US embassy cable - 05ROME3729

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, IT, MW, SR, NATO 
SUBJECT: SERBIA/MONTENEGRO AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON RELATIONS 
WITH ITALY, POSSIBLE MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Gabriel Escobar, Political Officer, for re 
asons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On November 8, Poloff met with Amb. Darko 
Uskokovic, Serbia/Montenegro Ambassador to Italy to discuss 
his views on the bilateral relationship between SaM and Italy 
and a possible Montenegrin referendum for independence. 
Uskokovic, a politically-appointed Ambassador who is close to 
Montenegrin PM Djukanovic, stated that one of his priorities 
as ambassador in Italy would be to ensure "proper" 
Montenegrin representation in the bilateral relationship and 
to work to allay Italian fears of an independent Montenegro. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C) On November 8, Poloff met with Uskokovic at his 
request to discuss the current political situation in the 
Balkans.  Uskokovic is an influential member of the ruling 
Montenegrin DPS party and staunch supporter of Montenegrin 
independence. Uskokovic stated that he agreed to leave his 
position as Montenegrin Minister of Economy to become SaM 
ambassador to Italy after a Montenegrin leadership decision 
to populate the central government institutions in Belgrade 
with competent, pro-independence figures from Montenegro. 
This policy marks a departure from a long-standing 
Montenegrin policy of ignoring the central government or 
using it as a place to exile those who had passed their 
political prime.  Central to this policy was a goal of 
sending pro-independence ambassadors and deputy chiefs of 
missions to key Western nations.  Uskokovic noted that his 
first priority will be to ensure that his staff gives an 
accurate and balanced view of the political situation in SaM, 
including the view that "Montenegro has the democratic right 
to vote on its future status." 
 
3. (C) Uskokovic claimed that despite his personal interest 
in seeing Montenegro become independent, he will continue to 
defend the interests of the central government.  He added, 
however, that he hoped that he could help overcome opposition 
to potential Montenegrin independence.  His efforts will 
focus on three themes: 
 
    - To dispel the notion that Montenegro is a 
crime-exporting entity and a haven for smugglers.  "We live 
in a bad neighborhood," he added, pointing out that Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Albania and Serbia have similar or worse crime 
problems than Montenegro.  The Montenegro leadership was 
puzzled as to why the US and EU believed that the current 
union created better conditions to fight organized crime than 
an independent Serbia and independent Montenegro. 
 
    - To allay fears that an independent Montenegro would 
become an economically failed state. Montenegro gains no 
economic benefit from Serbia, he stated, and Montenegro gets 
no transfer payments, subsidies or food and fuel discounts 
from Serbia.  The current plan of the Montenegrin leadership 
would be to propose a union of independent states that would 
provide for freedom of movement, goods, labor, and capital. 
The only difference, he said, would be voting rights.  The US 
and EU should not fear a population displacement or economic 
disruption caused by a declaration of Montenegrin 
independence. 
 
    - To urge Italian leaders to avoid linking a Montenegrin 
referendum to Kosovar independence.  International pressure 
to keep Montenegro from holding a referendum will not 
decrease Kosovar Albanian demands for independence. 
Similarly, keeping Montenegro would be a poor "consolation 
prize" for Serbian leadership in the wake of Kosovar 
independence. 
 
4. (C) Uskokovic plans to urge GOI interlocutors to look more 
closely at the unstable Serbian political situation.  The 
current Serbian leadership is so fragile that it cannot 
afford to take any decisions at all regarding the status of 
the union, combating organized crime, or making painful 
economic reforms.  "In the end, this is not leadership," he 
stated, questioning whether the US and EU wanted to preserve 
the current government at the cost of future stability.  He 
agreed that the a shift to a Radical Party government or a 
coalition that included the SRS would be a serious setback, 
but the US and EU needed to be more imaginative in finding 
ways to advance the transatlantic agenda than by stifling the 
democratic processes in Kosovo and Montenegro. 
 
5. (C) When asked about a possible postponement of a 
Montenegrin referendum from the spring of 2006 to the fall of 
2006, Uskokovic noted that he believed the DPS would not want 
to risk losing momentum during local election campaigns, 
which he insisted were more important to the current 
coalition than the 2006 parliamentary elections.  Djukanovic, 
in his view, would be more responsive to the pressures of his 
own party to hold a referendum sooner rather than later than 
he would be to pressure from the Contact Group. 
6. (C) Comment: Uskokovic's comments are a reiteration of the 
same line that the Djukanovic government has pressed for the 
last 7 years.  Although there may be some validity to 
Uskokovic's arguments, they are unlikely to convince the 
Italians to drop their opposition to an early referendum in 
Montenegro. 
SPOGLI