US embassy cable - 05WARSAW3794

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 003794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, PL, Polish Elections 
SUBJECT: NEW POLISH DEFMIN SIKORSKI HOPES TO VISIT 
WASHINGTON LATE NOVEMBER 2005 
 
REF: (A) WARSAW 3734 (B) WARSAW 3694 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  In his introductory meeting with Ambassador 
Ashe, new Defense Minister Radek Sikorski expressed his 
desire to visit Washington during the week of November 28 for 
official meetings with Secretary Rumsfeld and other senior 
officials.  In a focused half-hour discussion, Sikorski also 
addressed plans for a post-inaugural visit to Washington by 
President-elect Lech Kaczynski in early 2006, the prospects 
for continued Polish deployments in Iraq, U.S. assistance for 
Polish defense transformation, and Poland's expected takeover 
of the ISAF lead in 2007.  While not discounting the 
possibility of Polish troops' staying in Iraq, Sikorski 
stressed the difficult political decisions that the new 
government faced and the need for continued U.S. assistance. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Polish Senior Visits to the U.S. 
-------------------------------- 
2. (C) Ambassador Ashe paid an introductory call November 8 
on Radoslaw "Radek" Sikorski, who was named Defense Minister 
in the Marcinkiewicz government on October 31 (Ref A). 
Following Ambassador's presentation of key U.S. priorities, 
including Iraq deployment, the U.S.-Polish strategic 
partnership, cooperative engagement in Ukraine, the 
discussion turned to the invitation President Bush had 
extended to Poland's future Foreign and Defense Ministers to 
visit Washington.  Ambassador expressed his hope that 
Sikorski and newly named Foreign Minister Stefan Meller would 
visit their counterparts in Washington soon, in order to 
prepare for a meaningful visit post-inaugural visit to the 
U.S. by President-elect Kaczynski January/February 2006. 
 
3. (C) Sikorski suggested two possible windows for his own 
visit, taking into account the projected Strategic Dialogue 
discussions in Poland in mid-December and the need to prepare 
his own substantive agenda.  He preferred to visit November 
30-December 2, as that would allow the discussions in 
Washington to feed into the new Polish government's decisions 
on Iraq deployment.  However, December 19-21 would also be 
possible.  Ambassador stressed that it would be very 
important for Sikorski to meet with Congressional leaders, 
who would already be out of session during the later time 
frame.  Sikorski suggested that it might be possible for him 
to travel together with FM Meller, which might be "more 
effective in emphasizing certain themes and generating 
momentum for new policies," and undertook to consult with 
Meller on the timing of their travel. 
 
Iraq Deployments in 2006 
------------------------ 
4. (C) Noting that Secretary Rumsfeld had praised the Polish 
contribution in Iraq in his November 7 congratulatory 
telephone call to Sikorski, Ambassador stressed the important 
role that Polish forces continued to play in Iraq and the 
U.S. hope that the GOP would at least maintain the current 
Polish troop level of 1400 through the end of 2006.  Sikorski 
replied that the timing of the ongoing November 8-9 
Multinational Division Center-South (MND-CS) Force 
Regeneration Conference (FRC) in Warsaw was unfortunate, 
since the new GOP had not yet been confirmed and the Cabinet 
would have to conduct a complete review of Poland's Iraq 
policy before making any commitments on future deployments. 
Absent the requisite political decision, any recommendations 
by the Polish military at the PRC could only be considered 
"provisional."  Poland wanted to be a dependable and 
supportive ally that fulfills its commitments, but the Iraq 
deployment was nonetheless an issue of great concern to the 
Polish public and therefore warranted careful consideration. 
Ambassador expressed the hope that the GOP would consult with 
the U.S. privately and informally on any Iraq-related 
decisions before they were discussed publicly. 
 
5. (C)  Sikorski characterized the Iraq situation as a 
dilemma.  On the one hand, the Polish military regards the 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in MND-CS,s sector as "almost 
ready" and is in the process of certifying brigades of the 
Iraqi Army's Eighth Division.  Should the Iraqi military be 
able to take over security tasks in the sector, MND-CS,s 
mission could be considered a success and the Polish 
contingent could "hand off and say goodbye."  On the other 
hand Polish forces could stay on the ground even after the 
handover to ISF, at their current level but in a different 
capacity, serving as a training element and a "last resort" 
intervention contingent. 
 
6. (C) Sikorski speculated that "more ambitious scenarios" 
might exist, but stressed that Poland could only consider 
them in the context of U.S. military assistance to Poland and 
"the broader bilateral relationship."  According to Sikorski, 
Poland,s military could only increase its support of the 
U.S. in Iraq if the costs of the additional deployment were 
offset.  When Ambassador noted that the U.S. budgetary 
outlook was extremely tight in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Wilma, Sikorski replied that it wasn't "necessarily about 
more cash for next year" (2006). He said that the new 
government aimed to create a fully modern Polish 
Expeditionary Brigade by the end of its four-year term (2009) 
and U.S. assistance would be critical in achieving that goal. 
 
7. (C) Sikorski commented briefly on his upcoming visit to 
Polish troops in Iraq (November 11-12, commemorating Polish 
Independence Day), saying that the Polish contingent's morale 
was high, having seen no Polish casualties in the past year 
and very few Iraqi civilian casualties in the MND-CS sector. 
He expressed concern about al-Sadr,s increasing closeness to 
the Revolutionary Council, and mentioned that he fully relies 
on the advice of Amb. Ryszard Krystosik, the "Polish civilian 
adviser in Iraq." 
 
Afghanistan, Ukraine 
-------------------- 
8. (C) Sikorski said that the GOP was prepared to assume 
command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2007 as 
scheduled, but stressed that Poland would need airlift 
support to deploy and sustain its force.  He had told the 
German Ambassador earlier the same day that Poland would 
expect Germany to upgrade its staffing level at the NATO 
Multinational Corps, North-East (MNC-NE).  Sikorski added 
that Denmark would also need to maintain its MNC-NE staffing 
level.  (N.B. The Danish-German-Polish MNC-NE is projected to 
command the eleventh ISAF rotation, starting in August 2007, 
at which time Poland is scheduled to hold the rotating MNC-NE 
command).  Sikorski said that Poland would seriously consider 
taking over a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan, but only after its ISAF command (i.e., Feb 
2008).  Sikorski briefly reminisced about his personal 
experiences in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, noting that he 
regards the current situation in Afghanistan on the whole as 
a success. 
 
9. (C)  Turning briefly to Ukraine, Sikorski said that 
Secretary Rumsfeld had asked for Polish support on NATO 
 
SIPDIS 
membership.  He stated that "you don't have to push us, we'll 
push you" in helping move Ukraine toward European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  He suggested one avenue might be 
to simultaneously assist both the Ukrainian and Polish 
militaries by upgrading the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion 
currently serving in Kosovo.  Sikorski mentioned that he 
would like to visit Ukraine for his first official travel 
abroad (Ref B), but that he'd first have to decide whether 
the signal such a visit would send would be too strong (i.e., 
for Poland,s eastern neighbors). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
10. (C) Sikorski was clearly comfortable in the role of 
Defense Minister, and he took a markedly softer line than he 
had several weeks earlier with EUR DAS Mark Pekala on the 
link between continued Iraq deployment and desired increases 
in U.S. military assistance.  Perhaps not surprisingly given 
his recent time living in Washington, Sikorski in his first 
days as DefMin has taken a more pragmatic view of U.S. 
relations than one might expect from other members of the 
newly formed government. 
ASHE