US embassy cable - 05ALMATY4029

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 004029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/CACEN (MUDGE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KZ, 2005 Election, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:  U.S. OFFICIALS PRESS FOR FREE AND 
FAIR ELECTION, DEMOCRATIC REFORMS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Almaty-USOSCE cable. 
 
2. (C)  Summary:  USOSCE Ambassador Finley and Ambassador 
Ordway met with opposition, civil society and youth group 
representatives and government officials October 25-28 to 
discuss progress on democratic reforms, the upcoming 
presidential election, and Kazakhstan's bid for the 2009 OSCE 
chairmanship.  We heard complaints about pre-electoral 
crackdowns on opposition papers and the stifling government 
control of the media, and concerns that local authorities 
will falsify votes in favor of President Nazarbayev to curry 
favor.  Government officials took on board our message that 
the U.S. will be watching closely developments pre-and 
post-December, and that a free and fair election, including 
equitable media access for candidates, is a good first step 
in a series of sustained democratic reforms needed for 
Kazakhstan to prove that it deserves to hold the OSCE chair 
in the future.  End summary. 
 
Media Access Still a Problem for Opposition 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) USOSCE Ambassador Finley traveled to Kazakhstan 
October 25-28 to meet with representatives from the GOKZ and 
with members of opposition parties, youth groups and local 
NGOs.  She was accompanied to her meetings by Ambassador 
Ordway and poloffs from USOSCE, Embassy Almaty and the 
Embassy Branch Office in Astana.  During the visit, we were 
informed that the election commission officials continued to 
order the confiscation of the opposition newspaper "Svoboda 
Slova."  (Comment:  The first confiscation order, October 19, 
alleged that the paper had insulted President Nazarbayev by 
depicting him as a dictator and  had engaged in "active 
campaigning" before the campaign period officially started 
October 25, by prominently featuring opposition candidates. 
End comment.)  Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, the opposition candidate 
representing "For a Just Kazakhstan," told the Ambassador 
that the opposition still has only minimal coverage in both 
the state-owned and private media, and that the OSCE can help 
further the democratization process in Kazakhstan by 
maintaining a spotlight on the GOK in the run-up to the 
election.  Tuyakbay commented that the presence of the OSCE 
election monitors will help to exert continued pressure on 
President Nazarbayev to run a cleaner election. Opposition 
"Ak Zhol" party leader Alikhan Baymenov also told us that the 
new electronic voting system being implemented in some voting 
stations may be problematic as some voters are being 
intimidated into using the new and unfamiliar system by being 
told "We'll know if you didn't use it."  Youth groups and 
NGOs also complained to us about harassment by the 
authorities for unauthorized gatherings. (Comment:  In fact, 
one of our interlocutors was late to our meeting because she 
had just been arrested and charged for this offense, but was 
released after paying a fine.  End comment.) 
 
Keeping the Akims Under Control 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) In addition to securing access to the media for 
opposition candidates, a top concern of the opposition and of 
youth groups and NGOs in particular is the penchant of local 
authorities ("akims") to prove their loyalty to President 
Nazarbayev by delivering up as many votes as possible, 
whether through the use of administrative resources or fraud. 
 The akims reportedly compete amongst themselves to produce 
the most votes in favor of Nazarbayev, and are difficult to 
control, we were told. 
 
5. (C) The opposition, youth group and NGO reps were sheepish 
when asked if they thought the election would be free and 
fair, adding that the final numbers would show just how much 
latitude the akims had been given.  Baymenov declared that if 
the election were really free and fair, there would be a 
run-off between Nazarbayev (who he estimated would receive 
40% of the vote) and Baymenov (with an estimated 30-35%). 
Everyone agreed that a voting percentage for Nazarbayev much 
beyond 65% would mean that the akims had "over-fulfilled" the 
plan, and expressed hope that the ODIHR election monitors' 
presence would help to prevent the more blatant election 
fraud.  (Comment:  Post believes 65-75% is a realistic range, 
given polling data.  End comment.) 
 
Clean Election, Democratic Reforms Needed before CiO 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
6. (C) The view from official Astana was, predictably, 
rosier, as GOK reps described their government's 
democratization strategy and outlined how far the country has 
 
 
progressed since gaining independence 15 years ago. 
Ambassador Finley delivered to our interlocutors the message 
that the U.S. will be watching for a free and fair 
presidential election, which includes the pre-December 
period.  It is important for the GOK to even the media 
playing field for all presidential candidates:  resorting to 
measures such as confiscating issues of "Svoboda Slova" only 
sends a message of desperation and fear on the part of the 
government.  The GOK is in a strong position to run a clean 
election, and the local akims should receive a clear message 
from President Nazarbayev that vote tampering will not be 
tolerated.  While President Nazarbayev has implemented 
significant economic reforms, political reforms are equally 
important and Kazakhstan needs to demonstrate a sustained 
commitment to democratic principles if it wants to be a 
serious candidate for the OSCE chairmanship in the future. 
The international community wants Kazakhstan to succeed, but 
it is premature to discuss the CiO question now, particularly 
given the reform-heavy agenda for the December OSCE 
ministerial in Ljubljana. 
 
