US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2407

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, PTER, MOPS, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: MAOISTS MENACE RURAL NEPAL 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2391 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Taking advantage of the Maoist unilateral cease-fire, 
the Ambassador traveled to Lumbini Zone in western Nepal 
October 24 and 25 to discuss the current situation with local 
government officials, human rights activists, political party 
leaders and journalists.  All told the Ambassador of the 
continuing difficulties caused by the Maoist insurgency. 
Civil society representatives worried about the poor human 
rights situation and called on the King to reach out to the 
Parties to start a process toward peace.  Businessmen 
reported increased Maoist extortion demands, and local 
government officials admitted the limited capabilities of the 
current security forces.  RNA Brigadier General Rawal noted 
that trial "Peace and Development Committees" (PDCs) were 
successful in keeping Maoists out of villages, but 
acknowledged the PDCs had been strongly condemned by the 
international community for leading to vigilante violence, 
and could be subject to Maoist reprisals.  End summary. 
 
Human Rights Activists Urge Reconciliation, Parties Toe Line 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2. (C) In Tansen, Palpa District Headquarters, local human 
rights workers expressed concern about the deteriorating 
human rights situation.  They noted that there was no 
security force presence beyond the District Headquarters and 
lamented that it was impossible for local NGOs to work in 
rural areas without Maoist approval.  They stressed that the 
way to end the insurgency involved reconciliation of 
legitimate democratic forces, which in turn would pressure 
the Maoists to give up arms.  They called on the King to take 
the first step by reaching out to the political parties. 
Local political party leaders (NC, UML, United People's 
Front) repeated central party platforms in their meeting with 
the Ambassador.  Though they appeared less engaged and active 
than the human rights representatives, they claimed that 
during the cease-fire, parties had begun to venture into 
rural areas.  After the meeting, they called the Embassy to 
explain they had not been able to speak freely due to the 
presence of a plain clothes security official taking notes in 
the meeting. 
 
Businessmen Squeezed by Maoist Extortion and Government Taxes 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
3. (C) Chamber of Commerce representatives in Tansen said 
that Maoists had increased extortion demands recently.  The 
businessmen, who were involved in hotels, weaving, 
construction, and noodle and cigarette distribution, 
explained that in addition to paying the Maoists, they also 
continued paying government taxes.  This defacto double 
taxation severely strained their activities.  The insurgency 
had affected all of their businesses.  The poor security 
situation translated into fewer tourists, fewer hotel beds, 
and lower demand for woven shawls.  The curfews and inability 
to travel freely in rural areas hindered distributors and 
contractors.  All the businessmen feared that the Maoists 
were insincere in their attempt to work with political 
parties. 
 
Security Forces Confined to District Headquarters 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (C) The Tansen Chief District Officer, Laxman Kumar Thapa, 
admitted that security forces were not present outside the 
District Headquarters.  He commented that the cease-fire had 
allowed security forces to go into villages they had not 
patrolled for months, but cautioned that the Maoist 
cease-fire could end any time.  Chief District Judge Lekh 
Nath Sharma said he remained committed to the rule of law, 
but worried about the direction the country was taking.  He 
noted his criminal caseload was down, as Maoist coerced 
individuals into not using the government courts and the 
police had little time to pursue routine crimes.  RNA 
Brigadier General Narendra Bahadur Rawal, head of a brigade 
covering all six districts in the Lumbini Zone, noted that he 
had a total of 5,000 security forces under his unified 
command: 2,500 were RNA, 2,100 were police and 400 were armed 
police.  As he had to protect government buildings and 
people, he only had 300 troops free to deploy in an 
emergency.  He estimated that there were about 2,500 
insurgents in the area. (Note: The ratio of 2:1 security 
forces to insurgents is highly unfavorable when fighting an 
insurgency.  DATT notes a more preferred number is 8:1.  End 
note.) 
 
Peace and Development Committees 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Brigadier General Rawal told the Ambassador that there 
were three villages in his zone with trial "Peace and 
Development Committee" (PDC) programs.  He noted that such 
programs were based on U.S. military strategy of using 
village defense forces to fight counterinsurgencies.  The 
government had given 500,000 rupees (USD 7,140) to each PDC, 
along with some training, to fight insurgents.  Rawal 
asserted that the government did not provide any weapons.  He 
acknowledged that the trial program had received intense 
international criticism after the mid-February Kaplivastu 
incident in which "vigilante" violence against the Maoists 
resulted in numerous deaths.  Rawal opined that the PDCs were 
successful in  deterring Maoists from entering the villages 
in which they were present.  However, he feared that once the 
Maoists broke the cease-fire, the Maoists would target 
villages that had PDCs, as he was receiving reports of Maoist 
fighters coming down from the hills to areas near the PDC 
villages.  He therefore planned to increase patrols in those 
areas.  Rawal said that the RNA did not have any tactical 
link with the villagers and there was no system in place for 
them to call for reinforcements. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (C) Those in rural areas are feeling the effects of the 
Maoist insurgency more acutely than those in the Kathmandu 
valley.  Businessmen, civil society, and politicos alike are 
all being hurt by the insurgency and, at least in this part 
of Nepal, appear to view reconciliation between the Palace 
and the Parties as the best chance to bring peace. 
MORIARTY