US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2741

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) RUSSIAN CLOSING PLENARY 
STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-052. 
 
2.  (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the official translation 
of the Russian statement that was delivered at the closing 
plenary meeting of Part II of the Twenty-seventh Session of 
the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
(JCIC), held at the Russian Mission on November 9, 2005. 
 
3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
                  Official Translation 
 
                                    JCIC-XXVII 
 
                          STATEMENT 
       by the Representative of the Russian Federation 
                   at the Plenary Meeting 
                      November 9, 2005 
 
     Esteemed Colleagues, 
 
     If we had to use one word to characterize the session of 
our Commission that is concluding today, it would be 
"businesslike."  Indeed, most of the issues that we 
considered both this time and during the first half of the 
session early last summer are strictly practical in nature. 
It is pleasant to note that we succeeded in resolving some of 
these issues and laying a good foundation for resolving a 
number of others, we hope, in the foreseeable future. 
 
     On the plus side there has been a positive step such as 
the adoption of the JCIC Joint Statement on First Stages of 
SS-25 ICBMs Burned without Nozzles Attached.  We trust that 
this will be followed by yet another necessary step--the 
withdrawal of U.S. claims about the procedures for Russia's 
elimination of ICBMs of this type at Votkinsk, procedures 
that are strictly in accord with the Treaty requirements. 
 
     The Russian side made a significant contribution to 
resolving issues of the same type related to reentry vehicle 
inspections of U.S. Trident II SLBMs and Russian SS-25 ICBMs. 
 We submitted a serious new proposal aimed at removing the 
well-known U.S. concern regarding SS-25 ICBMs.  The 
clarifications we provided during the special briefing 
graphically illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
demonstration.  We are prepared to arrange the demonstration 
in an expeditious manner.  A positive response from the U.S. 
side to this proposal would make it possible, on the basis of 
reciprocity, to close out similar issues concerning reentry 
vehicle inspections for both SS-25 ICBMs and Trident II 
SLBMs.  In order to expedite achievement of this goal the 
Russian side makes the following Coordinated Statement 
(attached text is read). 
 
     We believe that the Parties have made significant 
progress toward resolving the problem of inspecting U.S. 
SLBMs in liners and loading tubes, which has been on the 
Commission's agenda for a long time.  However, the work was 
not completed.  Nevertheless, we heard the U.S. side's 
statement regarding its desire to do this during the break 
between sessions.  We hope that we will finally close out 
this issue as well. 
 
     It is regrettable that for some reason less attention 
was devoted to resolving problems that have for many years 
made Treaty implementation more onerous.  The Russian 
delegation was prepared for such work. 
     In this connection, I would like to remind you of issues 
which, we believe, are already close to resolution, such as 
the procedure for elimination of U.S. Peacekeeper ICBMs and 
the production of the Castor 120 missile stage in the U.S. 
We note the statement the U.S. side made in this context at 
the Plenary Meeting (sic) on November 7 of this year, that 
the U.S. currently has no plans to eliminate its existing 
Peacekeeper ICBMs.  We believe that closing out these two 
problems is entirely feasible.  The Russian side has done a 
great deal to achieve that.  It is now up to the United 
States to take reciprocal steps. 
 
     It is also regrettable that we were unable to consider 
in greater detail the question of U.S. actions regarding the 
five silo ICBM launchers at Vandenberg.  In essence what we 
have here is the creation of a serious new problem by the 
United States in terms of Treaty compliance.  After all, U.S. 
actions at Vandenberg quite clearly do not fit in with the 
fundamental requirements of the Treaty, specifically that 
each ICBM launcher must be capable of launching only an ICBM 
of the type specified for it in the Memorandum of 
Understanding and that a space launch facility is a facility 
from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or 
space using ICBMs and SLBMs.  We are compelled to keep these 
and several other issues on the Commission's agenda. 
 
     As before, the Russian side will be prepared to actively 
utilize diplomatic channels to consider issues related to 
Treaty implementation and urges the other Parties to do the 
same. 
 
     In conclusion, allow me to thank all the participants in 
this session for businesslike cooperation and a friendly 
atmosphere at our meetings and during our interaction in 
general.  I wish everyone a good trip home. 
 
End text. 
 
4.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley