US embassy cable - 05SOFIA1902

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2010 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, KCRM, IZ, BU 
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: PRESIDENT SIGNALS A MEK DECISION IS CLOSE 
 
REF: A. 04 SOFIA 0196 
     B. KOLEV-ABIZAID LETTER 01 NOV 05 
     C. SOFIA 1882 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a November 8 meeting with the Ambassador, 
President Parvanov mirrored the General Staff's 
forward-leaning position on Bulgaria's follow-on activities 
in Iraq, indicating the government is now leaning toward the 
MEK mission at Camp Ashraf.  He also expressed his optimism 
for a positive outcome on bilateral base negotiations and 
emphasized the importance of Bulgaria's fight against 
organized crime following the murder of prominent businessman 
Emil Kyulev.  The President reiterated a previous request 
(ref A) for U.S. help in obtaining information on allegations 
that Parvanov's Bulgarian Socialist Party benefited from 
corrupt oil deals with the government of Saddam Hussein. END 
SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) On Iraq, President Parvanov echoed the recent letter 
of General Staff Chief Kolev (ref B), referring to a 
Bulgarian follow-on mission at Camp Ashraf as if it were 
already a firm decision.  In a follow up discussion with the 
DCM, Deputy Foreign Minister Kyuchokov said the MFA and MOD 
will be sending a joint recommendation in favor of the MEK to 
the Council of Ministers.  They hope to have their final 
proposal ready for deliberation at the Council's Nov. 17 
meeting.  Both Kyuchokov and Parvanov indicated the proposed 
force size would be 100-120 troops.  Kyuchokov said the 
government is preparing for a negative public reaction to the 
decision, but hopes to mute this by emphasizing the 
humanitarian nature of the MEK mission and the reduced force 
size.  The Ambassador thanked Parvanov for Bulgaria's 
continued engagement with the USG throughout the planned 
withdrawal of their current battalion. 
 
3. (C) Parvanov also remained optimistic on the issue of 
joint basing negotiations, indicating that he expected all 
political forces in the country except one (a reference to 
the extreme nationalist party "Ataka") to ultimately support 
an agreement on U.S. forces in Bulgaria.  Ambassador Beyrle 
stressed the importance of reclaiming the basing issue from 
Ataka and highlighted Prime Minister Stanishev's recent 
positive statements on basing as an example of Bulgarian 
politicians shaping public opinion on the issue. 
 
4. (C) The President thanked the Ambassador for U.S. offers 
to assist in the murder investigation of banker Emil Kyulev 
(ref C).  He emphasized the GOB's seriousness on this issue 
and his satisfaction at international and inter-ministerial 
cooperation on the investigation.  The Ambassador restated 
the U.S.'s willingness to help, but also expressed concern at 
the investigation's slow pace and failure to collect basic 
pieces of evidence in a timely fashion.  He reminded 
President Parvanov that -- despite the GOB,s request for 
technical experts -- no evidence has yet been seized that 
would require the presence of these experts in Bulgaria.  The 
Ambassador noted that Bulgaria may again be losing an 
opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness in the fight 
against organized crime. 
 
5. (C) Further to the theme of national security, President 
Parvanov emphasized the threat of radical nationalism in 
Bulgaria as one that "we should not underestimate."  The 
President mentioned the success of the recently launched 
"Ataka" newspaper, which he claimed had reached a circulation 
of 40,000 in a matter of weeks, and raised concerns about 
Ataka's financial backers. 
 
6. (SBU) The President expressed great appreciation for the 
hospitality shown by President Bush and the First Lady during 
his recent White House visit.  Parvanov reserved special 
praise for the "meaningful, forceful, and clear" statements 
by President Bush on the Bulgarian nurses in Libya, and noted 
that the U.S. position had been welcomed by the Bulgarian 
public. 
 
7. (C) President Parvanov closed the meeting by repeating a 
"special request" previously made in 2004 (ref A).  In light 
of the "Petrolgate" scandal, Parvanov asked for U.S. help in 
obtaining information regarding ongoing allegations that his 
Bulgarian Socialist Party had profited from "oil for 
influence" deals with the Saddam Hussein regime.  Parvanov 
categorically denied that the BSP had received "a cent" from 
Saddam.  He emphasized that this request was not for public 
use, but merely for party leaders "to know for ourselves what 
this is about." 
 
8. (C) COMMENT: President Parvanov,s White House visit has 
been extremely successful in ensuring Bulgaria,s continuing 
cooperation on a number of high-profile issues.  The 
Government is clearly moving toward the MEK mission, although 
concern remains about public reaction.  We will continue to 
track the government's discussion, encouraging a positive 
decision and developing a public diplomacy strategy that 
minimizes negative public response.  END COMMENT 
BEYRLE