Vandenberg 
Space Launch Facility, and the Russian proposal for 
inspections of Trident SLBMs in Containers (REF B). 
 
4.  (S) The discussions on the two Trident issues were a 
follow-on to the morning discussions (REF B).  The Parties 
agreed that the Trident in Containers issue was close to 
resolution, but there was still a major difference regarding 
the number of SLBMs to be removed from their container each 
year under the policy arrangement.  Therefore, the Parties 
agreed to continue to work the issue during the intersession. 
 
5.  (S) The discussions on Trident RVOSI reached substantive 
agreement with modified language over the measurement 
procedures used with the Trident RVOSI measurement device to 
the Russian-proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement (CPS). 
The Parties agreed to provide Joint Draft Text (JDT) of the 
CPS at the next meeting based on the understandings of 
today's meetings. 
 
6.  (S) In the discussions of PK ICBMs, Russia de-linked the 
Peacekeeper elimination issue from the Castor 120 issue, and 
took Peacekeeper off the table for the time being.  Russia 
said it reserved the right to raise the issue later.  The 
U.S. Delegation stated that the United States has no plans in 
the future to eliminate Peacekeeper ICBMs. 
 
7.  (S) With regard to Castor 120 Stages, the Russian 
Delegation noted that the issue was close to resolution and 
the issue boiled down to two remaining points:  not locating 
Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S. providing the number 
and location of Castor 120 stages produced. 
 
8.  (S) On Vandenberg Silo attribution, the Russian 
Delegation reasserted its position that the U.S. action 
contradicts the fundamental provisions of the Treaty.  The 
Russian Delegation declared that the U.S.-proposed visit to 
the silos attributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility 
(SLF) would not be feasible or useful. 
 
-------------------- 
COULD IT BE END-GAME 
ON TRIDENT II RVOSI? 
-------------------- 
 
9.  (S) Boryak opened the HOD meeting by welcoming the two 
heads of delegation from Ukraine and Belarus, who had arrived 
for the JCIC session that day.  After opening remarks, Taylor 
said he was pleased by the progress made in the working group 
regarding Trident RVOSI procedures and that the Parties were 
close to resolving the issue.  He noted that the 
Russian-proposed option allowing for both groups of 
inspectors to take one measurement each, then averaging the 
two measurements for the official measurement, was acceptable 
to the United States.  Taylor said there were a few 
non-substantive changes within the Russian-proposed wording 
that needed to be made.  He handed over the following 
U.S.-proposed text, which was a U.S.-proposed version of the 
paper the Russian Delegation provided at the morning meeting. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                   JCIC-XXVII 
                                   U.S.-Proposed Language 
                                   November 7, 2005 
 
     Each group will then separately observe as facility 
personnel take one measurement to determine the distance from 
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the 
SLBM third-stage motor, as was done during the demonstration. 
 
     If the result of each measurement differs by no more 
than three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, the 
two measurements are averaged to determine the distance from 
the upper point of the hard cover to the upper point of the 
SLBM third-stage motor. 
 
     If the result of either measurement differs by more than 
three centimeters from the benchmark measurement, additional 
measurements are taken in the presence of the group observing 
the measurement, until a measurement is obtained that differs 
from the benchmark measurement by no more than three 
centimeters.  The two measurements are averaged to determine 
the distance from the upper point of the hard cover to the 
upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor. 
 
     The measurement taken for each group and the average 
obtained for the distance from the upper point of the hard 
cover to the upper point of the SLBM third-stage motor are 
recorded in the inspection report. 
 
End text. 
 
10.  (S) Taylor said that if the revision was acceptable to 
the Parties, the U.S. Delegation would consider this issue 
resolved and would provide a U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text. 
 
11.  (S) Boryak provided the U.S.-suggested language on a 
portion of the CPS to his experts to review and provide a 
response later in the meeting.  Boryak moved on to the PK and 
Castor 120 issues. 
 
----------------------- 
PEACEKEEPER ELIMINATION 
----------------------- 
 
12.  (S) Boryak began the discussion of PK eliminations 
stating that the Parties had worked hard for resolution of 
the issue.  He said that, should the U.S. Delegation provide 
assurances that it had no plans to eliminate PK ICBMs, the 
Russian Delegation could consider the matter removed from the 
table and further consideration during JCIC.  Boryak said the 
U.S. Delegatiion had not made a steadfast statement in JCIC 
stating its absence of elimination plans.  Taylor responded, 
unequivocally, that the U.S. has no plans to eliminate PK 
ICBMs at this time. 
---------------------------- 
CASTOR-120, HERE WE GO AGAIN 
---------------------------- 
13.  (S) Boryak noted that the Parties were not far apart on 
Castor 120, as of JCIC-XXVI, and that this issue could be 
resolved if there was sufficient goodwill.  He said the issue 
boiled down to two remaining points:  a U.S. statement that 
it would not locate Castor 120 at ICBM bases; and the U.S. 
providing information on the number and location of Castor 
120 stages produced. 
 
