US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU2245

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, SA/RA, DS/IP/SA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2012 
TAGS: MASS, PREL, PTER, KPAO, CASC, NP 
SUBJECT: U.S. ARMS SALES TO NEPALI ARMY MAKES FRONT-PAGE 
NEWS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2171 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
1.  (SBU) Reports on U.S. sales of M-16 rifles to the Royal 
Nepal Army (RNA) appeared on the front pages of the November 
23 editions of leading newspapers.  Disclosure of this 
information, apparently leaked by the RNA itself, follows a 
November 15 Maoist statement claiming responsibility for the 
killings of two Embassy guards and warning that diplomatic 
missions working against the Maoists "will not be spared by 
our party."  Suggested press guidance follows in Para 4 
below.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U) On November 23, the Kathmandu Post, the 
largest-circulation English daily, and its vernacular 
counterpart, Kantipur, ran front-page reports on U.S. sales 
of M-16 rifles to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).  The story, 
quoting unidentified "RNA sources," reported RNA plans over 
the next three years to provide every soldier with an M-16. 
(Note:  A statement in the fourth paragraph of the story, 
alleging that a first tranche of 5,000 of the weapons were 
received in August, is incorrect.  No weapons have yet been 
received by the RNA.  End note.)  The RNA decision to 
purchase the rifles is explicitly linked to "escalating 
Maoist violence." 
 
3.  (C)  Comment:  Until now, the Embassy has successfully 
deflected specific queries from the public and the press 
about details of our security assistance to the Government of 
Nepal and the RNA.  It will be difficult for us to continue 
to do so, at least with respect to our sales of M-16s. 
Delivery of the first 1,500 may take place as early as 
December, with the balance of the delivery in March.  The 
story follows a November 15 press release from the Maoists 
claiming responsibility for the slayings of two U.S. Embassy 
guards (both Nepali) on December 15, 2001, and on November 9, 
2002 (Reftel).  The press release sparked concern because of 
its explicit warning that members of the U.S. and other 
diplomatic missions "working against the Maoist party or . . 
. to destroy the people's war . . . will not be spared by our 
party. . . . We do not have the policy of fighting against 
them unless they come to fight with us."  We suspect the 
Maoists may well have known the rifles were coming, although 
information about exact numbers and delivery dates may have 
been sketchy.  Now that the story is out, we think it is 
important that it be couched in a manner that the USG policy 
decision to expand its military-to-military relationship with 
Nepal be linked publicly to Maoist terror.  At the same time, 
we plan to emphasize the unprecedented levels of our 
development assistance and note that the arms sales in no way 
undercut our previously stated support for a negotiated 
resolution to the conflict. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Begin text of suggested, if-asked press guidance: 
 
IF ASKED ABOUT WEAPONS SALES: 
 
--The USG has agreed to sell M-16 rifles to the Royal Nepal 
Army.  We have provided such rifles in the past for 
international peacekeeping. 
 
--This agreement follows a USG policy decision to support the 
Government of Nepal in its fight against Maoist terror and 
violence against innocent civilians.  This violence has 
obstructed international development programs--including 
decades of US assistance--and severely undermined Nepal's 
economic growth and social welfare. 
 
--Our security assistance to Nepal has expanded in direct 
response to the unprecedented expansion of Maoist violence. 
 
--This assistance will include equipment, supplies, and 
training, with particular emphasis on human rights training 
for Royal Nepal Army soldiers. 
 
--We know that resolving the insurgency will require more 
than security assistance.  Our government has increased 
development assistance to Nepal to the unprecedented level of 
almost USD 38 million--more than double the amount of our 
security assistance. 
 
--More important than either security or development 
assistance from foreign donors is commitment from the 
government, the insurgents and the Nepali people to finding a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict that upholds 
constitutional multi-party democracy. 
 
--We call on the Maoists to cease their campaign of violence 
and terror and accept the government's call for dialogue. 
 
MALINOWSKI