US embassy cable - 05WELLINGTON880

C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/P/IP, EAP/ANP, DS/IP/EAP AND DS/CR/CIL 
SINGAPORE FOR MATT KING (ICE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, CASC, CVIS, PGOV, PREL, PINR, NZ 
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD ON HSPD-6 
INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. STATE 200695 
     B. WELLINGTON 758 
     C. WELLINGTON 739 
     D. STATE 173539 
     E. WELLINGTON 718 
     F. STATE 158827 
 
(U) Classified by Political-Economic Counselor Katherine B. 
Hadda.  Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The New Zealand government remains eager to 
move quickly toward bilateral sharing of terrorist lookout 
information.  To move forward, however, the government needs 
to know more about how the information it supplies to the 
United States would be used, details on how such an 
information-sharing system would work, and specifics on the 
technical requirements.  New Zealand officials expressed hope 
that U.S. experts could visit Wellington soon to provide 
detailed information on the Terrorist Screening Data Base and 
how New Zealand could participate in the sharing of terrorist 
information.  Post believes such a visit would be necessary 
to make progress toward an HSPD-6 agreement.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) As requested in ref A, post officers met November 7 
with Mike McBurney, manager of the counter terrorism branch 
of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.  McBurney 
confirmed his government,s continued interest in the HSPD-6 
terrorist lookout information sharing initiative. "We are 
happy to move as fast as the U.S. is happy to move,8 he said. 
 
3. (C) McBurney said, however, that his government seeks 
additional information on the initiative to determine how it 
might be able to participate.  His questions included: would 
the information that New Zealand provided ever be made public 
by the U.S. government; would the United States restrict the 
use of information it provided to New Zealand; who on each 
side would have access to the information and how much would 
be classified; and, would the source of the information be 
identified. 
 
4. (C) His questions also focused on technical aspects of the 
Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB): Would New Zealand have 
to install a dedicated computer terminal, or would access be 
provided via internet?  How much encryption would be 
involved; would it be commercial- or high-grade? 
 
5. (C) In essence, McBurney said his government wants to move 
ahead on the initiative but, before it could do so, needs 
more details on what would be required of New Zealand and 
whether it has the technical capability to participate.  He 
asked whether U.S. experts could visit Wellington to help 
provide such details and assess New Zealand,s capabilities. 
A visit could be accommodated before Christmas or after the 
first two weeks of January. 
 
6. (C) Meanwhile, McBurney said he was conferring on the 
initiative with other relevant New Zealand agencies, 
including New Zealand Customs, Immigration Service, Police, 
Government Communications Security Bureau and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.  All have expressed interest in 
exploring the initiative. 
 
7. (C) As also requested in ref A, post officers met November 
10 with Arron Baker, national manager of border security and 
compliance operations of the New Zealand Immigration Service. 
 The officers discussed the information-sharing initiative 
and Baker,s request for possible access to TSA,s no-fly 
list (ref B).  He was informed of the USG,s preference for 
sharing information under the HSPD-6 rather than through an 
ad-hoc sharing of the no-fly list.  Baker supports his 
government,s preference for an agreement to obtain data from 
the entire TSDB. 
 
8. (U) Post believes a visit by U.S. experts would help move 
this initiative forward and welcomes Department guidance on 
the next steps it should take. 
McCormick