US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1276

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, BM, Pyinmana 
SUBJECT: NLD VIEWS ON CAPITAL RELOCATION 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1265 
 
     B. RANGOON 1233 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In an exchange of views on November 8 with 
NLD leaders, party Secretary U Lwin expressed befuddlement 
over the regime's relocation of Burma's capital to remote 
Pyinmana.  He revealed, however, his own participation in 
military exercises under a former Burmese dictator that had 
concluded "in every case" Pyinmana was the best strategic 
location for command headquarters in the event of a foreign 
invasion.  NLD leaders also offered views on the regime's 
National Convention, efforts to engage the UN Security 
Council on Burma, and the recent sentencing of Shan 
politician Hkun Htun Oo.  End Summary. 
 
PYINMANA - TO THE BUNKERS 
 
2. (C) P/E Chief met on November 8 with NLD Central Executive 
Committee members U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei to exchange views on 
recent developments.  The NLD elders were befuddled by the 
regime's announcement on November 7 that it had commenced the 
relocation of Burma's administrative capital to remote 
Pyinmana (ref A).  "I suspect that Than Shwe has again been 
taking the advice of his fortune-teller," said U Lwin, adding 
that "there is no good reason to move the capital." 
 
3. (C) U Lwin, a former Deputy Prime Minister and defense 
attache, revealed some history behind the selection of 
Pyinmana as a "command and control" center.  "Even in my time 
(as a military and government leader under former dictator Ne 
Win)," said U Lwin, "we went through endless war-gaming 
exercises that addressed a potential invasion by China, 
India, or even the United States."  In every case, he said, 
decision makers agreed that the most strategic location for a 
war-time military headquarters, based on its central location 
and natural barriers, would be Pyinmana 
 
FAREWELL TO ARMS? 
 
4. (C) The NLD leaders affirmed that the SPDC had made no 
effort to reach out to the NLD, or to other pro-democracy 
parties, in advance of the reconvening of National 
Convention, scheduled for December 5 (ref B).  U Lwin, saying 
the party has not heard "in quite some time" from General 
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest, 
 
SIPDIS 
opined that the upcoming session of the NC "will be the last" 
and suggested that the regime is anxious to conclude the 
process. 
 
5. (C) U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei both noted that it would be 
impossible for the SPDC to follow the NC quickly with a 
referendum on a new constitution, unless the cease-fire 
groups agree to surrender their arms.  "The problem," U Lwin 
added, "is that the armed groups will resist and say that 
(former Prime Minister) Khin Nyunt never mentioned such a 
requirement when negotiating the cease-fire agreements." 
 
6. (C) U Lwin said he was perplexed that the SPDC had ceased 
its annual dry season military offensives against remaining 
insurgent groups.  "Maybe the Burmese regime has lost its 
spirit for fighting," said the former Burmese Army colonel, 
"or maybe their efforts at diplomacy with the ethnics are 
actually producing results." 
 
PESSIMISM OVER UNSC EFFORT 
 
7. (C) We observed that the NLD had issued a special appeal 
on October 28, urging members of the UN Security Council to 
support the findings of the Tutu/Havel report.  U Lwin said 
that he personally doubted the UNSC effort would succeed.  He 
noted that while Tutu and Havel are respected statesmen, 
"they are not from this region" and annual UNGA resolutions 
have no support beyond the West.  U Lwin said he was still 
bitter over a letter he received from the UN in 2003 that, he 
claimed, described the UNSYG as having "no mandate on Burma 
because no one from ASEAN supports UN resolutions."  U Lwin 
concluded that, while the UNSC "might consider the Burma 
question," real action will be thwarted by "the veto of two 
countries (China and Russia)." 
HKUN HTUN OO 
 
8. (C) We shared with the NLD leaders the Department's 
November 7 statement on recent sentences handed down for SNLD 
Chairman Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan political leaders.  The 
NLD leaders said they had had virtually no contact with 
ethnic Shan pro-democracy parties in recent months and had no 
observations on the fate of Hkun Htun Oo. 
 
9. (C) After our meeting, the NLD distributed a declaration 
by the Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) 
that criticized the long-term imprisonment of Hkun Htun Oo 
and Sai Nyunt Lwin as "harmful to efforts aimed at building 
national reconciliation and unity among the country's 
nationalities."  The SNLD, which expressed gratitude to 
Emboffs for the Department's statement, issued its own press 
release on November 9 that demanded the unconditional release 
of Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan leaders, criticizing the SPDC 
for equating "the expression of opinions and views with 
conspiracy and treason." 
 
10. (C) Comment: Sadly, our exchange with the NLD leaders 
reflects the tenor of our recent meetings with the country's 
leading opposition party.  They have a great deal to offer 
with regard to historical events and thinking.  Strategic 
views, however, seem to be lacking, especially about how the 
NLD could take advantage of a potential emerging vacuum as 
the GOB heads packing, literally, for the proverbial hills. 
End Comment. 
VILLAROSA