US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2726

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002726 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TRIDENT 
ISSUES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017) 
     B. GENEVA 2719 (JCIC-XXVII-039) 
     C. GENEVA 1406 (JCIC-XXVII-020) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-040. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 3, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 6:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
3.  (S) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on November 3, 2005, to discuss the U.S. and Russian 
proposals for Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection 
(RVOSI) procedures (REF A) and the Russian proposal for 
inspections of Trident SLBMs in Containers (REF B). 
 
4.  (S) In discussion of the two proposals for Trident II 
RVOSIs, the Parties appeared to be close to resolution of the 
issue with differences remaining over the number of 
measurements that would be taken with the measuring device 
demonstrated at the February 2005 Trident II RVOSI 
demonstration at Kings Bay Submarine Base, and the meaning of 
"official" and "unofficial" measurements.  The Russians 
proposed that each of the two subgroups observe two 
measurements being made.  The U.S. Delegation said that, for 
safety reasons, each subgroup could observe only one 
measurement. 
 
5.  (S) In the discussions of draft policy arrangements for 
inspections of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and Trident II SLBMs 
in Loading Tubes during data update inspections, the U.S. 
Delegation made clear that the United States was proposing, 
at most, one Trident missile (regardless of type) to be 
removed from its container per Treaty year as a matter of 
policy.  The U.S. Delegation also emphasized that if the 
inspecting Party requested, more than once in a Treaty year, 
the removal of a Trident missile under the policy 
arrangement, the United States may have to reconsider this 
proposed policy.  The Russians stated that their requests for 
removal of a Trident I or II missile have always been based 
on substantial concerns.  The Russian Delegation insisted, 
since Trident I still existed in containers at the Silverdale 
submarine base, that Russia still wanted to be able to 
request a Trident missile removal of each type within the 
same Treaty year under the policy arrangement.  This would 
equate to a total of two potential missile removals from 
their containers for a Treaty year.  The Russian Delegation 
also reminded the U.S. Delegation that Russia believes it is 
necessary to distinguish the difference between a 
"verification removal" (i.e., a removal pursuant to the 
Statement of Policy) and a removal to confirm missile type 
based on Russia's Treaty right. 
 
6.  (S) The United States also sought to gain clarification 
on Russia's request to remove specific hatches from the 
containers in advance.  The Russian Delegation said that if 
specific hatches were not specified in the policy 
arrangement, the inspected Party might not remove any 
hatches. The U.S. Delegation stated that it would respond at 
a later meeting. 
 
----------------- 
RUSSIA'S PAPER ON 
TRIDENT II RVOSI 
----------------- 
 
7.  (S) Fedorchenko opened the meeting by stating that the 
U.S. proposal, dated October 11, 2005, and the 
Russian-proposed paper, dated November 2, 2005, addressing 
Trident II RVOSIs were both on the table for discussion.  The 
Russian Delegation was interested in the U.S. response to the 
Russian proposal. 
 
8.  (S) The Russian proposal, for the conduct of Trident II 
RVOSIs in response to REF A, was the first topic of 
discussion.  The text of the Russian proposal on the 
Coordinated JCIC Plenary Statement on Reentry Vehicle 
Inspections of Trident II SLBMs follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                      Official Translation 
 
                                      JCIC-XXVII 
                                      Text Proposed by the 
                                      Russian Side 
                                      November 2, 2005 
 
    Coordinated JCIC Plenary Statement by (Name of Party) 
     on Reentry Vehicle Inspections of Trident II SLBMs 
 
     (Name of Party) takes note of the statement by the 
United States of America that the front sections of Trident 
II SLBMs belonging to the United States of America are not 
equipped with more than eight warheads and that the United 
States of America will not equip those missiles with more 
than eight warheads during the term of the START Treaty (text 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine). 
 The United States of America, as stated in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, reaffirms that the front sections of Trident 
II SLBMs belonging to the United States of America are not 
equipped with more than eight warheads and that the United 
States of America will not equip those missiles with more 
than eight warheads during the term of the START Treaty (text 
of the United States of America). 
 
     (Name of Party) notes that in order to resolve concerns 
regarding confirmation that the Trident II SLBM is not 
deployed with more reentry vehicles than its attributed 
number of warheads, the United States of America conducted a 
demonstration in connection with reentry vehicle inspections 
of Trident II missiles at the Strategic Weapons Facility 
Atlantic, King's Bay Submarine Base, Georgia, during the 
period February 7-9, 2005 (hereinafter - the demonstration). 
 
     In this regard, (Name of Party) understands that the 
United States of America will supplement existing procedures 
for conducting Trident II reentry vehicle inspections with 
procedures for using the measuring device demonstrated; those 
procedures are designed to confirm that the cover used during 
Trident II reentry vehicle inspections is installed on the 
front section of the missile contained in the SLBM launcher 
in the same manner as was observed during the demonstration. 
 
     Provided that measurements obtained using the device 
referred to above are within the prescribed tolerances, the 
inspecting Party: 
 
     -- will insert an "*" as a note instead of a number in 
Section II of the report, in the column "Confirmed by 
inspecting Party" and indicate on that page that the "*" 
refers to the relevant note in Section IV of the Inspection 
report, and: 
 
     -- will include the following as a note in Section IV of 
the Inspection Report: 
 
     "In addition to the reentry vehicle inspection 
procedures for the front sections, the inspected Party used 
the measuring device demonstrated earlier during the 
demonstration conducted February 7-9, 2005, at the Strategic 
Weapons Facility Atlantic, King's Bay Submarine Base, 
Georgia.  The results of the changes (sic) specified in this 
report show that the cover used during the inspection was 
installed on the missile front section in the same manner as 
was observed during the demonstration. 
 
     Thus, it has been indirectly confirmed, with the 
assistance of the measuring device demonstrated during the 
February 7-9, 2005, demonstration, that the front section of 
the inspected SLBM contains no more than eight reentry 
vehicles." 
 
     (Name of Party) also confirms that this understanding is 
based on the following: 
 
     1.  After all of the inspectors complete their 15 
minutes of viewing of the installed cover used during Trident 
II reentry vehicle inspections, the Inspection Team Leader, 
at the request of the Escort Team Leader, shall designate 
from among the inspection team members two measurement groups 
consisting of two inspectors each.  At the request of the 
in-country escort, each group shall move in succession to the 
temporary structure specially intended for preparing the 
front section for viewing of the SLBM launcher, where it will 
be given the opportunity to examine the measuring device used 
during Trident II reentry vehicle inspections.  Each group 
will then observe as facility personnel successively take 
official measurements in the same manner as was done during 
the demonstration. 
 
     The results of these measurements shall be recorded in 
Section III of the Inspection Report. 
 
     2.  The benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A 
SLBM configuration is 23 cm  /- 3 cm, as stated by the United 
States of America during the demonstration.  The benchmark 
measurement for a Trident II Type B SLBM configuration is 
24.0 cm  /- 3 cm, as stated by the United States of America 
during the demonstration. 
 
End text. 
 
---------------------- 
ARE WE CLOSE? -- THE 
ONLY DIFFERENCE IS HOW 
MANY MEASUREMENTS? 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (S) Mullins said that the United States had a positive 
response to the Russian revision, but sought clarification on 
one point. 
 
10.  (S) Mullins reiterated that the United States was 
willing to permit two different subgroups of two inspectors 
to observe the measurements made using the Trident RVOSI 
measuring device at the conclusion of the Trident II RVOSI. 
He stressed, however, that U.S. escorts would be taking a 
total of only two measurements with the measuring device at 
each RVOSI, so each subgroup would see one measurement.  He 
asked whether this was the understanding of the Russian 
Delegation. 
 
11.  (S) Fedorchenko explained that Russia expected to have 
two measurements observed by each of the two subgroups of 
inspectors for a total of four measurements.  He explained 
that the logic behind this expectation was based upon how 
measurements are taken under the Treaty:  two measurements 
are taken and, if in agreement, the average is put into the 
report; if there is some difference in the two measurements, 
more measurements are taken until two agree within the 
expected tolerance.  He noted that inspection reports contain 
tables to record the first and second measurements as well as 
the average of the two.  Under the Russian proposal, each of 
the two subgroups would repeat this process. 
 
12.  (S) Mullins noted that there are safety concerns about 
the use of the measuring device within the viewing structure 
for an RVOSI.  A sailor would be leaning over the open 
launcher with this long measuring device attached to his 
wrist with a lanyard and there would be obvious safety 
concerns.  Procedures are developed to reduce risk, but the 
best way to reduce risk is to limit the number of 
measurements that must be taken. 
 
13.  (S) Mullins suggested new language to replace the 
statement under contention.  The proposal was to replace the 
Russian-proposed language "Each group will then observe as 
facility personnel successively take official measurements in 
the same manner as was done during the demonstration." with 
the following:  'Each group will then observe as facility 
personnel take one official measurement, using the procedures 
that were used during the demonstration."  Mullins handed the 
head of the Russian working group a copy of the text he had 
described. 
 