FM Tokayev on the CiO Bid 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) FM Tokayev said he understood our message about the 
CiO bid, adding that the bid is tied to a strong desire by 
Kazakhstan to be associated with European values and 
institutions.  Kazakhstan has concerns about regional 
security, given its geographic location between Russia and 
China, and "problem areas" to the south, and realizes that 
democracy is its future.  Repeating a message that we have 
heard in Vienna, Tokayev said that holding the CiO seat would 
encourage Kazakhstan to continue on its path of democratic 
reform.  (Comment:  Our message in Astana as well as in 
Vienna continues to be that the CiO cannot be used as an 
inducement to meet OSCE commitments; there must be a proven 
track record on those commitments before a CiO bid can even 
be considered.  End comment.)  When pressed by Ambassador 
Finley, Tokayev admitted that there would be no serious 
backlash if Kazakhstan did not succeed in its bid for the CiO 
for 2009, but underscored that it would create frustration 
and would be seen as a lack of confidence in Kazakhstan by 
the international community.  Nevertheless, even with a 
failed CiO bid, the GOKZ will continue with democratic 
reforms (although Tokayev added that a stint as the CiO could 
help Kazakhstan to speed up the pace of those reforms). 
 
The GOK's Democratization Strategy 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Presidential Administration Head Dzhaksybekov asserted 
that economic reform in Kazakhstan has been a necessary 
precursor to political reform.  While there has been 
significant progress on the democratization front -- with an 
elected president and parliament, an independent judiciary, 
independent newspapers -- the GOK wants to deepen reforms. 
Presidential Administration Deputy Tazhin added that 
Nazarbayev's democratization strategy includes further 
enhancing the authority of parliament; increasing political 
party activity and using a mix of proportional and direct 
election representation; encouraging NGO activity (he 
estimated that only 1,500 of the 5,000 NGOs are currently 
active); strengthening public control of local government 
institutions and fighting regional corruption; and developing 
independent mass media, including public television. 
Regarding the current election, Dzhaksybekov said that the 
government targets the opposition only when it violates 
election laws (such as campaigning prior to the official 
start of the campaign, or holding unauthorized rallies). 
Tazhin added that the opposition shouldn't complain about 
lack of access to the media, since the opposition print media 
circulation is estimated at 770,000 daily, while official 
papers have a circulation of 200,000.  As for 
government-controlled television channels, he said that they 
will provide equitable access to all presidential candidates 
during the campaign period.  While Tazhin acknowledged that 
the Rose and Orange revolutions contained positive elements, 
Kazakhstan does not seek a "forced change" of the elite. 
Kazakhstan's electoral environment, with a registered and 
competitive opposition, is more favorable than that of Russia 
or Uzbekistan, he concluded. 
 
Steps to Ensure a Free and Fair Election 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Security Council Chairman Utemuratov, who told us he 
maintains close contact and friendships with opposition 
leaders, said that the GOK understood Secretary Rice's 
message that the U.S. is a strategic partner and that 
Kazakhstan should hold a free and fair election.  Utemuratov 
 
said that President Nazarbayev instructed him to tour the 
electoral regions and meet with akims to deliver the message 
that the GOK is committed to holding an election that meets 
international standards and that falsifications of vote 
counts will be severely punished.  "The President doesn't 
need 98% of the vote.  The opposition is estimating he will 
get 65%, and that is enough," Utemuratov said.  Utemuratov 
added that he told opposition parties to go to the akims 
directly to ask what instructions they have received from the 
GOK.  Central Election Commission Chairman Zhumabekov 
reiterated Utemuratov's points.  After two regions had 
reportedly denied access to premises by opposition 
candidates, Zhumabekov said the CEC would be sending letters 
that day to remind the akims of the rules on equitable 
access.  While Zhumabekov acknowledged that there had been 
flaws in the September 2004 parliamentary elections, he saw 
no major trouble ahead for the December election and 
underscored the CEC's commitment to cooperate fully with 
ODIHR's election monitors ("We see them as partners in this 
process," he said.)  The CEC is also involved in monitoring 
candidate campaign accounts (there is a cap of $2 million on 
campaign spending) and equitable media access for candidates. 
 Regarding the concerns expressed to us by NGOs about the 
electronic voting system, Zhumabekov said that there will be 
e-voting in 15% of the precincts but added that all voters 
will still have the option to use a paper ballot if desired. 
 
10. (C) Utemuratov admitted that there is still much progress 
to be made on democratic reforms.  President Nazarbayev 
understands that he must share power with other branches of 
government, he said.  However, as Senate Chairman Abykayev 
told us, political reform cannot catch up with economic 
reform overnight.  This election will be a test of the 
country's maturity, Abykayev concluded. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) While our GOK interlocutors said all the right things 
about the need to ensure an election that meets international 
standards and to continue on the path of democratic reform, 
it is clear that President Nazarbayev's approach to pursuing 
democratic principles is rooted in the local context. 
Nevertheless, in terms of proving that Kazakstan is on a 
serious path to democratic reform, the GOK appears to 
recognize that a lot is riding on this election and the 
progress it makes toward meeting its OSCE commitments in the 
next 12-14 months.  While GOK reps continue to insist that 
chairing the OSCE in 2009 will represent a critical vote of 
support by the international community for progress made and 
provide backing for future steps forward, we have been clear 
that promises of democratic reform must be matched by 
demonstrated, sustained results. 
 
ORDWAY 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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