US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1854

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPKO, MOPS, CG 
SUBJECT: MONUC DIVISIONAL COMMANDER COMMENTS ON NORTH KIVU 
OPERATION 
 
REF: KIN 1814 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE.  REASON 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Ambassador hosted for lunch on Saturday, November 5 
MONUC,s eastern division commander, MG Patrick Cammaert. 
The Ambassador asked for Cammaert,s observations regarding 
the recently-launched FARDC/MONUC operation in North Kivu 
province targeting FDLR and Mai Mai elements in the Virunga 
area. 
 
2. (C) Cammaert reaffirmed that the operation represented a 
new element in the area.  The ostensible lead role of FARDC 
troops, the use of an integrated FARDC brigade, and a 
coordinated operation in North Kivu are all new and welcome 
developments in the Kivu provinces.  Responding to questions, 
Cammaert also affirmed that the operation has the support of 
North Kivu Governor Serufuli and FARDC 8th Military District 
Commander Amisi, also both important elements. (Comment: 
Amisi and Serufuli in essence represent rival centers of 
power in the province, with Serufuli in particular seeking to 
establish himself as the primary authority for the province. 
End comment).  Cammaert noted that the MONUC Indian brigade 
commander in North Kivu had played a key role to obtain a 
FARDC decision to move out of the operational area 
"unhelpful" non-integrated FARDC units that had been 
stationed there, including units associated with Serufuli,s 
former "self-defense" force who presumably still feel a 
primary loyalty to Serufuli rather than the FARDC chain of 
command.  Cammaert noted, however, that these units might 
return to the area as follow-on operations continue over a 
longer period of time, or expand their geographic scope.  The 
Ambassador asked if all the elements of the 5th Brigade, 
including ex-MLC, so-called ex-Government, and ex-RCD troops, 
were all fully participating and working reasonably well 
together.  Cammaert affirmed that to be the case. 
 
3. (C) While encouraged by the development, Cammaert also 
expressed caution.  He underscored that the FARDC brigade, 
having received additional training from MONUC in addition to 
that offered during the integration process, is a step above 
most FARDC units, but it still has severe limitations.  MONUC 
is obliged to lead much of the operational planning.  FARDC 
logistical support is all but non-existent, and as elsewhere 
MONUC is obliged to provide food, water, and other supplies 
to the FARDC troops, a function for which MONUC is not 
budgeted.  MONUC is also providing medevac and other 
services, all of which are frequently over the reserves or 
opposition of MONUC and DPKO administrators.  MONUC is also 
providing all air support and much if not all of the ground 
transportation being utilized for the troops.  Cammaert 
reported that the 5th Integrated Brigade seemed to be better 
equipped than the 3rd Integrated Brigade now being deployed 
to South Kivu, but basic equipment remains a problem.  (Note: 
Belgium is in the process of transferring large quantities of 
material to the DRC to equip the 3rd Integrated Brigade.  End 
note).  Salary payments to the FARDC troops involved in this 
operation, as elsewhere, is another major problem. 
 
4. (C) Contrary to initial information, Cammaert also 
confirmed that some FDLR combatants had been killed by FARDC 
troops in early action in Virunga Park.  He did not have a 
figure, but believed the FDLR casualties to be relatively 
small.  The FDLR combatants killed were in addition to the 
Mai Mai killed in nearby operations to free Election 
Commission personnel that were being held.  The Ambassador 
noted that FDLR troops in South Kivu to-date had avoided open 
confrontation with FARDC/MONUC forces operating in 
combination.   Cammaert speculated that the FDLR in question 
had been caught by surprise and therefore chose to resist, 
acknowledging that the FDLR normally chooses to retreat. 
 
5. (C) Cammaert also highlighted a problem with FDLR 
prisoners.  A group of FDLR prisoners captured the previous 
week in South Kivu had refused repatriation to Rwanda, and UN 
DDRRR personnel had therefore returned the prisoners to the 
FARDC.  FDLR prisoners caught in the North Kivu operation 
were being similarly transferred to DDRRR authorities, but if 
they too refused repatriation, they also presumably would be 
given back to the FARDC.   It is not clear what will happen 
over the long-term to these FDLR prisoners who refuse 
repatriation. 
 
6. (C) In northeastern DRC, Cammaert confirmed that MONUC 
companies and helicopter refueling facilities were being 
established at a working base in Aba to deal with any Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) troops returning to the area.  Cammaert 
said that he would welcome any information available, 
particularly if actionable, regarding potential LRA presence 
or operations in the DRC. 
MEECE