US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE3054

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, MOPS, AF, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN:  WHAT THE DUTCH WANT 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 3037 
     B. THE HAGUE 2988 
     C. HAGUE-STATE E-MAIL.11/8/05 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Dutch officials have compiled a list of 
conditions for deploying to Uruzghan province in Afghanistan 
under ISAF Stage III which they shared with SACEUR on 
November 8.  A key Dutch request is that U.S. forces remain 
at current levels in Zabol and two northern firebases in 
Uruzghan.  The Dutch will continue intense consultations with 
partners, including the U.S., this week and hope to begin 
Cabinet discussion of the deployment on November 18. End 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) As noted reftels, Dutch Defense Minister Kamp, in 
coordination with Foreign Minister Bot, has asked for a 
thorough review of Dutch plans to deploy troops to Uruzghan 
province under ISAF Stage III.  This review was prompted by 
recent Dutch intelligence analysis suggesting that the 
security situation in the province was more dangerous than 
anticipated.  On November 8, Minister of Defense Kamp and 
other senior Dutch officials briefed SACEUR Jones on the 
results of their review, listing several new "conditions" 
which the Dutch believe would facilitate a positive Dutch 
decision to deploy.  Charge was briefed on November 8 by CHOD 
Dik Berlijn, and on November 9 by MOD Director of General 
Policy Lo Castelijn, on the Dutch requirements, which will 
also be contained in a letter to SACEUR. 
 
3. (C) The Dutch anticipate an initial deployment of 1,100 
Dutch troops, plus 340 Australians and 100 Canadians for 
transport and force protection.  Dutch conditions include: 
 
- Commitments by the Afghan government and G-8 lead nations 
to strengthen police, courts, and civil administration in the 
province.  This would also include a continuation of U.S. 
training of police and military forces in the region. 
 
- An effective development strategy in the province involving 
USAID, its Dutch counterpart, and other development agencies. 
 
 
- Agreement on acceptable arrangements/regime for handling 
detainees.  This would entail some infrastructure projects, 
such as the construction of appropriate detention and 
transfer centers.  (Note:  According to the MFA, a Dutch team 
is traveling to Afghanistan this week to engage Afghan 
authorities on this issue.) 
 
- Clear understanding/agreement that the Dutch deployment 
would be for two years.  Castelijn and Berlijn both noted 
that such an agreement need not preclude the possibility of 
an extension, but they clearly wish to avoid any 
"bad-mouthing" if the Dutch decide not to extend -- as 
happened at the end of the Dutch deployment in Southern Iraq. 
 
- A clear distinction between OEF and ISAF missions in the 
region.  Specifically, Berlijn and Castelijn stressed that 
OEF should retain responsibility for "counter-terrorism" 
operations, with ISAF taking on "counter-insurgency" 
functions.  Castelijn clarified that this would help the GONL 
make its case to parliament -- where ISAF enjoys more support 
than OEF -- while retaining enough flexibility on the ground 
for OEF to conduct operations in ISAF areas if necessary.  He 
added that the Dutch would insist on coordination between OEF 
and ISAF, maintaining the distinction between missions was a 
political necessity. 
 
- Full intelligence sharing on the ground.  Castelijn 
acknowledged that he was not sure how big a problem this was; 
there was, in fact, more sharing taking place than some of 
those making the complaint understood.  He noted, however, 
that the Dutch believed that establishing a "fusion cell" in 
Kandahar would be a good way of ensuring maximum coordination 
in the future. 
 
- Cost sharing to repair and maintain Kandahar airport. 
Castelijn stressed that this was essential. 
 
- Additional assistance on helicopter transport and other 
logistics issues; Castelijn indicated that this issue had 
already largely been resolved through consultations with the 
British, Canadians, and Australians. 
 
- Continuation of U.S. presence in Zabol and the northern 
firebases in Uruzghan province, as well as retention of an 
OEF capability to mount counter-terrorism operations from the 
firebases as necessary. 
 
4. (C) With regard to the last point, Castelijn said that 
this would require a significant U.S. commitment, and said he 
intended to reach out to ASD Peter Flory in the next few days 
to discuss it.  He added that the Dutch were not requesting 
an increase, but believed maintaining current force levels 
and advisors was necessary to secure the Northern and Western 
flanks of the territory in which the Dutch would be 
operating.  Castelijn stressed that the Dutch did not 
anticipate dividing up Uruzghan geographically, but felt that 
the situation demanded a distinction between areas in which 
OEF counter-terrorism operations remained necessary and areas 
more suitable for ISAF missions. 
 
5. (C) Castelijn noted that the Dutch intended to engage in 
intense consultations with NATO partners and the Afghan 
government over the next week to resolve as many issues as 
possible.  Assuming discussion went well, the Ministers of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs would then present their proposal 
to Cabinet on November 18 for a preliminary discussion, with 
a more formal discussion and possible decision on November 25 
(and a referral to Parliament soon afterwards.)  He 
recognized that some of the more general requirements would 
not be satisfied in a week, and noted that the Ministers of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs would most review the situation 
again in 2006 to determine how much progress had been made. 
 
6. (C) Castelijn said the Dutch had been impressed by 
SACEUR's willingness to consider the Dutch requirements in 
the spirit in which they were intended -- i.e., the Dutch 
want to go forward but need some help to do so.  Castelijn 
added that the Dutch fully understood that only some of their 
requests fell into NATO's purview; others would have to be 
worked out directly with the Afghan government and individual 
partners. The key issue for the U.S. is whether it can 
maintain a presence in Zabol and northern Uruzghan. 
Castelijn noted that he and other senior Dutch officials had 
canceled travel plans this week and next to concentrate on 
the deployment issue. 
 
BLAKEMAN