US embassy cable - 02HARARE2689

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FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ON DETENTION OF US/UN STAFF IN MELFORT

Identifier: 02HARARE2689
Wikileaks: View 02HARARE2689 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2002-11-25 12:08:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL ODIP EAID ASEC ZI UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/S, OI/UN, AND DS 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2007 
TAGS: PREL, ODIP, EAID, ASEC, ZI, UN 
SUBJECT: FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ON DETENTION OF US/UN STAFF IN 
MELFORT 
 
REF: A) HARARE 2529 B) HARARE 2628 C) 2624 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY DCM REWHITEHEAD DUE TO 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (c) Summary.  The November 15 detention of a U.S. 
diplomat, a UN officer, and two Zimbabwean nationals (ref a) 
continues to reverberate.  Following Ambassador's meeting 
with the MFA (ref b), GOZ official also met with UNDP Deputy 
Resident Representative after the latter submitted a note of 
protest parallel to the one submitted by us.  The meeting, 
during which the UN threatened to scale back activities if 
security issues cannot be resolved, received equally slanted 
coverage in the GOZ press.  The GOZ appears unwilling to take 
the necessary punitive action against the "war veterans" 
responsible for the detention and had instead embarked on a 
strategy of obfuscation and disinformaton that has further 
damaged its credibility and strained its relations with the 
diplomatic corps.  The EU and some African colleagues have 
expressed displeasure with the GOZ's instruction that 
henceforth diplomats must notify the MFA before traveling 
outside of greater Harare.  We see this as something of a 
side-show and remain convinced that forcing the GOZ to face 
up to its responsibilities is far more important, especially 
should this occur in broader United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) discussions of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
UN Faces Off Against the GOZ 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (c) On November 21, in the wake of a meeting between the 
U.S. and GOZ diplomats, MFA Europe and Americas Director Joey 
Bihma also met with UNDP Deputy Resrep Bernard Mokam at 
Bihma's request.  According to Mokam, the encounter was 
considerably tougher than our session.  Bihma complained 
about the tone of the diplomatic note of protest that the 
UNDP submitted following the Melfort incident and blamed the 
visiting diplomats for provoking the incident.  Mokam in turn 
warned that if the security issue is not resolved, the UN 
would have no choice but to heighten its security posture, 
limit travel of staff to the field, and as a result reduce or 
curtail some programs.  He also warned that GOZ inaction on 
assuring the security of diplomats would have an adverse 
impact on overall donor support for Zimbabwe.  Following the 
encounter, Mokam expressed particular displeasure with GOZ 
press coverage of the meeting, specifically the Herald's 
allegation that Mokam had admitted that the UN had failed to 
inform the GOZ, as required by (non-existent) MFA circular 
note D61, prior to the visit in Melfort.  The UN sent a 
follow-up diplomatic note objecting to the statements 
attributed to GOZ officials in the Herald report and 
providing a detailed summary of the meeting, for the record. 
 
----------------------------- 
Covering Their Tracks, Poorly 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (c) The GOZ approach to the Melfort incident is clearly 
one of misdirection.  Instead of disavowing the actions of 
the war vets involved, and taking punitive action against 
them, the GOZ has attempted to shift the blame.  In doing so, 
GOZ officials have resorted not so much to disinformation as 
outright lies, and increasingly damaged what little 
credibility they have left.  On November 22, most members of 
the diplomatic community received MFA circular (secular, 
according to the GOZ press) note D61.  The note claims to be 
a reminder of an earlier note that required all diplomats to 
notify (as opposed to request permission) 48-hours before 
traveling more than 40 kilometers beyond greater Harare. 
This "reminder" presumably refers to the June 22 circular 
(secular) note cited in GOZ press coverage of our meeting, a 
note that in fact was never sent.  No one in the diplomatic 
corps received such a note in June (although the British 
received a similar note in September).  The note, which was 
clearly rushed out the door to support the alleged existence 
the earlier non-existent note, is sloppily written.  If does 
not clarify exactly who must notify, nor whether this refers 
to official travel.  Attempts by various diplomats to clarify 
these points with the MFA have engendered contradictory 
responses. 
 
4.  (c) Not surprisingly, the GOZ's clumsy approach has 
provoked a mixture of smiles and frowns from the donor 
community.  A number of our colleagues have pointed out that 
Melfort lies within 40-kilometers of greater Harare, thus 
having obviated the then non-existent need to inform before 
visiting.  Charges of the U.S./UN group throwing food out the 
window of their car and filming the ensuing food fight has 
also inspired considerable mirth.  The EU and other 
diplomats, however, have expressed disbelief and ire at the 
GOZ's latest blundering.  There is a move afoot to send the 
acting dean of the diplomatic corps, the Zambian High 
Commissioner, to protest the notification requirement and 
request clarification on exactly what it means.  Later today, 
the far more serious issue of failing to take the necessary 
steps to protect diplomats risks becoming the central point 
of discussion in a meeting at UNDP between the donors and the 
GOZ. 
 
------------------- 
COMMENT: Next Steps 
------------------- 
 
5.  (c) While we think reciprocal restrictions on Zimbabwean 
diplomats in Washington and New York might be in order at the 
appropriate moment, we think it important first to define 
clearly just who is being restricted and how, particularly 
since U.S. diplomats have far more at stake than Zimbabwe's 
tiny diplomatic staff, and more importantly, to keep the 
focus on GOZ responsibility to ensure protection and 
diplomatic privileges rather than let the GOZ change the 
subject to a dispute over travel restrictions.  Several of 
our diplomatic colleagues are also anxious to give our 
African colleagues an opportunity to convince the GOZ to 
abandon its position.  We also note that the notification 
requirement does not constitute GOZ permission to travel, 
which we would strongly protest, and is little more than a 
paperwork exercise.  The GOZ failure to protect diplomats 
involved in humanitarian actions is an altogether different 
and more serious matter.  We continue to believe that the 
best approach to the Melfort incident, and similar problems, 
would be to package this within a UNSC special session on the 
humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.  In that context, the GOZ 
would find is very difficult to hide its failure to respect 
its responsibilities behind the usual veil of obfuscation and 
untruth 
 
SULLIVAN 

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