US embassy cable - 05PORTAUPRINCE2786

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S/CRS DIRECTOR PASCUAL MEETS WITH CEP DG BERNARD

Identifier: 05PORTAUPRINCE2786
Wikileaks: View 05PORTAUPRINCE2786 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Port Au Prince
Created: 2005-11-09 15:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL HA Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002786 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
WHA ALSO FOR USOAS 
S/CRS FOR MICHELLE SCHIMP 
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, HA, Elections 
SUBJECT: S/CRS DIRECTOR PASCUAL MEETS WITH CEP DG BERNARD 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4(b) an 
d (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. S/CRS Director Ambassador Carlos Pascual met 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) Director General Jacques 
Bernard on November 3 in Port-au-Prince to assess progress 
toward organizing elections.  Bernard reaffirmed that a first 
round on December 18 was still possible, though he allows for 
a first round as late as December 21.  He warned that the 
electoral budget deficit was in the range of $10 million. 
Ambassador Pascual stressed that Core Group members would 
need a detailed budget by mid-November in order to consider 
further funding.  Bernard said Prime Minister Latortue had 
assured him that the State Commission on the Nationality of 
Candidates (CENC) would release information to the CEP 
allowing it to publish a final list of presidential 
candidates, excluding dual-nationals Dumarsais Simeus and 
Samir Mourra, by November 4.  In a later with Ambassador 
Pascual, however, the PM backed away from that commitment. 
(Note: The PM finally informed Charge d,Affairs Carney on 
November 6 that the IGOH would take the necessary steps to 
allow the CEP to publish the final Presidential list by 
November 8.  Post will report fully septel.  End Note.) 
Ambassador Pascual pledged to Bernard full USG support for 
his efforts 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) CEP DG Jacques Bernard admitted to Ambassador Pascual 
that he faced an enormous task and still encountered 
resistance and inefficiency within the CEP.  However, he 
still believed he would be able to organize the first round 
of elections within a window of December 18-21.  The Prime 
Minister had finally agreed to force the CENC to publish its 
findings that Dumarsais Simeus, Samir Mourra, and Joel 
Borgella were not qualified candidates, as they had not even 
bothered to submit their eligibility questionnaires to the 
CENC.  As a result, Bernard hoped to issue the final list of 
presidential candidates by November 4.  (Note:  The PM later 
told Ambassador Pascual that because of reservations 
expressed by the Minister of Justice, he could not yet make 
good on his commitment to Bernard.  The PM finally reported 
to Charge Carney on November 6 that the CENC would submit its 
findings to the CEP, allowing it to issue the final 
presidential list.  He insisted that exclusions would be made 
on the basis of proven dual-nationality, not failure to 
submit the questionnaire. (Septel) End Note.) 
 
3. (C) Bernard clarified the status of his own official 
authority:  the cabinet had formally reduced the role of the 
electoral support committee from decision-making to 
consultative -- though support committee chairman Danielle 
Magloire denies the cabinet took this step -- but neither the 
cabinet nor the CEP had yet to formally approve his increased 
authority.  (Note:  support committee members formally 
submitted their resignations on November 7, thereby 
dissolving the body.  End Note.)  The PM had pledged to 
Bernard that he would organize a meeting at which the 
President presided and both the IGOH and the CEP would 
formally approve new CEP by-laws that established Bernard's 
authority.  In the meantime, Bernard reaffirmed that he had 
the support of six of the nine CEP members.  He planned to 
overcome some of the resistance by sending Pierre-Richard 
Duchemin, the CEP member who most challenged his authority, 
to Mexico to oversee the production of identification cards. 
 
4. (C) Bernard said that his greatest concern regarding 
logistics remained ballot printing.  He had arranged for CEP 
and OAS staff to travel to the printers in the Dominican 
Republic to oversee quality control and the sorting of ballot 
packages for the different departments.  Bernard expressed 
concern that the printing company, Digimarc, was not meeting 
its contractual obligations to deliver all of the 
identification cards to registered voters, and thanked 
Ambassador Pascual for USG efforts to pressure the firm.  He 
did not believe, however, that lack of cards should delay the 
elections, and had contingency plans in place to allow voters 
to vote with only their registration receipt. 
 
5. (SBU) On the positive side, Bernard detailed how he had 
integrated MINUSTAH and CEP technical staff under his own 
direction, and now held daily senior staff meetings.  Bernard 
was confident that he could move quickly to set up 835 voting 
centers MINUSTAH had identified -- though he expressed 
reservations about the decision to decrease the number of 
urban centers in favor of rural centers -- and had in place a 
system to recruit and train voting center staff. 
6. (C) Asked by Ambassador Pascual what the U.S. could do to 
further support the electoral process, Bernard warned that he 
estimated that the electoral budget deficit now stood between 
$10-$12 million.  Ambassador Pascual advised Bernard that the 
CEP must produce a detailed budget to have any hope of 
successfully soliciting donors.  Ambassador Pascual suggested 
that Bernard produce a budget by mid-November so that the 
Core Group could address the deficit before the Christmas 
holidays.  Citing his banking background, Bernard expressed 
confidence he could do so, adding that budgets MINUSTAH had 
prepared previously had failed to account for variables or 
include contingency planning.  Bernard also asked for U.S. 
support in convincing the Prime Minister to offer more public 
support to CEP members, and to have the PM and the cabinet 
help publicize the elections as they traveled around the 
country.  The Prime Minister later agreed to take both steps 
during his following meeting with Ambassador Pascual (septel). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) Bernard's evident professionalism, political savvy, 
and managerial expertise are heartening.  It is increasingly 
clear that holding to first found of elections before 
Christmas depends on Bernard's ability to control and direct 
both Haitian and international electoral expertise and 
resources.  Over the past two weeks Bernard has downplayed 
the importance of having by-laws in place that cement his own 
authority, focusing instead on neutralizing the electoral 
support committee and building personal relationships with 
individual CEP members.  Under pointed questions from 
Ambassador Pascual, however, Bernard for the first time 
admitted that he now needs his authority formally approved by 
the CEP and the government.  Post will, as the week 
progresses, hold the PM and the IGOH to the commitments they 
have made to Bernard and the international community. 
CARNEY 

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