US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2735

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002735 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, 
NOVEMBER 9, 2005 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-049. 
 
2.  (U) At paragraph 3 is the text of the U.S. statement that 
was made at the closing plenary meeting of Part II of the 
Twenty-seventh Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the Russian Mission 
on November 9, 2005. 
 
3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
                          STATEMENT 
            BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO 
        THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
               AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING 
                OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION 
 
                       NOVEMBER 9, 2005 
 
     The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of 
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine in closing the Twenty-seventh 
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission. 
 
                              I 
 
     In this session, which was conducted in two parts, we 
have had a mix of success and disappointment with respect to 
specific issues.  However, based on the tenor of our work, I 
believe the relationships among the Parties continue to 
develop in a productive and engaging manner. 
 
                             II 
 
     During the first part of this session, we worked closely 
with the other Parties to ensure that the many aspects of 
bringing Russia's new RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty were 
accomplished without difficulty.  To that end, we completed 
four critical documents that provided for technical data, 
applicable inspection procedures, provisions for SLBM launch 
canisters, and characteristics for training models of 
missiles for Russia's new SLBM. 
 
     We also completed two documents related to changing 
Russia's radiation detection equipment used during 
inspections and reducing the boundary of the Zlatoust 
facility subject to suspect-site inspections. 
 
     During the second part of the session, we completed a 
Joint Statement related to measuring SS-25 first stages that 
have been burned without their nozzles attached. 
 
     I'm especially pleased that we were able to exchange 
statements on utilizing the supplemental procedures 
successfully demonstrated during the February 2005, Trident 
II RVOSI demonstration, which we have attached as an 
unclassified Annex to this statement. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
                             III 
 
     However, the United States is disappointed that the 
Parties were unable to agree on using the U.S.-proposed 
procedures for confirming the type of Trident SLBM in its 
loading tube or liner.  This is an issue that is long overdue 
for resolution and we hope that we can agree on the policy 
statement during the next session. 
 
     Although we have achieved significant success with 
respect to bringing the RSM-56 SLBM into the Treaty, the U.S. 
is disappointed that the Russian Federation has not provided 
Treaty-required information relating to this new SLBM.  Now 
that this missile has been deployed, the U.S. believes that 
the Russian Federation should be able to provide the required 
information on throw-weight data and warhead attribution. 
 
     The United States explained in detail why the 
eliminations of the SS-25 ICBMs in April and August of this 
year were incomplete.  The United States urges Russia to 
bring its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance 
with Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol by 
eliminating the airframe for the forward section of the SCDM, 
or that Russia develop alternative Treaty-compliant 
procedures.  We look forward to Russia's response during the 
intersessional period. 
 
                             IV 
 
     The United States appreciates the detailed briefing 
provided by the Russian Federation with respect to its 
proposal to conduct an SS-25 RVOSI demonstration.  The United 
States will respond as soon as possible to this proposal. 
 
                              V 
 
     It is my hope that each Delegation will return to its 
capital, review the work achieved here, and communicate any 
follow-up ideas or actions through diplomatic channels.  We 
must follow through on our discussions here with additional 
communication and dialog throughout the intersessional period 
if we are to be successful. 
 
     Thank you for your work and your cooperation.  I look 
forward to our corresponding on outstanding issues during the 
intersessional period. 
 
     And finally, I'd like to thank our interpreters for 
their exceptional work.  Without them, we could not function. 
 
     Have a safe journey home. 
 
End text. 
 
4.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley