US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6634

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PUSHING FOR PROGRESS AGAINST PKK NETWORKS IN EUROPE

Identifier: 05ANKARA6634
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA6634 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-11-09 15:23:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KTFN PTER EFIN PGOV TU PKK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT - JSILVERWOOD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2010 
TAGS: KTFN, PTER, EFIN, PGOV, TU, PKK 
SUBJECT: PUSHING FOR PROGRESS AGAINST PKK NETWORKS IN 
EUROPE 
 
REF: ANKARA 6448 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Now that the Turks have given us their 
initial response to our list of PKK support groups in Europe, 
we should move quickly to the next phase of our strategy.  We 
recommend that Washington send an interagency team to Ankara 
as soon as possible so that we can begin the process of 
compiling dossiers that contain sufficient evidence to compel 
law enforcement action by European governments. Given the 
weakness of the Turkish system, to be successful we are 
likely to require continued face to face engagement with the 
GOT and a lot of handholding. End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Handholding Required 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C) We understand that Washington agencies are refining 
steps to be taken toward the goal of enhanced cooperation 
with Turkey against PKK networks in Europe.  With the GOT 
having responded affirmatively to our offer, it is important 
to deliver quickly and concretely on the high-level 
commitments made by NSA Hadley and others.  The success or 
failure of this effort will depend in large measure on input 
from the Turks, who will need to work with us to develop 
"dossiers" of illegal activities in Europe by PKK operatives 
sufficiently persuasive to induce EU law enforcement agencies 
to take enforcement action against these individuals.  Given 
the weaknesses of the Turkish system, both with regard to 
interagency cooperation and the ability to put together 
strong, internationally-accepted case files, we expect this 
to be a long and labor-intensive process that will require 
detailed U.S. involvement.  In addition to work in 
Washington, continued face to face engagement on the ground 
here in Turkey is likely to be required. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Arrests Based on Criminal Activity 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) In order to get European law enforcement agencies to 
make PKK arrests--whether for deportation, prosecution or 
extradition--the track record suggests that going after PKK 
officials for criminal activity in Europe has a better chance 
of success than arrests based on anti-terrorism laws or on 
crimes committed in Turkey.  Even if the information provided 
by Turkey convinces law enforcement agencies to make arrests, 
in the past such information has failed to convince 
independent courts, or the courts have refused to extradite 
on human rights grounds.  Though the Turks do not seem to 
have grasped the need to focus on criminal activity such as 
money-laundering, narcotics, human trafficking, and 
extortion, their poor track record using the terrorism card 
is telling. Moreover, evidence of criminal activity in Europe 
could trigger action by European law enforcement agencies 
without their needing to establish a link to terrorism. 
 
--------------------------- 
Terror Finance Designations 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (C) As we work through the law enforcement effort, we 
should not neglect the potential offered by the use of 
anti-terrorism finance tools.  Even if less of a headline 
grabber than arrests, designation of PKK individuals and 
front companies by EU members (and other countries) could 
have a disruptive impact of PKK finances.  In some cases, it 
may also be easier to get the Europeans to designate than to 
arrest: the lower evidentiary standard, allowing the use of 
intelligence, sets the bar much lower for the required 
provision of information.  Moreover, with the EU 
Clearinghouse having designated PKK and Kongra-Gel, merely 
establishing that individuals or companies are PKK-connected 
should logically be sufficient for them to be designated.  In 
view of the fact that the Turks have no experience preparing 
Statements of Case, the U.S. may need to provide assistance 
here as well. 
 
MCELDOWNEY 

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