14.  (S) Mullins stated that the measurements the U.S. 
escorts would be taking at an RVOSI are outside the Treaty; 
they would be conducted under the procedures outlined in the 
coordinated plenary statement.  He also noted that in realty 
measurements would be taken twice as in other inspections, 
but each measurement would be observed by two different 
subgroups of inspectors.  This method, he pointed out, was 
introduced by the United States to address the Russian 
request to permit four inspectors rather then two inspectors. 
 The fact that the same measurement is achieved while being 
observed by two different subgroups of inspectors should 
increase Russia's confidence in the results. 
 
---------------------- 
OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL 
MEASUREMENTS? 
---------------------- 
 
15.  (S) Fedorchenko responded with a concern regarding the 
possibility of each of the two subgroups observing different 
measurements with one being outside the tolerance. 
 
16.  (S) Mullins stated that the U.S.-proposed text just 
tabled referred to "official measurements" to address this 
possibility.  As an example, if the measuring device were 
bumped accidentally, so that the measurement taken was in 
error, this would not be considered an "official measurement" 
and the U.S. escorts would measure again.  He stated that the 
United States is confident that measurements taken at RVOSIs 
will be within tolerance.  If a measurement were out of 
tolerance, it would indicate a problem and inspectors on the 
ground would try to work it out by suggesting another 
measurement based on the assumption that there was an error 
in the method of taking the measurement. 
 
17.  (S) Smith reiterated the differences between "official" 
and "unofficial" measurements, from the perspective of an 
inspector.  If a measurement taken was in error, then another 
measurement would be taken.  The measurement that was 
incorrect would be characterized as "unofficial," since it 
would not be used for the inspection report.  He pointed out 
that there could be human error in making  measurements. 
This is usually noted by the inspectors.  He also noted that 
Russian inspectors are aware that due to the limited space in 
the viewing area for a Trident II RVOSI, only two inspectors 
at a time can view the inspection during the 15-minute 
viewing period.  That is the same reason that the United 
States is limiting the number of inspectors for viewing the 
measurements taken with the measuring device.  In response to 
Fedorchenko's question, of what happens if the inspectors 
consistently see a measurement outside the tolerance of the 
measurement contained in the Coordinated Statement, Smith 
stated that this would be a reason for inspectors to raise a 
concern on the report.  However, the United States is 
confident that the measurements will be within tolerance. 
 
------------------ 
THE UKRAINIAN VIEW 
------------------ 
 
18.  (S) Shevtsov stated that Ukraine did not have a problem 
with the U.S. proposal to take two measurements and average 
the results for the inspection report. 
 
19.  (S) With respect to the question of how to proceed in 
the event of erroneous measurements, Shevtsov expressed the 
opinion that the language in the U.S.-proposed statement was 
not clear.  He suggested that two additions be made to the 
statement to address both the U.S. and Russian views.  Should 
negative or false results be obtained, then the measurement 
would be repeated.  If there is repeated failure in the 
measurements, a comment should placed in the inspection 
report to state the discrepancy. 
 
--------------------- 
TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS 
--------------------- 
 
20.  (S) Turning to Tridents in Containers, Mullins stated 
that the Treaty provided only one reason to request that a 
missile be removed from its container during a data update 
inspection and that is if, after viewing and measuring the 
missile within its container, inspectors still could not 
confirm type.  Mullins reminded the other Parties that the 
United States offered the Trident in Container demonstration 
and proposed a statement of policy to provide additional 
procedures addressing the inspecting Party's issues with 
Trident missile type confirmation, thereby eliminating the 
need to request the removal of a Trident missile from its 
container at each data update inspection.  Mullins also 
stated that the United States was confident that, in using 
the procedures outlined in the Statement of Policy, the 
inspecting Party would not have to request that any SLBMs be 
removed to confirm type.  However, in accordance with its 
proposed statement, the United States would not object, under 
the Statement of Policy, if the inspecting Party requested 
that one Trident missile per Treaty year be removed.  Mullins 
emphasized that the missile removal request would entail one 
SLBM per Treaty year total and not one per type.  Mullins 
stated that if the inspecting Party decided in the Treaty 
year that it could not confirm type and requested that 
another Trident missile be pulled, the missile would be 
removed.  That is the right of the inspecting Party under the 
Treaty, but it would cause the United States to question the 
effectiveness of its policy.  Mullins stated that a second 
request to remove any Trident SLBM in a Treaty year would 
cause the United States to conclude that the policy was not 
working, and it could cause the United States to terminate 
the policy.  Fedorchenko stated he understood, but hoped this 
was not a return to the Cold War. 
 