14.  (S) Boryak said that the U.S. Delegation had previously 
stated that it did not currently locate Castor 120 stages at 
ICBM bases.  He asked a rhetorical question, if Castor 120s 
were not used as ICBM stages, why not state that they would 
not be located at ICBM bases?  He said that it was hard for 
Russia to imagine that the United States Government could not 
control the production and movement of strategic arms such as 
the Castor 120 stage and provide reports on its movement in 
compliance with the 19th Agreed Statement.  He wanted the 
U.S. to provide more details on how the 19th Agreed Statement 
applied to Castor 120.  Boryak said that Russia found it hard 
to believe that the Castor 120 was produced by a private 
company for commercial use, since it was produced with the 
same equipment as the PK. 
 
15.  (S) Regarding Castor 120, Taylor said that the United 
States rejects any linkage of PK ICBMs with Castorv 120.  He 
noted that the Parties were aware of the U.S. position on 
this issue and that it had not changed.  He said that he 
appreciated Russia's presentation and would report Russia's 
comments back to Washington for consideration. 
 
----------------------- 
THEN THERE'S VANDENBERG 
----------------------- 
 
16.  (S) Boryak commented on the Vandenberg silo attribution 
issue by stating that the Russian position presented in 
detail during Part I of JCIC-XXVII had not changed.  The 
Russian Delegation believed the U.S. action contradicted the 
fundamental provisions of the Treaty.  Boryak declared that 
the U.S. offer to allow the Parties to visit the Vandenberg 
SLF before June 1, 2006 would not lift Russia's concerns 
about activities at the Vandenberg "Test Range."  (Begin 
comment:  The term "test range" was interpreted.  End 
comment.)  He concluded that Russia did not see the visit as 
useful, but reserved the right to re-open this issue. 
 
17.  (S) Taylor asked whether Russia intended to keep the 
visit offer on the agenda.  Boryak reiterated the rejection 
for such a visit as it would not be feasible or useful in 
resolving their concerns. 
 
18.  (S) Shevtsov commented that certain Treaty provisions 
may no longer correspond with reality, but most issues could 
be resolved in the JCIC.  Shevtsov suggested the offered 
visit may prove useful and recommended it be studied. 
 
19.  (S) Taylor concluded by reasserting two points made 
during Part I of JCIC XXVII:  1) The use of the attributed 
silos to launch non-accountable items is not prohibited by 
the Treaty and is, therefore, compliant; and 2) The 
attributed silos have been modified, not converted per the 
Treaty, and remain accountable.  Boryak responded that Russia 
did not interpret the Treaty on the principle "whatever is 
not prohibited is allowed," and the attributed silos could be 
used only for the space launch of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
---------------------- 
TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS 
(TIC) REVISTED 
---------------------- 
 
20.  (S) Taylor raised the TIC issue by commending the 
working group on its steady progress.  He said he was 
confident that this issue would soon be resolved and that the 
Parties were leaving the session in a positive direction. 
 
21.  (S) Boryak agreed with Taylor's assessment and added 
that the Parties found common ground for resolution and the 
JCIC discussions clarified points not identified before. 
Boryak closed the HOD portion of the meeting by reviewing the 
schedule for the next day.  He called for a short break 
before the working group portion of the meeting convened. 
 
--------------------------- 
RUSSIA RESPONDS TO U.S.- 
PROPOSED TRIDENT RVOSI TEXT 
--------------------------- 
 
22.  (S) Fedorchenko began the working group discussions with 
comments by the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-proposed 
revised text provided earlier in the meeting.  The Russians 
removed the reference to the benchmark measurement in the 
third paragraph. 
 
23.  (S) After a short break, Mullins said that the U.S. 
Delegation had narrowed down the problem to the language on 
what to do if measurements differ from the benchmark by more 
than 3 centimeters. 
 
24.  (S) Fedorchenko said that, hypothetically, there was a 
potential to continue measuring forever if the correct 
measurements were not obtained. 
 
----------------------- 
BUTTRICK SAVES THE DAY! 
----------------------- 
 
25.  (S) Buttrick suggested deleting the specific language on 
what to do if measurements were not within tolerance, since 
the United States was confident that the inspecting Party 
would not obtain two measurements that would differ by more 
than 3 centimeters from the benchmark measurement.  Mullins 
added that the Parties should allow the inspectors and 
escorts the flexibility to work out any problems. 
 
26.  (S) Fedorchenko agreed with this new proposal and 
offered a change to the language in the CPS to bring it in 
line with the new proposal.  The Parties agreed that the U.S. 
would provide a joint draft text. 
 
27.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S.-Proposed Language for the Draft Coordinated 
Plenary Statement on Trident RVOSI, dated November 7, 2005. 
 
28.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Maj. Mitchner 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Vogel 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Lt Col Zoubek 
Mr. French 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Dr. Baichorov 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Yegorov 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhenny 
Mr. Novikov 
Col Razumov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Zaytsev 
Mr. Fokin (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Mr. Belashov 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Dotsenko 
Mr. Fedotov 
Col Taran 
 
29.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Cassel 

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