21.   (S) Fedorchenko stated that all negotiations thus far, 
with respect to Tridents in Containers, were conducted on the 
basis of the inspecting team having some doubt about its 
ability to confirm missile type.  Fedorchenko emphasized that 
the inspecting team has always tried to request a removal 
based on substantial concerns.  Fedorchenko said the Russian 
proposal consisted of a request to remove one missile of each 
type of Trident missile.  Trident I and Trident II are two 
different missiles with different reference aid material, 
which produced two different results at the demonstration in 
2000.  Mullins stated that the United States had no problem 
with the Russians exercising their Treaty right. The United 
States acknowledged this in writing within the U.S. proposal. 
 
22.  (S) Fedorchenko reminded the United States that it 
wanted to distinguish the difference between a "verification 
removal" (i.e., a removal pursuant to the Statement of 
Policy) from a request by inspectors to remove a Trident SLBM 
from its container in order to confirm type in accordance 
with Russia's Treaty right.  Fedorchenko also stated that 
each base has a quota of two data update inspections, which 
provided for a total of four opportunities to request a 
removal of a Trident from its container.  Fedorchenko also 
referred to JCIC-XXVII, Part I (REF C), noting that Russia 
clearly stated that the inspecting Party should be permitted 
to request removal of a missile one time a year and only at 
one submarine base per Treaty year.  But because Trident I 
missiles still exist in containers at Silverdale, Russia 
believed it had a right to request to pull one missile of 
each type (Trident I and Trident II) within the same Treaty 
year, if the inspectors requested this at Silverdale.  He 
further noted that there was another option and that was to 
wait until there were no longer any Trident I SLBMs in 
containers, to settle this issue.  Mullins stated that both 
sides understood each other's position and the United States 
would take Russia's comments under consideration for later 
discussion. 
 
------------------------ 
HOW MANY AND WHICH 
HATCHES WILL BE REMOVED? 
------------------------ 
 
23.  (S) Mullins stated the procedures provided for some 
hatches to already be removed from the containers prior to 
the commencement of the inspection.  Mullins pointed out the 
Russian proposal specifically stated which hatches would be 
removed ("at least one end hatch removed from each end of the 
liner or loading tube, respectively").  (Begin comment:  The 
Russian-proposed language is not consistent with current Navy 
procedures for removing hatches in advance.  End comment.) 
The United States believes the phrase, "some access hatches 
opened for the demonstration will already be removed to 
permit viewing of the unique features to confirm type," is a 
more suitable description of the procedure. Mullins explained 
that this statement was more accurate because sometimes an 
inspecting Party will find two different missile types with 
different hatches.  Also, the two different bases may not 
necessarily remove the same hatches.  Fedorchenko stated that 
they added the language to specify which hatches were to be 
removed in advance because of their observations during past 
inspections.  He stated the concern was that, if the 
Statement of Policy did not specify which hatches were 
removed, the Navy might not open any hatches.  Specification 
of hatches would allow some degree of confidence.  Mullins 
stated that he understood Fedorchenko's point. 
24.  (S) Mullins suggested that the Parties use the phrase, 
"The inspection team may, as it encounters missiles in liners 
or loading tubes during the course of the inspection, request 
the same access hatches removed for the June 2000 
demonstrations be removed from these liners or loading 
tubes."  (Begin comment:  The purpose of this statement is to 
ensure that as the containers are encountered, if, following 
the standard procedures of viewing and measuring, the 
inspection team is still unable to confirm the missile type, 
it may request the same access hatches removed for the 
demonstration be removed from these additional containers. 
End comment.)  Fedorchenko agreed to the proposal and stated 
that this is how the Russians have always understood it. 
 
25.  (S) Shevtsov said both proposals imply that each of the 
four Parties (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) 
request one removal per year allowing for a total of four 
potential removal requests.  Shevtsov suggested better 
language such as "joint inspecting Party" vice "name of 
Party."  Kottmyer stated that the United States also recently 
noticed the problem with that formulation and, if the United 
States proposes a new text, that problem would be remedied in 
the next version.  She thanked Ukraine for raising the issue. 
 
26.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- Ad-Referendum-to-Governments text for JCIC Joint 
Statement Number 39 "On First Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned 
Without Nozzles Attached," dated November 3, 2005. 
 
27.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Diehl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Lt Col Zoubek 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Il'in 
Col Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Col Osetrov 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
 
28.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley